Russia Must Choose: Ukraine or the Arctic

All empires expand and then eventually suffer from “overreach,” when their territorial ambitions exceed their military and economic capacity to sustain them. Faced with the potentially disastrous consequences of excessive appetites, smart empires withdraw, as did Rome from Emperor Trajan’s acquisitions in the Middle East. Ideologically blinded empires refuse to make painful choices and suffer defeat and possible collapse. Adolf Hitler should have known better than to invade the USSR. He paid the price for his folly by losing the war.

Putin’s Russia is no exception to this rule. It aspires to reestablish an empire while possessing a tiny economy compared to those of genuine superpowers such as the United States and China. It’s also trying to revive an empire by fielding an army battered by the Ukrainian armed forces and pursuing hegemony in the Arctic.

If Russia were smart, it would choose between its imperial ambitions in occupied Ukraine and Arctic development and opt for the latter as more cost-effective and realistic. Instead, Putin Russia is trying to expand in both areas, even as its personnel, equipment, and economic losses in Ukraine have become astronomical and far outweigh whatever material advantages occupying Ukraine might have. The mineral deposits in Ukraine are estimated to be in excess of the 26 trillion dollar range and particularly rich in critically needed titanium and lithium.

Russia did not count on the fierce Ukrainian resistance. It certainly did not expect that its invasion would lead to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, making all Arctic nations part of the Alliance. Additionally, no one expected the emerging geopolitical impact of the accelerated melting of the Arctic ice cap much earlier than previously predicted. That phenomenon will further undercut Russian dominance in the region.

The war has already forced Russia to transfer an elite brigade from the Arctic to the Ukrainian front, where it was promptly destroyed. Modernizing the Arctic’s infrastructure has also become more difficult economically and politically for Russia because of the war.  Now Russia must choose: to continue its war and possibly keep some of the occupied territory or cut its losses in Ukraine and concentrate on doing what it still can in the Arctic.

Because Putin Russia is driven not by rational self-interest, but by ideology, it is highly likely that it will refuse to make that choice, experience overreach, and suffer the destabilizing consequences thereof.

It’s in the West’s interest for Russia to engage in overreach and thereby become even weaker than it already is—especially as chronic weakness might lead it to consider abandoning its imperial ideology and geopolitical ambitions, if only for a while. But it’s also in the West’s interest for Ukraine to survive and thrive as a fully sovereign state that would form a key component of Euro Atlantic security.

Western policy should, therefore, have the following two components. First, the likelihood that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in 2030 will free the world from dependence on the Northern Sea Route and, thus, on Russia. But greater independence will depend on the West’s taking more active steps as to the needed Arctic infrastructure and appropriate defense policy. The ultimate goal of Western policy should be maximum Western energy independence in the Arctic on the one hand and the intensification of Russian expenditures on an Arctic race that Russia cannot win, but that could bankrupt it.

Preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine while promoting a strong and secure Ukraine is the other prong of Western policy toward Russia. Ukraine does not need U.S. boots on the ground. What it needs is continued and enhanced assistance that would enable it to stop Russia’s aggression and roll at least some of it back. By stopping Russia in Ukraine, the West and its ally, Ukraine, would promote Russia’s overreach and ultimate demise as a would-be empire, thereby ridding the world of the immediate and possibly long-term threat of Russian imperialism.

Tu-160. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

As a result of its own folly, Russia has become weaker not only militarily, but also economically, to the point that, were it smart, it would choose between attempting to grab part of Ukraine or accepting the much safer alternative of focusing on its Arctic. By restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and withdrawing its forces, a rational Russia could potentially succeed in developing its Arctic regions. Not only could Russia avoid further bloody losses and the dissolution of its internal empire, but it could mellow its pariah status by potentially negotiating some relief from sanctions.

Due to its war in Ukraine and the accelerated warming in the Arctic, Russia is too weak to operate effectively on both fronts. If the West takes appropriate action, Putin and company will choose between dominating Ukraine (a costly proposition at best)  or exploiting the natural resources in the Arctic (the smart thing to do)—but only if the Kremlin abandons the imperialist ideology that it’s favored for centuries and begins to act rationally, in accordance with its real, and not its imagined interests.

Such a major transformation, one that would go against centuries of imperialism, is unlikely. But the good news is that, if Putin Russia refrains from making this choice, it will continue to suffer from overreach and bring about its own demise.

About the Authors

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

Dr. Vitalij Garber is a former Assistant Secretary General of NATO (Defense Support/Defense Investment) and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (International Programs and Technology).