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Ukraine War

Really Bad Idea: Ukraine Tried and Failed to ‘Invade’ Russia

Exercise Artemis Strike is a German-led tactical live fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece from Oct. 31-Nov. 09. Over 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen will be participating in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercise the rigors associated with force projection and educate operators on their air missile defense systems. The 10th Army Air Missile Defense Command will deploy, operate and fire live missiles within a tactical scenario, under Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe operational readiness evaluation criteria.
Exercise Artemis Strike is a German-led tactical live fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece from Oct. 31-Nov. 09. Over 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen will be participating in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercise the rigors associated with force projection and educate operators on their air missile defense systems. The 10th Army Air Missile Defense Command will deploy, operate and fire live missiles within a tactical scenario, under Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe operational readiness evaluation criteria.

Key Points – Ukraine’s surprise offensive into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024, while initially successful in boosting morale and seizing territory, is ultimately viewed as a costly gamble that failed to achieve lasting strategic advantages.

-The incursion aimed to disrupt Russian forces and create leverage for peace talks.

-However, Russia, reportedly reinforced by North Korean troops, launched a counterattack, eventually regaining control of most of the captured area by May 2025.

-The operation diverted crucial Ukrainian resources from other critical fronts like the Donbas and did not secure increased international aid, leaving a questionable impact on the war’s overall trajectory.

Was Ukraine’s Kursk Attack Worth It?

Last year, Ukraine was willing to roll the dice. Faced with a stalemate that pitted the Ukrainians and Russia in trenches ala World War One and both sides suffering from drone attacks where armor wasn’t effective, the home team desperately needed a win. There had to be somewhere on the frontlines where Russia was weak. Could there be a quick breakthrough that would destroy Russia’s will to fight?

Ukraine launched a surprise offensive in Kursk on August 6, 2024, and the attack was immediately successful. The frontlines in that area were filled with badly trained and poorly led Russian conscripts and reserve soldiers who were shocked at the ferocity of the advancing Ukrainians. It was like the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge in World War Two when the Nazis ran over the Americans with ease.

But the lightning strike soon abated, and the Russians stiffened their will. Then, they began to take back Kursk and finally regained control over most of the region this month. Was it all worth it? Let’s take a closer look to see whether Ukraine made the right decision.

Ukrainian Morale Needed a Boost

In terms of lifting morale, it was a correct move. Ukraine had become lethargic, lacking momentum. The soldiers were tired of fighting in the trenches. The Ukrainian public was growing increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress. Additionally, the international community, which had donated numerous arms systems, was growing restless. Could Ukraine win this war? There needed to be a spark, and the Kursk incursion provided what looked at first to be a decisive battle in the war. And it was working. According to Business Insider, “Russia lost 38,000 troops and more than 1,000 pieces of equipment in Kursk.”

Get Russia on the Back Foot

The Ukrainians believed they could capture and hold substantial territory. The Russians would redeploy soldiers from other parts of the frontline in the Donbas region, allowing another Ukrainian spearhead to ram through defenses and forcing the Russians to retreat in the north.

That didn’t happen, and Vladimir Putin’s forces adjusted and fought back well in Kursk. Soon, a counterattack pushed Ukraine back, and the incursion began to lose momentum.

It seemed like Ukraine had won a tactical victory with amazing surprise at first. Still, strategically, it did not provide the overall win that would have sent even more Ukrainian troops to victory.

It showed that executing an offensive in modern warfare is not as effective as playing defense. Reconnaissance drones can see the vector of attack before it happens. Soldiers can move quickly to defend the axis of the offensive maneuver. An attack can bog down even though an initial momentum burst can send the main effort of the assault to early territorial gains.

Creating an Advantage in Peace Negotiations

Another reason to attack Kursk was to create a larger buffer zone and take land that could have strengthened the Ukrainian hand for peace talks. Volodymyr Zelensky could have traded territory in an armistice and forced Russia to accept terms that were less favorable than before the Kursk incursion. Ukraine could also take a large number of prisoners as part of a potential prisoner swap later.

North Korea Enters the Fight

Overall, Ukraine was simply tired of playing defense and wanted to seize the initiative. But Russia had another answer in Kursk—reinforcements from an unlikely source—North Korea. Kim Jong Un sent thousands of soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a new alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang. These shock troops —numbering more than 10,000—sustained a high number of casualties, but they stopped the momentum. Russian troops sealed off roads that denied Ukraine the ability to reinforce and resupply its forces.

Russia, at the time of the Kursk incursion, was planning its offensive in Ukraine’s Sumy region. The friendly forces took a significant risk by going to Kursk, which allowed the bad guys to continue pressing ahead in Donetsk, especially in Pokrovsk and Kurakhove, creating momentum. At the same time, the Russian and North Korean troops turned the tide in Kursk.

Russia was not afraid to throw more troops into Kursk and play for a war of attrition in the region. We know that Putin is willing to incur a considerable amount of troop losses in defense, and this has shown his generals that the Kremlin is not going to panic. The situation appeared dire to Western military experts. Ukraine was able to take over approximately 500 square miles of territory and 100 villages, but by the beginning of 2025, Russia had regained about half of that territory.

This dashed the hopes that holding ground in Kursk would open the spigots for more international aid to Ukraine. The goal was to achieve a significant victory that would inspire the United States and NATO donors to believe in Ukraine’s potential to win the war outright.

I Would Have Said Don’t Do It

If I were commanding troops and advising Zelensky, I’m not sure I would have approved the Kursk incursion. It was too risky and had a limited upside. The end state was not clear. Was it to grab some territory to show the world that Ukraine was still strong? Was it to inspire troops in Donbas, where the stalemate was the worst so that Ukraine could make a similar attack in that area? Was it for bargaining power later? These questions were not answered before the attack on Kursk.

I would have saved the troops involved for a different mission – one that would have pushed the Russians back in Donbas, which was the decisive point for the entire war. Keep the powder dry and ready for another attack in a different location.

Kursk will be seen as a fleeting glimpse of success. It was a huge gamble, and it did not pay off. Now, Putin keeps fighting and sees no need for peace talks. He even claimed that Russia had won back all the territory in Kursk in May. Ukraine denied this, but psychologically, they could see the writing on the wall – failure in Kursk. The influx of military aid has dropped off. Ukraine could not hold the territory, and Russia even made a new ally in North Korea.

Kursk didn’t work out. Ukraine had to learn a difficult lesson about offensives that were not well thought through strategically or operationally. This was an initial tactical win and a morale boost for the home team, but it was not enough to teach Russia a decisive lesson that would lead to overall victory in the war.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

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Brent M. Eastwood
Written By

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

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