North Korea and South Korea are Shaping the Ukraine War (As in Weapons)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many of the global implications were obvious. Grain prices would rise because of transit and production disruptions in both countries. Gas and oil prices would increase because of sanctions against Russia. The global arms market would see a boost from the generalized sense of a return to mechanized, high-intensity warfare. All of these predictions would come true to a greater or lesser degree, but the details of the fallout have, in many ways, been unexpected. Indeed, very few would have expected North and South Korea, half a world away and without direct interests in the conflict, to have taken on such a prominent role in the war. Why has Korea taken center stage in the Russia-Ukraine War?

North Korean Arms Industry and Ukraine War

North Korea has long been in the global arms export market, specializing in two areas: low-cost, low-tech equipment for countries that can afford little else and relatively competitive ballistic missile technology. The North Korean defense industrial base, modeled on that of the Soviet Union, does not place a particularly significant emphasis on “efficiency” or “consumer feedback.”  It has historically produced vast amounts of relatively unsophisticated military equipment to be used by the DPRK’s colossal army and stored in massive stockpiles around the country.

This profile seems like a handicap, but as Russia’s war with Ukraine dragged on, Moscow found that vast stockpiles of old munitions and equipment were suddenly helpful and convenient, even when those stockpiles sat in North Korea. Who could imagine that Russia would need to lean on Pyongyang’s productive capacity to acquire decades’ old weapon systems? Such is the irony of great power politics.

Today, North Korea’s arms industry is working full-time on behalf of the Russian war effort. It has also stepped up the transfer of arms to other members of the “Axis of Resistance,” including Syria and Iran, as well as to non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East. In return, North Korea earns hard currency, technical assistance for its missile and nuclear programs, and a grudging degree of tolerance and respect. How long this respect will outlast the Russia-Ukraine War is a different question. The North Korean arms industry is pursuing a very thin (if very lucrative) slice of the market. When Russia no longer needs munitions, Pyongyang may find itself without a partner. Still, the performance of the arms trade is practice for the arms trade; North Korea is further developing the administrative expertise necessary to work effectively on the international stage. Indeed, North Korea may eventually find itself in competition with both of its patrons for a share of the export market.

South Korean Arms Industry

The foundations for massive growth in the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) arms industry were set more than a decade ago when Seoul purposefully combined an innovative, export-oriented tech economy with longstanding expertise in arms production. Since then, South Korea has worked hard to move itself outside the U.S. shadow, mainly by eliminating U.S. technology from some of the RoK’s most attractive exports. This has given the ROK a level of flexibility in contract and delivery that many Western countries do not enjoy. Moreover, due to its long-term rivalry with North Korea, South Korea has a robust and productive defense industrial base in place as many NATO countries continue to struggle to reverse decades of lethargy.

Thus far, South Korea’s involvement in the war has been less direct than North Korea’s. Seoul maintains a policy against transferring weapons directly into a conflict zone. South Korean artillery shells were part of a trade made by the United States to rush supplies to Kyiv, but direct exports of lethal equipment have yet to happen. South Korea is undoubtedly cautious about the prospect of crossing Russia or China before the U.S. election, which could bring about the return of President Donald Trump and a significant change in U.S. policy towards the Peninsula. Indeed, South Korea’s growing arms relationship with Poland, a centerpiece to its export strategy, has ruffled feathers in Moscow while at the same time offering a critical opportunity for growth. The shoe waiting to drop is a South Korean decision to export arms directly to Ukraine. South Korean weapons are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient to give Russia headaches at the front, an outcome that Moscow would very much like to avoid. Moscow’s dilemma is particularly complex because it needs to please North Korea while deterring (or reassuring) Seoul.

Still, the ROK’s biggest imprint will be seen after the war. As countries around the world seek to increase their defense budgets and acquire more equipment, Seoul is now well-positioned to seize an enduring advantage on the export market, as it can sell high-technology, high-quality equipment without the onerous export controls and end-use restrictions imposed by the US government. Indeed, South Korea’s political flexibility is undoubtedly an asset to US efforts to curb the spread of Russian and Chinese arms. With Russia likely to suffer under substantial sanctions for decades, South Korea can move into the space from which Russia is being evicted.

What Next: Korea and the Russia-Ukraine War

Ironically, the big changes wrought by the war upon North and South Korea are unlikely to transform the dynamics between them fundamentally. North Korea will become more of a member in good stead of the Axis of Resistance, with explicit patronage from Moscow and implicit patronage from Beijing. South Korea will assume a position as one of the most important arms producers in the Western world, at a time when defense budgets are likely to increase across the globe.

In other words, both will benefit mightily from the war, if to different degrees and extents. Still, the war’s end could lead to instability, especially for North Korea. Much depends on how rapidly the sanctions regime against Russia unravels.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.