Israel’s recent airstrike in Beirut has sparked concerns that war in Lebanon with Hezbollah may be brewing. In fact, war has been underway for some time, it is only a question of when and how it will escalate.
On Tuesday, Israel reportedly killed Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s most senior military commander, in a targeted airstrike in Beirut. The strike was retaliation for a rocket attack Saturday that killed 12 children on a soccer field in the Druze village of Majdal Shams in the Golan. The deaths were so gruesome that Hezbollah denied it had launched the attack, and indeed it was probably caused by a rocket that had gone tragically off course. But Israel said Hezbollah had crossed a “red line” and would pay a “heavy price,” which they now have.
Shukr was the most senior of around 200 Hezbollah commanders that have been eliminated since last fall. After Israel moved into Gaza against Hamas following the October 7th massacre, Hezbollah pledged to keep pressure on Israel’s north until the fighting ceased. In service of that goal, the Shi’ite militia has fired rockets, missiles, anti-tank guided munitions, and deployed advanced drones to harass the Jewish state. In response, Israel evacuated some 80,000 citizens from communities near its border with Lebanon, and beefed up both air and ground defenses. The Israeli Air Force has also conducted periodic airstrikes on selected Hezbollah commanders.
Nevertheless, the north of Israel is still far from safe. Before the missile attack on Saturday, Hezbollah had killed 13 civilians and 22 soldiers inside Israel. Israeli counterattacks, meanwhile, have reportedly killed more than 500 in Lebanon, including 90 civilians.
The situation cannot continue indefinitely. At some point, Israel will have to restore security in the north to allow its displaced citizens to return to their normal lives. But continued fighting in Gaza and international pressure against escalation make imposing peace complicated.
The scale of the Hezbollah threat is in some respects the result of negligence on the part of Israel and the international community. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Israel’s last incursion into Lebanon in 2006, was supposed to establish a durable framework for stability. It promised a ceasefire, disarming Hezbollah, demilitarizing Lebanon south of the Litani River and establishing stability to be monitored by UNIFIL. The ceasefire occurred and Israel withdrew, but Hezbollah remained armed, and no government, including Lebanon’s, was willing to enforce that key part of the resolution.
Over time, Hezbollah was able to build a massive presence in southern Lebanon in violation of Resolution 1701. A tense cold war developed in which Hezbollah and Israel traded occasional threats and low-level attacks. Hezbollah constructed numerous outposts along the remilitarized border, under the guise of forest fire control measures, and viewing these blockhouses became a staple of U.S. Congressional delegation visits and media tours to show the proximity of the threat.
As with Gaza and Hamas, Israel adopted a primarily defensive strategy vis-à-vis Hezbollah, using a forward troop presence, missile and drone defenses, and the occasional punitive strike to deter conflict. However, the limits of containment were demonstrated on October 7th, and Hezbollah forces are much larger and better equipped than those fielded by Hamas. So the current situation cannot persist without great risk to Israel.
There are precedents for cross-border ground operations. The 1982 invasion to clean out the PLO achieved many of its objectives, but also destabilized Lebanon and led to the creation of Hezbollah. The 2006 war achieved temporary stability, but was limited and seen as largely inconclusive, though UNSCR 1701 gave it a veneer of accomplishment.
A new war in Lebanon now would be even more difficult than 2006. Today, the Israelis would face a larger Hezbollah force, perhaps 100,000 strong, and a new type of battlefield. The war in Ukraine has shown the difficulties of contemporary maneuver warfare, given the availability of inexpensive, highly effective drones. An offensive into Lebanon that became quickly bogged down would create a political and diplomatic morass.
However, one key difference would be Israel’s expected air supremacy, which would enable the kind of precision deep strike missions that neither side in the Ukraine War has been able to mount. As well, the absence of significant Hamas drone activity in Gaza argues for the effectiveness of Israeli anti-done and -UAV technologies, which have been a focus of rapid development. This may free up Israeli maneuver forces to advance rapidly on Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River and finally enforce UNSCR 1701.
But what then? Leaving Hezbollah in place will not end the threat. And there will be strong international pressure to limit any such conflict. Indeed, the Biden administration would just as soon see nothing happen at all. The U.S. has been engaged in diplomatic efforts to calm the situation, and has warned Hezbollah that the White House cannot prevent Israel from crossing the border if the situation deteriorates. Taking out Fuad Shukr – as well as the same-day assassination in Iran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh – may be a signal to Hezbollah and the world at large that Israel is done with half-measures.
The potential U.S. role in the conflict remains to be seen. Should Israel cross the blue line into Lebanon, the principal role for the United States would be to serve as a check on an escalation of the conflict beyond southern Lebanon. Israel would require U.S. support for sustained operations, and to provide deterrence against other countries entering the fray. Iran and its client state, Syria, would no doubt seek to play an active role in helping to defend Hezbollah, and to otherwise create problems for the Israelis. Recent belligerent statements from Turkey also raise concerns that an incursion could result in a wider war. Here, the United States could play an important role by providing a credible deterrent in the form of an enhanced naval presence off the Lebanese coast, with the clear implication that U.S. assets would be brought to bear against any external power seeking to intervene on behalf of Hezbollah.
America may choose to take on a more direct role, too. Hezbollah is a listed foreign terrorist organization and thus within the scope of legal counter-terrorism operations. In fact, Fuad Shukr had been wanted for his role in the 1983 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut. The U.S. could likewise frame its actions as helping to enforce resolution 1701.
But any appearance of neutrality, indifference, or hostility toward Israel on Washington’s part would be read as a green light for external aggressors to escalate the conflict. It is therefore incumbent for the U.S. to make clear that it will back any reasonable operations on Israel’s part, including a ground component should that become necessary.
Ambiguity is what created the present problem in the first place. It will have no useful role in seeking to resolve it.
About the Author: James S. Robbins, Security Expert
James S. Robbins is a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and Dean of Academics at the Institute of World Politics.
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