Will Iraq Take Over “Resistance”? Is Baghdad Ready? Israel’s strike on Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s long-time leader, left a void at the group’s top. While Hezbollah subsequently appointed Hashem Safieddine, a man who just weeks ago was not deemed important enough to wear a pager, his ability to fill Nasrallah’s smoldering shoes is doubtful.
Nasrallah’s loss impacts more than the Lebanese terror group, though. Since the January 3, 2020 drone strike on Iranian Qods Force General Qassem Soleimani, Nasrallah was the de facto leader of what Iran calls the resistance front.
Technically speaking, of course, Nasrallah sat outside the chain-of-command. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Qods Force Deputy Esmail Qaani to succeed his long-term boss. Qaani, however, had spent much of his career managing Afghanistan affairs. While Soleimani was charismatic and built a cult of personality around himself, Qaani lurked in the shadows. When I briefly shared a Baghdad guest house with Qaani, he largely sat by himself and even many Iranians ignored him. As a crafter of strategy, Soleimani might have been the valedictorian; Qaani at best was salutatorian of the summer school class. Among extremists and rejectionists across the Middle East, Nasrallah inherited Soleimani’s mantle, whether he held the title or not.
Expect the same dynamic now. Safieddine may call himself Hezbollah secretary-general, but terrorist leaders must win the respect of their followers; they do not automatically receive it. Among Arab rejectionists at least in the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” Safieddine is a nobody.
The same is not true for some of Iraq’s pro-Iran militia and terror leaders. Hadi al-Amiri, for example, runs the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-trained Badr Corps. He has American blood on his hands, and can claim to merit broader leadership. However, he is from an older generation, and his health now falters.
Two other Iraqis, however, may seek to step up. The first is 50-year-old Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Shi’ite paramilitary group known in the West for its continued attacks on U.S. forces. The second is Muqtada al-Sadr, surviving son of a prominent clerical family, who is also 50-years old. While Biden administration officials convince themselves that Sadr is actually antagonistic to Iran’s control over Iraq, they fundamentally misunderstand him. He conflict with Iran is not a dispute over Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor Ali Khamenei’s concept of clerical rule, but rather a dispute about whether he himself should be the supreme leader or defer to his Iranian counterparts.
After the elimination of Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden, the terror group appointed Egyptian dentist Ayman al-Zawahiri to succeed him. There was grumbling within Al Qaeda’s many regional groupings, however, and in rapid succession each sought to stage spectacular attacks to reclaim the mantle of leadership. The same dynamic will be at play after Nasrallah’s death, as all the tentacles of the Iranian-backed resistance seek promotion to the head of the octopus.
The question is whether Iraq is ready, for any involvement by Khazali or Sadr could do to Iraq what Hezbollah did to Lebanon: Repeatedly drag the country into war that sets back the economic development that most citizens sought. Alas, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani is already failing the test with his gratuitous defense of Nasrallah.
A generation of Iraqi leaders have acknowledged their militia problem and debated policies to co-opt or excise them in order to preserve Iraqi sovereignty without sparking a war that could bring the state crumbling down. Time is now running out. Sudani must decide: Will Iraq follow Lebanon’s disastrous path, or will it put its own sovereignty and development first?
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For over a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The opinions and views expressed are his own.
