Key Points and Summary – While Iran’s parliament has voted to close the Strait of Hormuz, the nation’s ability to enforce a sustained blockade against the U.S. Navy and its regional allies is highly unlikely.
-Iran’s navy, while possessing a notable number of submarines and small attack craft, would be severely outmatched by the combined firepower of the US Fifth Fleet and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) navies.
-Historical precedent, specifically the decisive US victory in Operation Praying Mantis during the 1980s “Tanker War,” demonstrates that any Iranian attempt to mine or close the strait would be met with a swift and overwhelming military response.
Could Iran Really Close the Strait of Hormuz?
Its narrow size (a mere 21 miles across at one point) notwithstanding, the economic importance of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be understated, as it’s a transit point for around 25 percent of global seaborne oil shipments and about 20 percent of liquified natural gas flows. This vital waterway connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Arabian Sea.
The day after Operation Midnight Hammer—the devastating US air strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities—the Iranian parliament endorsed the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. If these words were to actually be put into action, it would presumably be manifested via mining operations. But beyond Iranian bluster, would this effort be successful in shutting down shipping in the Strait?
Short Answer
The short answer is “Hypothetically possible but highly unlikely,” unless Iran wants to incur even more physical and economic damage than it has already incurred via both their 12-day war with Israel as well as the US airstrikes. The Iranians could certainly inflict some damage and disruption within the Strait, somewhat akin to the damage and disruption that their Houthis proxies have inflicted in the Red Sea, but just as the Houthis didn’t cause a complete stoppage of Red Sea shipping.
Iranian Naval Capabilities
According to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (WDMMW), the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN; Nirū-yē Dəryâyi-yē Ərtēš-ē Žomhūri-yē Ēslâmi-yē Irân) has a total of 67 fleet units in its active naval inventory, ranking it 19th out of 40 national naval powers currently tracked by the website. The breakdown by vessel category is as follows:
–Submarines: 25; three Soviet-designed Kilo-class full-size diesel-electric boats, one Fateh-class coastal submarine, 20 Ghadir-class midget submarines, and one Nahang-class midget sub
–Frigates: 8; three 1971-vintage British-built Alvand-class ships (these were acquired back when the Shah was still in power and thereby still on friendly terms with the UK), five of the homegrown 2010-vintage Moudge-class
–Corvettes: 3; two Bayandorc-class and one Hamzeh-class
–Offshore Patrol Vessels: 21; 10 Kaman-class, five Sina-class, three Kaivan-class (which are 1956 vintage), three Parvin-class.
–Amphibious Assault Vessels: 10; four Hengam-class, four Karabala-class.
Regional Military Strength Available to Oppose an Iranian Blockage
As menacing as those IRIN weapons systems are, they pale in comparison to the aggregate firepower that can be brought to bear by the US military presence in the Middle East. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “In total, the United States has military facilities across at least nineteen sites—eight of them considered to be permanent by many regional analysts.”
A would-be military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would not only risk rekindling the wrath of US military might, but also that of America’s allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These oil-rich Sunni Muslim nations don’t exactly have a history of warm relations with the radical Shiite fundamentalist regime in Tehran. They wouldn’t take too kindly to their economic lifeblood being cut off. (Qatar’s more cozy relations with Iran are a different story.)
The Royal Saudi Navy has 28 active hulls in its fleet, including seven frigates, nine corvettes, and, perhaps most significantly, three British-designed Sandown-class countermine warfare ships. Meanwhile, the navies of the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain have 82, 113, and 35 vessels, respectively (including two Frankenthal-class minehunters possessed by the Emirati Navy). In a hypothetical regional war, a multinational coalition of these three nations’ naval assets, in tandem with the US, would almost certainly be too much for the IRIN to handle for an extended period of time.
Historical Precedent: Operation Earnest Will (1987-1988)
The last time Iran attempted to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, or at least come somewhat close to doing so, was during the Tanker War phase of their seven-year war against Iraq. As a result of Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy (with some assistance from the US Army and Air Force as well) initiated Operation Earnest Will from July 24, 1987, to September 26, 1988. Stemming from UN Security Council Resolution 598, it entailed the reflagging of Kuwaiti-owned oil tankers and placing them under US military protection.
Earnest Will was the largest naval convoy operation since World War II, and it resulted in several clashes between the US and Iran. Iran ended up paying a heavy price every time. To wit:
—Operation Prime Chance, September 21, 1987: A tandem of the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR; nicknamed the “Night Stalkers”), Navy SEALs, and Special Boat Teams captures and later scuttles the Iranian navy minelayer Iran Ajr. Five Iranian sailors are killed and 26 are taken prisoner. This event was also historically significant as the baptism of fire for the then-newly established US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
—Operation Nimble Archer, October 19 1987: In response to an Iranian Silkworm missile strike on the Kuwaiti tanker MV Sea Isle City, the destroyers USS Hoel (DDG-13), USS Leftwich (DD-984), USS Kidd (DDG-993), and USS John Young (DD-973) attack and destroy two Iranian oil platforms that were being used as command-and-control venues.
–Operation Praying Mantis, April 18, 1988: In its most extensive surface engagement against WWII, the US Navy launched a devastating attack upon Iranian naval assets in retaliation for a mine strike against the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58). As noted by the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), “It was the first, and so far only, time the US Navy has exchanged surface-to-surface missile fire with an enemy, and it resulted in the largest warship sunk by the US Navy since WWII. In the one-day operation, the US Navy destroyed two Iranian surveillance platforms, sank two of their ships, and severely damaged another. “At least 56 Iranians were killed in the engagement.
Ultimately, Iran was compelled to sign a ceasefire on July 18, 1988, and a permanent end to hostilities on August 20, 1988.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense Expert
Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor. He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU).
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