Key Points and Summary – The Northrop YF-23 “Black Widow II,” a prototype stealth fighter, competed against the YF-22 in the U.S. Air Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter program.
-Despite being faster and potentially stealthier, the YF-23 ultimately lost.
-Four key reasons for its defeat: it was perceived as less maneuverable because it lacked thrust vectoring; its complex weapons bay was seen as a developmental risk; Northrop was considered a higher programmatic risk; and its conservative flight demonstrations failed to impress evaluators as much as Lockheed’s more dynamic showcase of the YF-22.
The YF-23 Black Widow II: 4 Reasons It Failed
The YF-23 Black Widow II was a prototype stealth fighter designed to compete in the U.S. Air Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program.
In fact, National Security Journal got up close and personal with this plane at the U.S. Air Force Museum on July 19-20, 2025, in an extended visit.
The fighter featured an unorthodox but advanced design that prioritized stealth and speed overall. In many areas, the YF-23 outclassed its competitor, the YF-22 (which later became the F-22 Raptor); however, the Air Force ended up choosing the YF-22 over the YF-23.
Four factors influenced the Air Force’s decision to reject the YF-23: it was less maneuverable, the design was less conventional, the aircraft was a greater logistical burden, and Northrop had a less effective public relations strategy.
Worse Maneuverability
One of the most critical shortcomings of the YF-23 was its inferior maneuverability compared to the YF-22. The YF-23 did not incorporate thrust vectoring, a technology that allows an aircraft to direct engine thrust in different directions to enhance agility. Instead, it relied solely on aerodynamic surfaces for control.
Although the YF-23’s V-tail and unstable airframe allowed for high-angle-of-attack performance, it could not match the YF-22’s ability to perform extreme post-stall maneuvers.
The YF-22’s thrust vectoring nozzles gave it a distinct advantage in close-range dogfighting scenarios, which were still considered important by the Air Combat Command at the time. Lockheed made a strategic decision to highlight this capability during flight demonstrations, showcasing high-G turns and missile launches that impressed evaluators. Northrop, on the other hand, chose not to emphasize such maneuvers during the demonstration phase, which may have led to the perception that the YF-23 was less agile and less capable in visual-range combat.
Issues With the Weapons Bay
Another major weakness of the YF-23 was its unconventional weapons bay design.
Unlike the YF-22, which featured a straightforward ventral bay and side bays for missiles, the YF-23 had a single, large weapons bay that extended from behind the cockpit into the fuselage between the widely spaced air intakes. While this design was intended to maximize stealth and internal payload capacity, it introduced developmental risks. The system was complex and would have been a pain to maintain and repair. This risk did not sit well with decision makers at the Air Force.
Moreover, the YF-23 never demonstrated a fully functional weapons bay during the competition, whereas the YF-22 successfully showcased missile launches and weapons bay operations. This difference reinforced the perception that the YF-22 was more mature and combat-ready.
Additionally, the YF-23’s weapons bay was less modular and adaptable than the F-22’s, which later evolved to carry a mix of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. This lack of flexibility may have contributed to doubts about the YF-23’s long-term viability as a multi-role fighter.
Logistical Burdens
A third significant weakness of the YF-23 was the perception of higher programmatic and industrial risk. While Northrop’s design was more radical and arguably more advanced, it was also seen as less conventional and potentially harder to manage.
The Air Force had greater confidence in Lockheed’s ability to deliver a production-ready aircraft on time and within budget. Lockheed’s team was also more effective in marketing and communication, tailoring their presentations to appeal to both technical and non-technical decision-makers.
They emphasized the YF-22’s reliability, demonstrated capabilities, and alignment with existing Air Force doctrine. Northrop, by contrast, focused heavily on technical superiority but failed to make a compelling case for operational readiness and program stability. This perception was further influenced by Northrop’s recent history with the B-2 bomber program, which had faced cost overruns and delays. The Air Force may have been hesitant to entrust another high-stakes project to a company already under scrutiny for program management issues.
Lackluster PR Strategy
The final major weakness of the YF-23 was its limited demonstration and public relations strategy during the ATF competition. While Lockheed staged dramatic flight tests that included high-G turns, missile launches, and thrust vectoring maneuvers, Northrop opted for a more conservative approach. This decision failed to generate the same level of excitement and confidence among Air Force evaluators.
Test pilot Paul Metz, who flew both aircraft, noted that the YF-23 was capable of matching the YF-22 in many respects, but Northrop did not seize the opportunity to prove it publicly. The absence of high-profile flight demonstrations and weapons tests created a perception that the YF-23 was less mature and less capable, even if that wasn’t technically true. In a competition where optics and impressions mattered as much as engineering, Northrop’s understated approach was a strategic error. Lockheed’s showmanship helped solidify the YF-22’s image as the more complete and combat-ready fighter, tipping the scales in its favor.
These are the four most significant issues that I believe led to the downfall of the YF-23. While it still outperformed the YF-22 in some key areas, its reliability issues, lower performance, and poor marketing ultimately led to its defeat in the ATF competition.
On the other hand, the YF-22 was a safer, more familiar, and more marketable choice for the Air Force. Many have speculated what would have happened had the YF-23 won the competition.
Unfortunately, the deed has been done, and the YF-23 is now history.
About the Author: Isaac Seitz
Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.
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megiddo
August 5, 2025 at 1:51 pm
The YF-22 was better suited for european and pacific skies. Not the YF-23.
The YF-23 was better suited for the freezing cold arctic skies. Or the northern lights.
Washington could have had made a simple straighforward decision to allow canada to build the f-23 under licence since both countries are part of the FVEY grouping.
But washington didn’t and couldn’t trust ottawa at all.
After all, canada for a long time has been experiencing undue high immigration from south asia and east asia.
NOT good. Not good at all.
FORGET THE f-23.