The U.S. Navy’s Constellation-Class Frigate Crisis Keeps Getting Worse

Key Points and Summary – The Constellation-class frigate was sold as the Navy’s antidote to the Littoral Combat Ship: a proven European hull, minimal changes, and a low-risk path to a capable small surface combatant.

-Instead, the design has grown heavier, more complex, and more expensive, with the lead ship already exceeding its weight margin before it is even built.

An artist rendering of the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. The design is based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate. A contract for ten ships was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation, Wisconsin (USA), on 30 April 2020.

-Schedule slips, rising costs, and industrial bottlenecks now plague a program meant to avoid exactly these problems.

-Rather than offering relief, Constellation has become a warning that without design discipline and a stronger industrial base, next-generation U.S. warship plans will keep faltering.

The Constellation-Class Disaster Should Serve As A Warning

When the U.S. Navy selected the Constellation-class frigate design in 2020, it was intended to be a clean break from the turbulence and controversy surrounding the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. After years of mechanical failures and premature retirements, the Navy needed a reliable small surface combat vessel that could perform real-world missions without excessive risk to an expensive platform. The answer, officials said, was to choose a proven European hull, add American sensors and weapons, and keep the design work as simple as possible.

The resulting design would be a low-risk, low-cost, and on-time frigate – everything that the LCS was not.

Littoral Combat Ship USS Cooperstown NSJ Photo Taken On October 14, 2025.

Littoral Combat Ship USS Cooperstown. Image Taken By National Security Journal October 14, 2025.

Littoral Combat Ship Deck Gun U.S. Navy. Image Taken by National Security Journal on October 14, 2025.

Four years later, that promise is now unraveling before our eyes. The Constellation-class is everything it shouldn’t be: it’s running overweight, its delivery time has slipped, and the projected costs have risen time and again. The program is experiencing all the same kinds of problems that it was designed to avoid, and those problems mirror those seen across the U.S. Navy’s wider shipbuilding portfolio.

Instead of providing some relief, the frigate program is revealing an inconvenient and problematic truth about the U.S. Navy: it continues to battle with design discipline, industrial-base limits and unrealistic timelines. Some of these problems are within the U.S. Navy’s control, but for the most part, they arguably aren’t.

So, can the Constellation-class still deliver what the Navy needs? Or will this become yet another example of how the U.S. Navy needs support to deliver on these mission-critical projects?

What the Constellation-Class Was Meant to Be

The Constellation-class is a product of the Navy’s FFG(X) competition, launched in 2017 to fill the capability gap left by the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.

The goal was to field a frigate capable of anti-submarine warfare, air defense, surface strike, and escort duties. A “jack of all trades” frigate.

The Navy intended the multi-role frigate to be stable and mature, opting to use a proven European hull rather than creating a new design. Shipbuilders proposing their designs were asked to base their proposals on a parent ship already in service.

Fincantieri Marinette Marine ultimately won the competition with a design based on Italy’s FREMM frigate, a hull that is widely praised for its reliability, acoustic quieting, and overall flexibility. The Navy believed the strategy was sound – they would adapt the European hull only where necessary and accelerate production.

The FREMM’s reputation made the project seem achievable, too. Italy and France already operate the class with relative ease, and the design offers a strong range, endurance, and anti-submarine credentials.

The planned U.S. variant would be customized to include modern American sensors and weapons tailored to the U.S. Navy’s needs. The frigate is set to include the AN.SPY-6(V)3 radar, a 32-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, and the Aegis-derived combat system.

It is also set to include a combined diesel-electric propulsion system designed to ensure efficiency and quiet operations.

It would be fully equipped to serve as a competent escort for carrier and amphibious groups, as a forward presence asset, and even as a node for anti-submarine warfare in contested regions.

Early enthusiasm for the project was high. The project was praised for moving away from building and using untested concepts.

It was precisely the shift the Navy needed to make after the LCS struggles – but as design work progressed, the Navy began making changes to the parent hull, incorporating a series of additional and new requirements, and revising their internal arrangements to boot. It meant that the program was no longer as simple as it was once intended to be.

With every revision, the Navy’s risk-reduction strategy began to evaporate.

Overweight, Late, and Over Budget

By 2023-2024, government watchdogs and Navy officials began to acknowledge significant programs in the program.

The first, and perhaps most worrisome, was weight growth. According to the Government Accountability Office, the lead ship, USS Constellation, has already exceeded its design weight margin, leaving little room for future modernization and additions.

Weight growth really matters. Not only does it make it more difficult to upgrade in the future, but it impacts the stability, range, and survivability of the current iteration of the vessel. A frigate expected to serve into the 2060s must not only avoid being overweight now, but must have the capacity to add new sensors, electronic warfare systems, and weapons into the future. Losing that space before the ship is even built is a serious red flag. But that’s where the project is.

Schedule delays have also started to mount.

The ship is years late, with Navy officials acknowledging significant schedule pressure caused by design changes – among other things.

While some poor decisions have contributed significantly to the delays, other, more institutional problems are more complex for the Navy to address: notably, workforce shortages and industrial-base strain.

Costs have risen, too. Navy budget documents show that procurement costs continue to trend upward as design instability ripples throughout the program. And while the Navy and Fincantieri reportedly disagree about the scale of those increases, every party involved recognizes that they exist.

In the end, the Constellation-class – whatever its future may be – should serve as a warning to both the U.S. Navy and the federal government: simplicity is key, and the nation’s ship-building infrastructure needs serious improvement.

About the Author:

Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.

More Military

Could America Have Lost the Revolutionary War?

The Marines Don’t Have Tanks Anymore

The Essex-Class Aircraft Carriers Have An Embarrassing Message for the U.S. Navy

‘New’ Mach 4 MiG-41 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Has Warning for U.S. Air Force

Boeing’s F-47 NGAD 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Is No ‘Mission Impossible’