Ukraine’s First F-16 Lost in Combat: What Went Wrong?

What You Need to Know: Ukraine’s newly acquired F-16s faced their first significant challenge as one of the jets was lost during an engagement against a massive Russian missile barrage on August 26.

-The aircraft, piloted by the experienced Colonel Oleksiy Mes, was one of the first six F-16AMs delivered to Ukraine. The loss highlights both the strategic value and the inherent risks of deploying these jets, particularly as Ukraine continues to train pilots under accelerated programs.

-While the incident raises concerns, it also demonstrates the F-16’s capability to intercept cruise missiles, a crucial role for Ukraine’s defense.

First Ukrainian F-16s Lost While Battling Russian Missile Onslaught: Ukraine’s General staff revealed on Thursday that it had lost one of its first six F-16AM jet fighter earlier that Monday (August 26) when it was scrambled to defend against a massive wave of 236 Russian drones and cruise and ballistic missiles. The loss comes less than one month after Ukrainian Prime Minister Zelensky unveiled the first F-16s finally deployed to Ukrainian soil after more than two years of lobbying.

The destruction of the recently acquired, hand-me-down jets surely stings, though falls well short of disaster as Ukraine is slated to acquire at least 70-90 more F-16s in the next few years. These afterall are first-generation F-16A and F-16B aircraft license-built in Europe by the 1980s, then upgraded in the 1990s—vitally the first new combat aircraft received by Ukraine’s Air Force since it was created in 1991, but not expensive, cutting-edge aircraft by 2020 standards.

Far more tragic is the loss of pilot Oleksiy Mes (callsign ‘Moonfish’) an experienced fighter pilot and formerly commander of a MiG-29 squadron in the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade, promoted to colonel posthumously.

Mes first trained alongside U.S. personnel, flying in the backseat of a visiting F-15D fighter of the California Air National Guard in 2019. Just three years later, in the summer of 2022, he testified before U.S. Congress with his friend Andriy Pilshchikov on the importance of transferring F-16s to Ukraine, and he was amongst the first Ukraine pilots qualified to fly one following training in the U.K.

It was alleged at Mes’s funeral that in his last flight, he shot down three cruise missiles and a drone, an impressive tally for a single sortie if accurate. Depending on how those missiles were targeted, he may have saved lives.

In addition to the personal tragedy, the loss is keenly felt by the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF), which has a handful of pilots qualified to fly F-16s and is currently on track to train just 12 new ones annually. Until something changes, Ukraine is far more constrained by the supply of pilots qualified to fly F-16s than by the F-16 airframes themselves.

Enemy Fire, Accident, or Friendly Fire?

The air defense role Ukraine’s F-16s are currently focusing on should have minimized (though not entirely eliminated) the risk of loss to Russian anti-aircraft weapons, as Russian fighters do not venture far over Ukrainian-controlled airspace due to the risks posed by Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses.

Still, Russia’s military could have attempted a long-distance attack using an R-37M very-long-range air-to-air missile or a ground-based S-400 system—both have a maximum range exceeding 200 miles. However, the launch of such powerful missiles can ordinarily be detected from afar.

F-16 Fighting Falcons from both the 35th and 80th Fighter Squadrons of the 8th Fighter Wing, as well as from the 466th Fighter Squadron of the 419th Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, demonstrate an elephant walk formation as they taxi down a runway during an exercise at Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea Dec. 2, 2011. The exercise showcased Kunsan AB aircrews’ capability to quickly and safely prepare an aircraft for a wartime mission. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Rasheen Douglas/Released)

A Ukrainian member of parliament (though not one in good standing) has claimed on social media that Moonfish’s F-16 was hit by one of Ukraine’s Patriot surface-to-air missile systems and that the government was covering it up. While the ‘friendly fire’ claim remains unverified, it’s unfortunately plausible.

Deconflicting ground-based air defenses so that they don’t mistakenly attack friendly aircraft assisting them is not easy. For example, during wars with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, U.S. Army Patriot units three times accidentally engaged their own or allied aircraft, resulting in deadly attacks that destroyed a British Tornado jets and a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet.

In the context of Ukraine, the risk of confusing low-flying aircraft chasing low-flying cruise missiles at subsonic speeds is evident.

Nonetheless, The Wall Street Journal reports it was believed to be an accident most likely caused by pilot error, an implacable source of attrition even for peacetime air forces. Notably, Mes’s friend Pilshchikov (callsign ‘Juice’) died a year earlier in a collision while training new pilots rather than in combat.

One possible contributing factor is that Ukraine’s F-16 pilots (and the many technicians trained to keep their fighters operational), underwent accelerated six-month crash courses to get them back into combat as soon as possible. That means they’re starting with less real flight experience on F-16s than the years of training typical to peacetime standards.

Furthermore, even experienced combat pilots are at greater risk of accidents when converting to new aircraft types. Combat stress can cause reversion to prior techniques/maneuvers that could be counterproductive with the new fighter.

The F-16, for example, is designed around a flight computer that stabilizes its highly maneuverable (and aerodynamically unstable) airframe. Recall that in the 2010s, two Boeing 737-800MAX jets were lost in deadly accidents due to pilots fighting against the ‘pull’ a new, unfamiliar flight control system Boeing failed to adequately warn them about.

Another earlier identified risk factor was that the rougher condition of Ukraine’s many satellite airfields (used extensively to confound Russian airbase attacks) might interact poorly with the F-16’s under-belly jet intake, possibly putting Ukraine’s F-16s at risk of sucking in debris that could damage or destroy the motor.

F-16 Fighting Falcons from the 35th and 80th Fighter Squadrons of the 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea; the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron of the 388th FW at Hill Air Force Base, Utah; the 55th EFS from the 20th FW at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C.; and from the 38th Fighter Group of the ROK Air Force, demonstrate an “Elephant Walk” as they taxi down a runway, during an exercise at Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea, March 2, 2012. The exercise showcased Kunsan Air Base aircrews’ capability to quickly and safely prepare an aircraft for a wartime mission. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

It was always inevitable Ukraine would eventually lose F-16s to accidents and combat alike—between the beginning of F-16 production in the 1970s through 2020, over 670 F-16s suffered hull-losses to accidents, or roughly 15% of the 4,600 built and counting.

It’s also unsurprising to see accidents occur when an Air Force brings a new jet into service it’s less familiar with. Nonetheless, it’s a blow to morale to lose an F-16 on the type’s first confirmed combat mission, particularly while the fleet remains so small. Russian propagandists and partisans will undoubtedly harp on the loss to argue the F-16s will be useless.

However, one can’t yet infer much about the future performance of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet from an early, individual accident—at least not until the current investigation narrows down the cause.

Ukraine’s F-16s, Slayer of Cruise Missiles

While Ukraine hopes to eventually leverage its F-16 fleet to use long-range missiles to imperil Russian warplanes and air defenses on the frontline, the new force has been dedicated to the relatively low-risk home air defense mission for now.

Jet fighters have been used to shoot down land-attack cruise missiles since their near-simultaneous operational debut in the summer of 1944: the UK’s first-ever jet fighter, the Meteor, was tasked almost exclusively with hunting Nazi V-1 ‘buzz bombs’ terror-bombing London. But due to interception and targeting challenges, various ground-based air defenses—both in World War II and today—remain the most important cruise missile defense.

Still, fighters can play a helpful role in locating and helping thin out cruise missiles further afield to reduce the risk of oversaturating ground-based defenses with too many targets. Israel, U.S., French, Saudi, and Jordanian fighters have all shot down Houthi cruise missiles in the last 10 months. Historically, some specialized Cold War interceptors like the F-14 Tomcat and MiG-31 were aimed equally at shooting down both enemy bombers and their cruise missiles should they be launched.

An F-16 Fighting Falcon approaches the boom of a KC-10 extender aircraft during an aerial refueling mission out of Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., Nov. 16, 2016. F-16 pilots train on aerial refueling operations to be prepared for longer mission requirements. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman James Hensley)

Particularly for Ukraine, the F-16AMs is armed with AN/APG-66(V)2 doppler radar—though no longer state-of-the-art, it’s more capable than radars on Ukraine’s 1980s-era Soviet fighters for filtering out noisy ground clutter while scanning downward for cruise missiles. Downward, that is, because cruise missiles often fly low to mask themselves against ground-based radars by interposing buildings, hills and mountains between them

The F-16’s AIM-120 missiles (which have their own miniature built-in active radar for terminal guidance) also likely is more capable for homing in on cruise missiles despite their small radar cross-sections.

Ukrainian officials claim air defenses downed 102 missiles and 99 drones out of the combined total of 236 launched by Russia’s military on September 26; the remaining 35 weapons reportedly killed seven, wounded 47, and inflicted more damage to Ukraine’s beleaguered energy infrastructure. There are reports, however, that nearly twice as many munitions were reported impacting targets in Ukraine, suggesting another 35 or so may have gone undetected.

Of the missile kills, Ukrainian F-16s supposedly accounted for four cruise missiles, presumably all but one by the fallen Oleksiy Mes.

About the Author: Sébastien Roblin