Columbia-Class: The U.S. Navy Is Building the Most Complex Submarine In Human History

Key Points and Summary – America’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is entering a dangerous squeeze. The Navy’s 12-boat Columbia-class program is slipping right as the Ohio-class SSBNs hit the limits of their already-stretched service lives.

-Supply-chain bottlenecks, labor shortages, and the strain of building Columbia and Virginia boats in parallel are pushing the first Columbia well past its ideal delivery window.

The guided missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) arrives in Souda Bay, Greece, May 21, 2013, for a scheduled port visit. The Florida was underway in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts. (U.S. Navy photo by Paul Farley/Released)

-To compensate, the Navy is eyeing yet more life extensions for some Ohios, driving up maintenance demands, dry-dock time, and operational risk.

-The result is a narrowing margin for continuous at-sea deterrent patrols—and a stark warning about how thin the U.S. submarine industrial base has become.

America’s Nuclear Deterrent Has a Columbia-Class Problem

America’s nuclear deterrent depends heavily on its sea-based assets – specifically, its ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs).

The Navy’s next-generation Columbia-class SSBNs are a crucial part of protecting this deterrent and ensuring it remains effective for the long term.

They’re designed to replace the aging Ohio-class boats and sustain continuous at-sea deterrence well into the 2030s and beyond.

However, the Columbia-class program – much like other next-generation programs in the Navy – is already reporting significant cost growth and schedule slippages.

And that’s happening while the Ohio-class fleet is reaching the end of its extended service life.

That overlap – slipping replacement scheduled and aging platforms still at sea – poses a significant strategic risk to the United States: it means a capability gap is on the horizon, affecting America’s submarine-based deterrent.

NAVAL BASE GUAM (April 23, 2025) – The guided-missile submarine USS Ohio (SSGN 726) transits Apra Harbor, Naval Base Guam, April 23, 2025. Ohio, homeported in Bangor, Washington, and assigned to Submarine Squadron 19, is conducting routine operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. U.S. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. James Caliva)

Could it get any worse?

The question now is: if the lead Columbia-class submarine is delayed any further, can the Navy safely continue relying on its Ohio-class boats, whose margins for further extension in terms of both lifespan and capabilities are becoming impossibly thin?

What Went Wrong with the Columbia-Class

The Columbia-class SSBN program is a top Navy priority, with plans underway to acquire 12 such submarines at a total procurement cost of around $130 billion.

Yet the lead boat is now estimated to be 12 to 18 months behind its initially planned delivery.

And there are cost overruns—big ones.

The Government Accountability Office says that the lead boat’s construction costs could be hundreds of millions of dollars more than the Navy estimated initially, and that the shipbuilder’s projected cost growth could well be overly optimistic.

Among the chief causes? Many things are well beyond the Navy’s control.

SOUDA BAY, Greece (Sept. 7, 2019) The Ohio-class cruise missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) arrives in Souda Bay, Greece, for a scheduled port visit, Sept. 7, 2019. NSA Souda Bay is an operational ashore base that enables U.S., allied, and partner nation forces to be where they are needed and when they are needed to ensure security and stability in Europe, Africa, and Southwest Asia. (Photo by Joel Diller/Released)

For example, supply-chain bottlenecks are leading to unavoidable delays, alongside workforce shortages.

Then there are the issues of construction complexity, quality control, and the sheer strain of building the Columbia-class while simultaneously pursuing other submarine programs like the Virginia-class.

The Navy expects a lot, but also requires a lot.

This isn’t simply a matter of the Navy failing to achieve its goals or complicating matters unnecessarily, but a symptom of industrial-base weaknesses that have been building for years.

The shipyards responsible for building these subs – Electric Boat and Newport News – are attempting to execute the most complex submarine program in human history while simultaneously sustaining Virginia-class attack submarine production. That’s a tall order.

Combined with supply chain instability and labor shortages, the result is a program that is only just inching towards its deadlines rather than ever actually meeting them.

And even modest delays matter here. The Navy’s entire replacement plan is based on a tight schedule, with the first Columbia entering service around 2031.

Slipping past that date is serious: it pushes the Navy into a period in which its strategic deterrent would rely on boats that were never intended to serve as long as they are now.

Ultimately, it all goes to prove that America’s submarine and ship industrial base is being stretched very thin indeed. Every time one program falls behind, so does another.

Ohio-class Is Out Of Time

While the Columbia program absorbs these delays, the Ohio-class submarines are being forced to work overtime. Commissioned between 1981 and 1997, the Ohios were initially built with a 30-year lifespan.

Through major life-extension programs, many of those subs have been pushed to 42 years in service.

That was intended to be their absolute ceiling – but now, the Navy is looking at additional extensions on as many as five boats, solely because the Columbia schedule leaves little other choice.

Those extensions technically solve the problem in the short term, but they also come with a suite of problems.

They result in rising maintenance demands, unpredictable repair requirements, reduced availability, and more.

Older submarines also spend more time in dry dock, require more parts that are increasingly difficult to procure, and often uncover new issues during maintenance and overhauls when they return. With that in mind, it’s frankly impossible to determine the actual cost these delays may carry.

This is why those delays matter. For a fleet tasked with guaranteeing continuous at-sea deterrent patrols, that unpredictability poses an operational risk to the United States and its Navy.

The SSBN force structure is designed around a certain number of boats being at sea at any one time, and as maintenance stretches, that becomes increasingly difficult.

The issue isn’t necessarily that if one boat fails, it’ll cause a gap, but if multiple aging boats require more extended maintenance periods at a moment when the new class isn’t arriving fast enough, and geopolitical issues become increasingly delicate.

The U.S. is now facing a tightening overlap between a submarine class that shouldn’t be at sea, and a replacement class that may not arrive on time. And the only solution – expanding America’s shipbuilding infrastructure and industrial base – can’t be facilitated quickly enough to solve it.

About the Author:

Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.

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