Russia Seeks a Knockout Blow in the Caucasus. Where is America?

Just over a week before the U.S. elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin may deliver a knockout blow to U.S. influence and prestige in the Caucasus and consolidate Moscow’s greatest control over the region since the downfall of the Soviet Union. U.S. distraction, if not neglect, may very well allow Russia to kneecap freedom and extend its diplomatic influence in a way unimaginable just a couple of years ago.

Its war in Afghanistan may have symbolized the Soviet Union’s imperial overstretch, but historians too often exaggerate its importance. Successive Soviet leaders hid that their economy could not keep pace with the West. Still, Ronald Reagan’s military buildup punctured the pretense that the U.S. and Soviet economies were equal, let alone that the Soviet’s command economy was superior. The real democracy movement began in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, however, as its overwhelmingly indigenous Armenian population petitioned to escape the Azerbaijani control opposed by Joseph Stalin decades earlier.

Each of the region’s three countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—have sought freedom and democracy. In each case, however, the Kremlin has worked not only to undermine their aspirations, but to punish them as well. After Abulfaz Elchibey, a Soviet dissident sought to pull Azerbaijan toward democracy, the Kremlin sponsored a military coup that ousted him and imposed Heydar Aliyev, a former Azerbaijan KGB chief and Soviet politburo member, to rule the country with an iron grip.

In 2004, it was Georgia’s turn. The “Rose Revolution” forced the resignation of former Soviet foreign minister-turned Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, and enabled democratic elections which young lawyer Mikheil Saakashvili overwhelmingly won. Putin viewed color revolutions as evidence of conspiracy rather than aspiration for freedom, and sought to nip them in the bud. To do this, in 2008, he ordered Chechen units backed by Russian forces to invade Georgia where they remain today, propping up the Russian-backed satrapies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The lesson Putin sought to convey is that support for democracy will lead to the dismantlement of the state.

Armenia soon showed that Russian actions were the rule rather than the exception. In 2018, Armenians staged a revolution to protest the re-election of an old-guard prime minister. After one month, Nikol Pashinyan, a journalist-turned-protest leader, became prime minister and sought to reorient Armenia toward democratic norms and the West. What intuition Pashinyan had for domestic politics did not extend to foreign relations; he repeatedly and bluntly poked the bear. When Azerbaijan launched a surprise attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020, a move about which Russia certainly had prior intelligence, Russian forces stood down. Putin believed that if he could humiliate Pashinyan with the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians would turn on him and his new pro-Western order.

It did not work. While Pashinyan remains unpopular in Yerevan, so do those from the pre-2018 era. Armenians crave change but have yet to coalesce around any other candidate. Soon, that may no longer matter.

On October 26, 2024, Georgians will head to the polls. At stake is Georgia’s freedom from Russia’s sphere of influence and that of Armenia. The ruling Georgian Dream Party, increasingly oriented to the Kremlin, seeks a fourth term. It increasingly seeks to intimidate the opposition, requiring non-governmental organizations that accept grants from abroad or advocate for a more pro-European outlook to register as foreign agents. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the pro-Russian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, behind Georgian Dream, has used the party to position Georgia closer to Russia. Georgia’s refusal to join anti-Russia sanctions in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led Russian money to flow into the country that was the birthplace and childhood home to Joseph Stalin.

Washington has largely ignored the door closing on Georgian democracy. The irony, however, is that the White House and State Department continue their last minute push to cement Armenia’s pivot away from the Russian sphere. Here, the compartmentalization of Washington bureaucrats and diplomats shows its dark side. Armenia is landlocked. Pashinyan may promise Secretary of State Antony Blinken or National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan what they want to hear but, absent any outside ability to access the country, Russia can simply strangle the country. The United States can airlift supplies to Armenia, depending on open airspace. With Turkey and Azerbaijan blockading the country, and the U.S. unable to access Armenia through Iran, Georgia was its only recourse for land supply. The Kremlin, however, understands its leverage and can block access at any time. Armenians are fatalistic. They prepare for the worst, expecting the Kremlin to starve Armenia into submission and punish what Putin perceives as its disloyalty.

The United States cannot waste time. Turkey’s blockade of Armenia is illegal under the 1921 Treaty of Kars. It has no border dispute with Armenia. Coercing Turkey to open its border is the only way to preserve Armenia’s democracy and checkmate Russia’s attempts to smother the flame of democracy burning from the Caucasus. Whether Biden or his foreign policy team has the foresight or willingness to coerce rather than cajole Turkey, though, is another question. To do nothing, however, is to surrender not only Georgia, but also Armenia. Biden’s current inaction could not be a bigger gift to Putin as the curtain closes on his administration.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For over a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The opinions and views expressed are his own.