The Russia-North Korea Military Pact Is a Big Problem

It’s deeply troubling to see Russia and North Korea upgrade their military relationship. Not because of an ambiguous promise that Moscow might come to Pyongyang’s aid during a conflict with the U.S. or South Korea. The danger, instead, is that President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang portends increased North Korean munitions shipments to assist Moscow’s brutal war against Ukraine – and that Russia may now be willing to provide even more sophisticated military technology assistance in return.

South Korea responded to the Putin-Kim summit by hinting it might begin sending lethal military aid directly to Ukraine. That elicited a Putin warning that doing so would be a “very big mistake” by South Korea and would influence Moscow’s decisions on what military technology it would provide to North Korea.

All of this is occurring during already heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang has been sending balloons laden with trash and excrement, and an inter-Korean military agreement designed to reduce the potential for inadvertent military clashes collapsed.

Putin and Kim Jong-un declared that they had signed a comprehensive partnership agreement that provides for “the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this document.” While this may conjure images of Russian or North Korea troops riding to the other’s rescue in battle, the reality is likely to be less dramatic.

The new pact stipulates that if either party falls into a state of war due to foreign armed aggression, the other shall immediately “provide military and other assistance by all means available.” However, the agreement falls short of a guarantee of automatic intervention, and Putin downplayed it as “defensive.”

The extent to which either country is actually willing to help the other remains uncertain. Nor did either leader specify the circumstances under which the new accord would be implemented or whether the assistance would be military forces, logistics supplies, or diplomatic or economic assistance.

North Korea will not be sending troops to augment forces in Ukraine. Whether Russia would ever send troops to assist North Korea during a conflict on the peninsula is a moot point since allied military plans are defensive and will only be implemented following a North Korean invasion or sufficient intelligence indications of an impending North Korean attack, particularly nuclear.

One danger is that Kim might feel emboldened by both his growing military prowess and perceived Russian backing to become even more dangerously provocative. However, if Kim initiated a major war, Russia — like China before it — might signal North Korea that its defense assurance did not apply.

The far greater and more immediate threat is what may have occurred behind closed doors in the form of new military deals on weapons and military technology flowing in both directions between Moscow and Pyongyang. The bilateral Russian-North Korean relationship now appears to be a more long-term strategic partnership than the short-term transactional relationship that it seemed during last year’s summit.

North Korea has sent massive cumulative shipments of four million artillery shells and dozens of short-range ballistic missiles. However, Putin has been coy about what he might provide militarily in return for North Korea’s military largesse. During both summits with Kim, including when the North Korean leader traveled to Russia last September, Putin spoke of possible military-technical cooperation without providing details.

Expert speculation has ranged from Russia providing conventional weapons technology to the crown jewels of nuclear warhead, reentry vehicle, and ICBM blueprints. However, the flow of Russian military technology to Pyongyang will be difficult to identify. Any future success in North Korean conventional, missile, or nuclear weapons may be attributed or misattributed to Russian assistance.

Putin’s trip to see Kim, if not exactly with hat in hand, still reflects a diminished Russia that is now more reliant on China for enhanced economic engagement to offset international sanctions and North Korea for basic military munitions. As such, Kim may be able to drive a harder bargain to attain his wish list of more advanced Russian weapons technology.

Diplomacy with North Korea is stalled and both Russia and China have become even more obstructionist in the UN Security Council than before, particularly in rejecting international attempts to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. That leaves stronger sanctions enforcement in conjunction with other economic and diplomatic pressure, along with enhanced deterrence and defense capabilities as the most viable course of action.

The Biden administration continues to implement timid incrementalism in enforcing U.S. laws and international sanctions, particularly in not sufficiently targeting Chinese and Russian entities violating UN resolutions. While trilateral U.S., Japanese, and South Korean military cooperation has flourished, still more needs to be done to garner and incorporate greater contributions from Indo-Pacific and European allies and partners to collectively address the growing Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military threats.

Responding effectively will require deft diplomatic coordination, enhanced military cooperation, and strategic thinking on how to augment U.S. forces that are under-manned, under-equipped, and with dangerously low levels of munitions.

About the Author: Bruce Klingner

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. He previously served 20 years with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea.