Why F-16 Fighters for Ukraine Really Do Matter

After months of pleading, Ukraine is finally getting F-16 fighter jets. The number and kind of missiles they’ll be equipped with are unclear. All military analysts agree they won’t be game-changers, at least not yet.

U.S. Air Force Nathalie Olarte, crew chief, launches an F-16 Fighting Falcon from an undisclosed location within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, Jan. 14, 2024. The F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. The U.S. Air Force’s expeditionary capability enables U.S. and coalition forces to rapidly establish credible, combat-ready forces within U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to proactively deter potential adversaries. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Alexander Cook)

The F-16 Fighter Matters for Ukraine

However, the military impact of the F-16s is only one part of the equation. The other, perhaps more important part, is the symbolism of the jets’ arrival in Ukraine.

After months of hemming and hawing, The West has finally decided to brave the shallow waters of the Rubicon and deliver the planes. That’s biggish for several reasons.

First, having broken its own self-imposed taboo on delivering advanced fighter jets, the West is now in the position of delivering more with far less of the angst that went into the first delivery. A few today means a few more tomorrow.

Yes, the drib-and-drab approach to weapons deliveries is wrongheaded and annoying insofar as it merely extends the war without offering a vision of a decisive end. But, that said, a few high-quality jets are better than none. So, one and a half cheers for the West’s willingness finally to abandon its pusillanimity.

Second, the F-16s are an important signal to the Kremlin and its Führer that the West has not given up on Ukraine and will not give up on Ukraine. Russia’s self-elected president hopes that “Ukraine fatigue” is setting in and that the West’s support will dwindle over time.

That may, of course, still happen, but for the time being and for the foreseeable future, the Kremlin must assume that the West’s support of Ukraine is more likely to increase than decrease.

Waiting things out is thus not an option for Putin, because even a Trump administration will be hard-pressed to do an about-face, stop all deliveries, and thereby get tarred for “losing” Ukraine immediately after being sworn in. So, three cheers for the West.

And third, the F-16s signal to Ukraine that the West still has its back. That’s important, especially to Ukraine’s soldiers and their loved ones. An army that thinks it’s been abandoned will be far more prone to be demoralized than an army with international support.

Ditto for Ukraine’s civilian population. Naturally, they’ll kvetch about the insufficiently large numbers of F-16s—and they’ll be right to do so. At the same time, they’ll be thrilled to know that, finally, the planes have arrived, that they are not alone, that the West cares—more or less. So, two and a half cheers for the West.

Having dared to cross the Rubicon once, the West is now ideally positioned to repeat this feat of derring-do. Permitting Ukraine to use Western weapons against Russian targets might be a good place to get one’s feet wet again.

About the Author: Dr. Alexander Motyl

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”