Against the backdrop of Hamas’ October 7th terrorist attacks in Israel, Hezbollah, a Hamas ally and IRGC affiliate, intervened to supplement pressure from Gazan militant groups. For the past ten months, the Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah engaged in low-level fighting in operations to enact deterrence. Still, since the end of the spring, the situation has changed drastically.
During heavy Israeli military clearing operations in Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Gaza City, consistent Hezbollah rocket, mortar, and anti-tank fire has become a major issue for Israel as military units and civilian contractors have suffered casualties in the northern sector. While an American-backed ceasefire mended by various Arab states looks to be a positively welcomed development, a mediation of fighting in the North will be much harder than the international community realizes.
Israel-Hezbollah Clashes on the Backdrop of October 7th
Knowing Hamas would come under major Israeli pressure and wrath for the October 7th attacks, Hezbollah supplemented and supported the group by intervening simultaneously—albeit with more low-level fighting compared to the Gazan militant group. Hezbollah’s goal was to divert IDF resources away from Gaza and focus on some of Southern Lebanon and Syria, where the Shiite paramilitary is heavily based.
Hamas and Hezbollah are both trained, armed, and funded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps. However, the latter is more directly tied to the Iranian Mullahs and has a constant corridor of weaponry, making the Lebanese militia far more deadly.
Neither Israel nor Hezbollah have committed their full arsenal to the fighting, but both parties have conducted major strikes against one another. Over the past ten months, the IDF has killed numerous top figures of Hezbollah’s shura council, Redwan special forces, and district commander. Likewise, Hezbollah was able to conduct major strikes on Israeli military facilities in the North.
Already allied with Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria since the early 90s, Hezbollah also has a major presence in the country, and Israel has conducted major strikes on weapons transfers to the Shia paramilitary not only since October 7th but the Syrian Civil War as well.
The Growing War for the Buffer Zone
Alongside a constant stream of Houthis attacks and a near Israeli-Iranian open war, Hezbollah realized these events from their allies were not enough to deter Israel from continuing its goal of complete eradication of Hezbollah. Therefore, the Shiite militia moved towards more symbolic victories at the behest of the Khomeinists—forcing an Israeli refugee crisis in the North.
Despite not committing the militia to full force, Hezbollah, for now, has enacted a major propaganda victory by displacing over 100,000 Israeli civilians from the North. Simultaneously, IDF retaliations at Hezbollah positions in Southern Lebanon have displaced tens of thousands of Lebanese as well.
Residents of Northern Israel, many of which are Druze, are becoming dissatisfied at the lack of government response, and the defense cabinet realizes Hezbollah has far more capabilities as an existential threat than Hamas, the Houthis, or even the IRGC could ever be to the state.
In lieu of continuous tit-for-tat strikes and the mass displacement of the North, the IDF war cabinet has pre-approved contingency plans of a potential military invasion of Southern Lebanon to push the Shiite militia beyond the Litani River and establish a security zone.
A war between Israel and Hezbollah is already ‘unthinkable’ due to both parties having capabilities that can set the Middle East on fire. In the event of all-out war, thousands of rockets from Lebanon and hundreds of airstrikes from Israel would take place daily, along with the factors of Cyprus, the UK, France, the US, Greece, and potentially Turkey all being involved due to the spillover of the Israeli-Hamas war.
Prior wars between Israel and Hezbollah saw the Shiite militias use their topography and rigid terrain of Southern Lebanon not only to cause problems from Israeli armor but also strike IDF brigades through unconventional and asymmetric warfare.
Israel would need to resort to precious air power, especially with its now combat tested F-35 air wings, to liquidate key launch sites and degrade Hezbollah rocket activity if war were to come.
Internal Turmoil in Lebanon and Israel May Keep the Fighting Ongoing Perpetually
Ongoing negotiations over a potential ceasefire are seeing more positive steps than a current cessation of fighting in the North for various reasons. Currently, both Israeli and Lebanese civilians do not feel comfortable returning to their homes in the current ‘no man’s land’ between Southern Lebanon and Northern Israel.
The Southern Lebanese, mostly Shiites, remain Hezbollah’s biggest supporters and power base. Southern Lebanon is also a haven for other pro-Iranian militias, such as Hamas and other various Palestinian factions located in the decades-old refugee camps.
Lebanon’s fragile central government does not have jurisdiction over the camps due to Hezbollah’s vast strength in the South, and the Lebanese army does not have the troop strength or heavy equipment to combat the terrorist group. While Hamas has full authority over all Gazan factions, Hezbollah can play mind games and disavow operations against Israel’s North by claiming it was other militant factions—continuously drawing the IDF into prolonged engagements.
Simultaneously, the United Nations-led peacekeeping mission has done little to nothing to enforce UN Resolution 1701, which calls for Hezbollah to disarm and disengage from the Litani River. Due to the lack of central authority in Lebanon and the UN’s inept actions, the IDF may be compelled to try to enact their own operation on their own terms as Hezbollah has grown too powerful to ignore anymore.
The attacks on Israel’s North are quietly causing political disputes as many of the northern residents will not support a future government if they do not feel safe to return. The recent attack on the Druze community of Majdal Shams may ultimately become the biggest red line that could ignite political turmoil in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv if not addressed decisively.
The Druze in Israel, Syria, and Lebanon are some of the biggest oppositions to Iranian influence in the Levant, and continuous rallies against Assad take place in the Druze-majority Suwayda government. The Israeli Druze will want revenge and could take out their kind of retaliation if the IDF does not respond.
Rocket fire on Majdal Shams could also ignite sectarian tensions in Lebanon as the Druze community in various countries remains close. In 2021, a Druze village beat and detained a Hezbollah rocket firing team when they launched projectiles into their town to use the Druze as human shields. The attack on Magdal Shams could also grow hatred towards Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The Bottom Line
For an all-out war or a major military operation to take place in the North, Israel would have to allocate most of their resources toward Lebanon and Syria. For this, the war cabinet will now be more reluctant to a ceasefire in Gaza compared to one with Hezbollah.
About the Author: Julian McBride
Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist, SOFREP contributor, and independent journalist born in New York. He reports and documents the plight of people around the world who are affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard. Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.” McBride is also a Contributing Editor to this publication.
