When it debuted, it was the world’s leading air superiority fighter. Dual-engined, with sleek lines and a robust radar-mitigation capability, the F-22 Raptor was the U.S. Air Force’s dream platform. Built to wrest control of the skies from Soviet aircraft, the stealth fighter was years ahead of its peers.
So why was the Raptor production line permanently closed down after less than 200 of them had been built?
U.S. Air Force Maj. Paul “Loco” Lopez, Air Combat Command F-22 Raptor Demonstation Team commander, flies the F-22 Raptor, demonstrating its combat capabilities at FIDAE (Feria Internacional del Aire y del Espacio) in Santiago, Chile, April 7, 2018. The Raptor is a multirole fighter capable of supporting both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions worldwide.
The shuttering of the F-22 Raptor production line was not attributable to any single factor, but is rather a reflection of a changed strategic environment in which the F-22 was not the right tool for the job, as well as a strong and ultimately successful congressional push to prevent the technologies that went into the Raptor from leaving the United States.
The Raptor was conceived of during the Cold War as a solution to both increasingly advanced Soviet fighter designs, which challenged the United States air superiority fighter at the time, the F-15, as well as sophisticated Soviet air defenses that threatened to negate the technological superiority then enjoyed by United States warplanes.
Stealth technology held great allure. Its proponents argued that it would allow American jets to fly through even highly contested aerial environments with near impunity.
In 2009, the threat that the Raptor had been built to stare down and defeat — massed formations of advanced Soviet fighter jets over Europe — had evaporated.
Instead, the United States was conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East against enemies that lacked the robust air defenses the Raptor’s designers expected it to face.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor fighter jet assigned to the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES), takes off for a mission at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Aug. 26, 2025. The 422nd TES is a geographically separated unit of the 53rd Test and Evaluation Group, Eglin AFB, Florida. (U.S. Air Force photo by William R. Lewis)
Dovetailing with that very different threat environment was the F-22’s lack of utility to ground troops.
Though it is still arguably the world’s preeminent air superiority fighter, it cannot provide robust and sustained ground support. Costs would also prove to be detrimental to the jet’s longevity.
Show Me the Money
At around 140 million dollars per jet, the F-22 is an extremely expensive plane to build.
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colo. – Two F-22 Raptors perform a flyover and air demonstration during noon meal formation at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo., April 12, 2023. Events such as these aim to cultivate warrior ethos, a future-focused mindset, and supplement existing character, leadership, and officer development efforts with the cadets. (U.S Air Force Photo by Trevor Cokley)
High maintenance and readiness costs were an issue. Had the U.S. Air Force purchased the 750 F-22 Raptors it originally intended to buy, unit cost would have declined significantly.
Instead, research and production costs were spread across a relatively small fleet, boosting the price tag of each jet.
In essence, the Raptor program was both highly expensive and inapplicable to fighting terror groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. In light of those constraints, it is perhaps more understandable that the program was truncated so severely.
In parallel to these developments, the Department of Defense was preparing to accept the F-35 Lightning II into service across the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.
One platform, available in three variants, was promised to keep overall program costs low while also giving each service a bespoke fighter jet to meet its unique needs.
Single-engined and less refined than the Raptor, the F-35 offered, on paper, a cost-effective solution and multirole capability, more akin to a Swiss Army Knife than the Raptor’s scalpel.
An F-35B Lightening II with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing out of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., stopped at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska en route to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Jan. 12, 2017. The VMFA-121 was the first operational F-35B squadron in the Marine Corps, with its relocation to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Iwakuni. The F-35B was developed to replace the Marine Corps’ F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier and EA- 6B Prowler. The Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL) sensor technology, and electronic warfare systems bring all of the access and lethality capabilities of a fifth-generation fighter, a modern bomber, and an adverse-weather, all-threat environment air support platform. U.S Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt. Mike Campbell. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK, UNITED STATES
A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II assigned to the 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, performs a strafing run during Haboob Havoc, April 24, 2024, over Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona. Haboob Havoc is a total force exercise that provides a way for pilots from various bases to demonstrate their skills across a diverse range of aircraft, including F-35 Lightning IIs, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, while also testing their abilities in different mission sets such as dogfighting and gun runs. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Mason Hargrove)
Some senior leadership acknowledged that the F-35 would be less capable than the Raptor for air superiority missions, but that the two jets could fight together and offer a high-low mix of capabilities that would serve American interests.
Congress ultimately sided with then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who argued that F-22s were not the right solution for an era of “small wars.” The Senate voted 58 to 40 to end F-22 production. Including test aircraft, a total of 195 Raptors were ultimately manufactured.
And with that decision, the aircraft’s industrial base withered dramatically.
Stop Means Stop
The Raptor production shutdown was not a pause; it was the dismantling of the F-22 production ecosystem.
Key supplies moved on to other projects and shut down their Raptor portfolios, and much of the tooling used to manufacture Raptor subsystems was mothballed, repurposed, or destroyed.
Despite perennial calls to restart production, doing so would be both prohibitively expensive and significantly more complex than pressing a start button at an aviation assembly facility.
As the United States Air Force prepares to accept their latest air superiority fighter, the F-47, a sixth-generation aircraft, restarting the Raptor production line would be counter to prevailing logic and arguably a significant detraction from the F-47 fighter.
The decision in 2009 to close production was, at the time, a significant strategic bet, and one that was, in that era, not illogical.
The premise that the United States would not face a near-peer air force and would not require a large number of cutting-edge air superiority fighters for Middle Eastern engagements was clear.
In today’s climate, however, the return to great-power competition has occurred. Instead of fighting Islamist insurgents, the specter of a grinding, high-end fight against China or Russia has emerged.
About the Author: Caleb Larson
Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.
