Key Points and Summary – The Navy’s decision to cancel most of the Constellation-class frigate program is more than a one-off embarrassment—it is an indictment of America’s surface shipbuilding system.
-A supposedly “low-risk” FREMM-based design was weighed down by U.S.-only requirements, ballooning weight, cost, and complexity while slashing commonality with the parent hull.
Constellation-Class Frigate U.S. Navy. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
-Workforce shortages and attrition at Fincantieri Marinette compounded delays, pushing the first ship years late and more than 50 percent over budget.
-Now the Navy is left with two expensive unicorn frigates and a widening gap in its future fleet.
-Unless Washington rebuilds the industrial base, U.S. sea power will keep eroding.
Constellation-Class Collapse Sums Up What’s Broken in U.S. Navy Warship Building
In a scene reminiscent of the film “Groundhog Day,” the U.S. Navy has canceled the Constellation-class frigate program, with only the first two ships, which are already under construction, scheduled for completion.
The program was terminated due to production delays, escalating costs, and design challenges stemming from adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. requirements. The funds from the canceled frigates will be reallocated to other ships that can be produced more quickly.
“We’re reshaping how we build and field the Fleet, working with industry to deliver warfighting advantage, beginning with a strategic shift away from the Constellation-class frigate program,” Navy Secretary John C. Phelan said in a post on X.
“The Navy and our industry partners have reached a comprehensive framework that terminates for the Navy’s convenience the last four ships of the class which have not begun construction,” he said.
“We greatly value the shipbuilders of Michigan and Wisconsin. While work continues on the first two ships, they remain under review as we navigate this strategic shift. Keeping this critical workforce employed and the yard viable for future Navy shipbuilding is of foremost concern,” he added.
Fincantieri stated the cancellation. “Fincantieri has been a committed partner, and the Navy values this partnership, our investment and together we want to deliver capabilities to warfighters rapidly, so we believe that the Navy will honor the agreed framework and channel work in sectors such as amphibious, icebreaking, and special missions into our system of shipyards, while they determine how we can support with new types of small surface combatants, both manned and unmanned, that they want to rapidly field. The key is to maximize the commitment and capabilities our system of shipyards represents.”
The Navy System of Surface Combatant Acquisition is Badly Broken
The Constellation-class frigate program was intended to be a “low-risk” approach, basically a slam-dunk to building a new frigate, but it underwent significant changes to its Italian FREMM-based design, making it heavier, more expensive, and less aligned with its original blueprints.
And like the Zumwalt-class destroyer, the ill-fated Littoral Combat Ship, and others, the entire process of trying to merge a design with the cost of building a ship has completely gone off the reservation.
(Dec. 8, 2016) The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) arrives at its new homeport in San Diego. Zumwalt, the Navy’s most technologically advanced surface ship, will now begin installation of combat systems, testing and evaluation and operation integration with the fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Emiline L. M. Senn/Released)
Ultimately, the Navy cancelled the last four ships, leaving only the two already under construction, stating the program was a poor value and was hindering other shipbuilding efforts.
Design Changes Doom Program
The program intended to use the FREMM frigate design as a base because it was a mature, successful, and already affordable program. Still, the Navy then heavily modified the design to meet U.S. survivability and sensor requirements.
This led to increased weight and costs. These modifications resulted in the ship being significantly heavier and pushed the projected cost per hull well above the initial estimate. The US design wasn’t even completed before the program was rushed into production, a red flag from the very start.
(Oct. 16, 2025) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Ignatius (DDG 117) renders honors to the USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), Oct. 16, 2025. Paul Ignatius is on a scheduled deployment in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations to support the warfighting effectiveness, lethality and readiness of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, and defend U.S., Allied and partner interests in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Bradley Wolff)
The lack of commonality was another significant issue. The final design had only about 15 percent commonality with the original FREMM design, contradicting the initial plan for a “low-risk” and efficient build. This raised the question of why the Navy had adopted the design in the first place.
Due to the redesign, weight growth reduced the speed of the Constellation frigates to below 25 knots, making it nearly impossible for the ships to operate comfortably in carrier battle groups and limiting the prospects for future modification.
Fincantieri Marinette Shipyard Workforce Issues
The Fincantieri Marinette shipyard workforce issues include shortages in skilled trades like welding and pipefitting, high employee turnover, and a significant number of retirements.
These problems have led to project delays, such as the Constellation-class frigate, and are part of a broader challenge across the U.S. shipbuilding industry. To address these issues, the shipyard and the Navy are using incentives like retention bonuses, investing in training and infrastructure, and exploring new hiring and partnership strategies.
Some specific workforce issues at the Marinette shipyard include a significant shortage of skilled workers in key areas, particularly welders and pipefitters, to meet production demands.
The shipyard has experienced “unprecedented poor workforce retention” and high attrition rates, making it challenging to maintain a stable, experienced workforce. A number of experienced workers have retired, creating a hard-to-fill skills gap.
The first of the class, the USS Constellation, is under construction in Marinette, Wisconsin, and was expected to be completed in 2026. Fincantieri Marinette Marine has invested $300 million in improvements to assist in production.
However, these problems pushed up the ship’s price by more than 50 percent and delayed its projected completion date by about 3 years.
Now the Navy will be stuck with two frigates that are unicorns, that are ill-suited to sail with the existing carrier groups, and overpriced. They will still have to be manned by sailors serving on a lame-duck platform.
(April 21, 2021) The Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) leads a formation including the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), USS Spruance (DDG 111), USS Pinckney (91), and USS Kidd (DDG 100), and the Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) during U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem (UxS IBP) 21, April 21. UxS IBP 21 integrates manned and unmanned capabilities into challenging operational scenarios to generate warfighting advantages. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Shannon Renfroe)
The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan is dependent on the shipbuilding industry to right itself and deliver new designs on time and on budget. Currently, that is a fallacy.
Canceling the Constellation-class is a major red flag over the US Navy’s eroding naval shipbuilding foundations. The challenge now is reviving the US shipbuilding industry with our allies to deliver warships at the speed today’s great-power competition demands.
Littoral Combat Ship. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
As part of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, complete modernization of shipyards would not be achieved until 2046. That is unacceptable.
The Korean Make American Shipbuilding Great Again program is a small step. The Trump administration had agreed to lower the reciprocal tariff from the proposed 25 percent to 15 percent in return for Korea’s $350 billion investments that are “owned and controlled by the United States.” Of the amount, $150 billion is earmarked for the shipbuilding industry.
The shipbuilding industry must be addressed, as it has reached a tipping point. The Navy’s backlog of ships requiring maintenance, along with the construction of new ships, is crippling the Navy’s ability to address all of our security concerns.
About the Author: Steve Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
