Canada’s Slow-Motion Tank Crisis Is Just Getting Started

Key Points and Summary – The Canadian Army is showing signs of a long-overdue renewal, but its Leopard 2 tank fleet is rolling toward an uncertain future.

-While the tanks are a concrete contribution to NATO’s deterrence against Russia, their relevance is being questioned as Canada’s strategic focus shifts toward Arctic sovereignty and the realities of modern warfare, where drones threaten heavy armor.

Leopard 2. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-With no clear grand strategy from Ottawa, the aging tank fleet remains in limbo—a powerful symbol not of strength, but of a nation’s “strategic drift” and indecision about its role on the world stage.

Canada’s Tanks Are in Limbo

Canada’s tanks are rolling toward an uncertain future.

The Leopard 2 fleet is still operational. A billion-dollar sustainment contract and a steady stream of upgrades are keeping it afloat for now.

Still, no one in Ottawa seems to be prepared to say what role, if any, heavy armor should play in the country’s defence beyond the next decade.

The fact of the matter is, the tank fleet is in limbo: not quite obsolete but also not yet moored to a coherent strategic vision for the future.

If Canada plans to continue as a NATO land power with serious commitments in Europe, or if it anticipates ground obligations in the Indo-Pacific, a next-generation main battle tank (MBT) will eventually be required.

If, however, Canada’s defence priorities become more focused on North American air defence, Arctic sovereignty and security, and maritime domain awareness of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, main battle tanks may well be a relic. And as the character of warfare itself changes, with drones and loitering munitions and unmanned ground systems, acquiring alternative forms of weaponry may even prove more prudent than maintaining a shrinking fleet of MBTs.

Until Ottawa articulates a real grand strategy, it can’t make a rational choice about tanks, and every Leopard that still clanks on in service is less a symbol of strength than of drift.

On the other hand, the case for keeping tanks rests on some familiar ground. In Europe, armor still matters. The squadron of fifteen Leopards Canada deployed to Latvia is a concrete contribution to NATO deterrence, a visible sign that Canada is prepared to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with its allies if Russia ever pushes westward. In such a context, main battle tanks remain indispensable. They can deliver shock. They can hold terrain. And they reassure allies in a way no other platform can.

If Canada intends to keep a meaningful presence in NATO’s front-line deterrence mission, it will need either to keep upgrading its Leopards or eventually to acquire a cutting-edge successor. Similarly, if Ottawa ever envisions ground commitments in the Indo-Pacific alongside the United States or other partners, tanks would also be relevant to high-intensity coalition warfare. In either of these contexts, getting out of the armored game would be a dangerous abdication.

But Canada’s geography and arguably more pressing national security interests point in a different direction. At home, the challenges are not continental land wars but Arctic sovereignty, maritime surveillance, and continental air defense. In these environments, heavy tanks are more liability than asset: they are both irrelevant to the mission and an expensive draw on a finite defense budget.

Early warning infrastructure, patrol aircraft, anti-ballistic missile systems, under-ice submarines, ice-capable surface vessels, satellites, and mobile light forces are far more relevant. In this context, pouring scarce resources into maintaining a small tank fleet risks crowding out investments in the very capabilities that could defend Canada’s High North and North America as a whole. If Arctic sovereignty, maritime security, and continental defense truly are the future priorities – and if these priorities are ultimately articulated in a coherent grand strategy – Ottawa might reasonably conclude that there is no place for main battle tanks at all.

Between these poles lies a third set of considerations – the evolving character of contemporary battlefields. The war in Ukraine has revealed both the persistence and the vulnerability of armor. Tanks remain indispensable in breaking through fortified lines and holding contested ground, but they are also increasingly exposed to precision drones and loitering munitions.

The image of hulking behemoths rolling into battle only to be destroyed by cheap quadcopters is now seared into the military imagination. Canada must ask whether doubling down on heavy armor in this environment is prudent, or whether resources should instead be allocated to alternatives, such as swarms of unmanned vehicles, precision long-range fires, resilient communications, and highly mobile light forces. These tools might not replace tanks entirely but could mitigate the need for Canada to bear the high costs of maintaining a whole heavy armored fleet on its own.

Currently, Ottawa is determined to buy time rather than make difficult strategic choices. The sustainment contract ensures the fleet remains serviceable. The 2A6M conversions provide an incremental upgrade, extending relevance into the mid-2030s.

The deployment to Latvia signals commitment without requiring deep modernization. All of this preserves optionality. Yet it also entrenches indecision. The Leopard 2s will continue to serve, but Canadians remain uncertain about whether these tanks are central to the nation’s defense strategy or simply relics maintained because no government wants to take the political risk of letting them go.

The choice, ultimately, depends on clarity of purpose. If Canada sees itself primarily as a NATO ally committed to deterring or opposing Russian aggression in Europe, then investing in a next-generation armored force makes sense.

If it believes its core responsibilities lie in the Arctic, North Pacific, and North Atlantic, where sea and air power predominate, then tanks are unnecessary. Suppose Ottawa wants to hedge against all contingencies.

In that case, a modest fleet of MBTs – sufficient for symbolic deployments and limited combat, but not for sustaining in war – may suffice, provided the government accepts the trade-offs this entails. Each path is coherent in its own way. What is incoherent is the current course of muddling through, sustaining an aging fleet without deciding why.

Canada’s tank force is thus not merely a military issue but a mirror of the country’s broader strategic drift. Tanks are expensive, manpower-intensive, and politically symbolic. Retaining them without a clear rationale drains resources from other capabilities. Abandoning them without explaining how Canada will meet alliance commitments risks credibility. The real problem is not the tanks themselves but the absence of a guiding concept that tells Canadians and allies alike what kind of military Canada intends to field in an era of multipolar rivalry, technological disruption, and Arctic awakening.

Tank Choices Must Be Made

The limbo can’t last forever. By the mid-2030s, the Leopards will be reaching the end of their life cycle. The bills for replacement or radical modernization will come due.

Allies will demand clarity about Canada’s role. Domestic realities – budgetary pressures, competing priorities, political winds – will force choices. When that moment arrives, Ottawa will either have a grand strategy that dictates the right answer or make another ad hoc decision shaped by inertia and expediency.

In that sense, the honest debate is not about tanks at all. It is about Canada’s identity as a strategic actor. Is it a NATO land power with obligations on Europe’s frontier?

A northern maritime and Arctic state investing in domain awareness and sovereignty? A Pacific partner preparing for contingencies in Asia? Or a middling hybrid, dabbling in each but excelling in none? Only once that question is answered can the tank issue be resolved rationally.

Canada’s Leopard 2s will continue to roll for another decade, but their future is borrowed time. The decision cannot be postponed indefinitely.

The country must either commit to tanks as a pillar of alliance warfare, declare them unnecessary for its primary missions, or pivot toward alternatives that better reflect the modern battlefield. Until Ottawa defines its grand strategy, the tank fleet will remain what it is today: a symbol not of strength or weakness, but of drift.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.

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