Key Points and Summary on China and Trump – While President Trump correctly identified China as America’s primary geopolitical challenge, his transactional “America First” foreign policy is a “profoundly self-destructive” mistake that undermines the very alliances needed to compete.
-By treating key partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia as economic adversaries and hitting them with tariffs, the administration weakens the coalition essential for deterring Beijing.
-This approach, which views alliances as a burden rather than a strategic advantage, sows doubt about U.S. commitments and risks fracturing the security architecture that has maintained peace in the Indo-Pacific, ultimately playing into China’s hands.
Trump’s China Mistake Is Clear
New York Times columnist David Brooks once remarked that Donald Trump is the wrong answer to the right questions—a sentiment that captures the core challenge facing US policy in East Asia. Trump correctly identified the central geopolitical problem of our time: competing with and deterring an increasingly assertive China.
His 2017 National Security Strategy rightly prioritised this challenge.
But identifying the problem is only half the battle. The real test is developing a coherent strategy—one that integrates military, economic, political and technological cooperation with key allies and partners: Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
This is where Trump’s approach falls short.
Rather than viewing allies as indispensable partners in a long-term strategic competition, Trump sees them as economic adversaries exploiting the United States through ‘unfair’ trade practices. To be sure, there are valid trade issues that need addressing. But Trump’s blanket use of tariffs as a blunt instrument—particularly against allies—is the wrong tool at the wrong time.
Trump’s approach reflects a fundamental flaw: he views geopolitics through a transactional lens, akin to a series of real-estate deals. His calculus is short-term and zero-sum, overlooking the broader strategic imperatives of alliance management.
The reality is that the US’s true asymmetric advantage in its competition with China lies in its alliances and partnerships. Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are not merely regional players; they are crucial pillars of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. By alienating these allies and partners through punitive economic measures, Trump risks weakening the very coalitions Washington needs to counterbalance Beijing’s growing power.
These concerns extend beyond trade policy. Trump’s worldview treats alliances as conditional arrangements, contingent on financial contributions rather than shared strategic interests. His rhetoric—whether threatening to withdraw from NATO or questioning defence commitments to East Asia—has sown doubt among US partners.
The war in Ukraine has only amplified these anxieties. Should Trump curtail US support for Kyiv, it would send a dangerous signal to Indo-Pacific allies: that US security guarantees are unreliable, subject to the whims of a president who views allies as burdens rather than strategic assets. Such uncertainty plays directly into China’s hands, emboldening Beijing to press its advantage in the region.
Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal, forging closer ties with Russia. Kim Jong-un has made a strategic decision: nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of his regime’s survival. The US intelligence community concurs—Kim is unlikely to give up his nuclear capabilities, regardless of diplomatic overtures.
The most effective way to deter North Korea remains a robust military posture, developed in close coordination with Japan and South Korea. Yet Trump’s transactional approach to alliances undermines the trust and cooperation necessary for such deterrence to hold.
At the heart of the US’s strategy in East Asia must be a clear understanding that alliances are not a burden—they are the cornerstone of US power. Tariffs may punish allies in the short term, but they will weaken the US’s hand in the long run. By alienating Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Trump’s policies risk fracturing the very coalition that has kept peace in East Asia for decades.
In sum, Trump’s tariff war and broader transactional worldview risk eroding the very foundations of the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy. At a moment when regional stability hinges on US leadership, a weakened alliance network would play directly into China’s hands.
The US must not squander its greatest advantage: the collective strength of its allies and partners.
About the Author: Frank Rose
Frank Rose is the president of Chevalier Strategic Advisors. He is also the former principal deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and assistant secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance in the Biden Administration. This first appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist.
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Jim
July 10, 2025 at 6:58 pm
The way the tariffs have been dealt out has caused friction for sure.
Quickly, the issue is reciprocity and “mirror” tariffs with these more industrialized nations, which all have import barriers to one degree or the other.
We should match them… and look for unfair trading practices and instances of arbitrage (advanced economies have less opportunity for arbitrage)… generally, I think tariff negotiations should be low key for market stability with cool voices behind closed doors to not unduly ruffle feathers of friends & allies.
China has many unfair practices and malign actions and trade barriers… we have to pick through them.
China is a competitor for sure, but we shouldn’t make it an adversary, much less an enemy.
It would be reckless and heedless of the danger.
How to do that?
Take Taiwan off the table by acknowledging the One China policy with a hand-off date certain for China’s full assumption of sovereignty as long as the process remains peaceful which has always been our requirement.
In exchange, China relinquishes all claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea beyond their Exclusive Economic Zone as well as any claims in the East China Sea.
China is engaged in its greatest military arms buildup in the last 500 years… taking into account advanced technology, it maybe the greatest arms buildup in China’s 5,000 year history!
Xi explicitly states the military buildup is to retake Taiwan by force if necessary, although a peaceful process is much preferred… but Xi returns again and again to declaring force will be used to reunify Taiwan with China if it can’t be done peacefully.
I believe him… and he isn’t alone in China in this regard. Actually, most mainland Chinese want Taiwan to be reunified with China.
China has interior lines of defense & supply and close in position for taking Taiwan. The United States mainland is roughly 7,000 miles away.
The United States has had a One China policy uninterrupted since 1943 at the Cairo Conference where Chiang Kai-shek was China’s representative. And there at Cairo all participants agreed Taiwan (Formosa) was part of China and would be returned to China after Japan was defeated (who had conquered Formosa in the 1890’s from China)
The United States has never disavowed the One China policy.
You want to keep the United States and China from being on a collision course for a great war which engulfs the entire East Asian seaboard? Take Taiwan off the table.
Otherwise, it’s the U.S.S. Titanic sailing directly for the Taiwanese and China iceberg.
It shouldn’t be that way.