Key Points – The war in Ukraine is increasingly drawing comparisons to the two-decade US intervention in Afghanistan, with both conflicts characterized by massive financial commitments, heavy reliance of local forces on Western aid, and a descent into a seemingly unwinnable “grinding stalemate.”
-As Ukraine’s manpower is steadily drained and Russia’s attritional strategy persists despite its own heavy losses, concerns grow that the Western effort in Ukraine could end similarly to the “fiasco” in Afghanistan.
-A key long-term risk is that such an outcome could create deep, lasting skepticism among the American public toward any future foreign interventions, even those vital to US national security.
Is Ukraine Becoming the New Afghanistan for the West?
It has now been more than three years since NATO and the United States began providing military aid to Ukraine, starting in the weeks and months that preceded Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Since then, Western governments have sent Ukraine everything from artillery and missile systems to tanks, drones, and air defense platforms – much of it American.
According to the United Nations, more than 12,654 civilians have been killed in Ukraine since the war began, with the true figure likely being much higher, and substantially more Ukrainian soldiers have died on the front lines. Russian casualties are estimated to be approaching one million.
Then, there are the equipment losses, which have reached staggering heights. Ukraine has lost thousands of tanks and armored vehicles since the outbreak of the war, and its supply of both men and machines is being steadily drained. Meanwhile, the United States alone has committed over $175 billion in aid to Ukraine.
The New Forever War…
With the war becoming more expensive and seemingly unwinnable by the day, it’s hard not to draw comparisons to the United States’ disastrous effort in Afghanistan. It’s a comparison that has been made many times before, and a piece published in the New York Times this week just expanded on this idea, raising key questions at a point where Russia seems less likely than ever to agree to a deal negotiated by the United States.
In the piece, which is a transcript of a conversation between columnist David French and reporter Megan K. Stack, French describes two cycles of irrational optimism that have been replaced by “grim reality.”
Cycle number one, French argues, is the idea that Russia could invade Ukraine and end its independent existence in 72 hours. “That turned to ashes almost immediately,” French said.
Cycle two, he says, was the optimism of Ukraine and its Western supporters who believed that Ukraine could simply push the Russians out.
“But then the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 was a bloody failure,” French continues, adding that it now seems “we’re in this position where it looks like nobody has grounds for optimism.”
And he’s right. Russia might well be winning this war by most metrics, but at least in the short-to-medium-term, Ukraine will likely keep defending itself quite well using NATO equipment and military aid. Russian victory, while obviously possible, will not come quickly. It could well be years before the dynamics on the battlefield change so much that NATO is forced to reconsider its support, or something more dramatic happens.
How the Wars Compare
So, is Ukraine the new Afghanistan? In many ways, yes.
The United States’ military engagement in Afghanistan, which spanned two decades, resulted in an estimated expenditure of $2.313 trillion. U.S. investment encompassed everything from military operations and reconstruction efforts to support for Afghan security forces.
Despite the financial commitment, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remained heavily reliant on U.S. support. Between 2001 and 2020, the U.S. disbursed approximately $72.7 billion in military aid into Afghanistan, primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Money, however, wasn’t Afghanistan’s only problem. Afghan forces are estimated to have suffered around 66,000 fatalities during the conflict. Their effectiveness was further undermined by inadequate infrastructure and corruption, including the notorious “ghost soldiers” phenomenon, where commanders siphoned off salaries and supplies meant for nonexistent troops. Neither the Afghan government nor the U.S. had an accurate count of active personnel, making accountability nearly impossible. It’s eerily similar to claims of corruption in Ukraine, and reports that Western governments have no way of knowing how funds have been spent in Ukraine.
While Ukraine has proven far more competent in how it has used U.S. and NATO support so far, its military is growing weaker by the day, with the country’s most effective soldiers being constantly replaced with whoever they can get.
As of January 2025, 400,000 Ukrainian soldiers are believed to have been killed or injured in the conflict, with 35,000 missing. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed in January 2025 that his army had grown to 980,000 troops, huge numbers have already been lost and he only has a finite supply of healthy, relatively young and capable men he can send to the frontlines. And, of course, there is no hope of foreign troops fighting alongside Ukrainian soldiers without triggering a Third World War.
Putin, meanwhile, has more troops, more ammunition, and a total disregard for human life that allows Moscow to escalate as much as it believes possible. One million casualties of his own aren’t enough to make Putin rethink his obsession with winning this war.
Ukraine depends almost entirely on NATO support, save for its burgeoning domestic drone manufacturing operation. What, then, happens if President Donald Trump follows through on his suggestion that he may simply withdraw aid to Ukraine and let Europe decide its fate? When U.S. troops left Afghanistan – comparable to Trump withdrawing aid to Ukraine – its government collapsed almost instantly. Why, then, wouldn’t this happen in Ukraine, particularly after years of further fighting funded by Europe, which itself has finite resources and capacity to assist?
It’s unclear if Europe can actually sustain this war, let alone rebuild its own militaries to avoid what a recent study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) called a 25-year “window of vulnerability” to Russia if Trump follows through on his other suggestion that the U.S. might withdraw from NATO entirely. And, in this hypothetical scenario, if Europe can’t sustain this war then the West must grapple with the reality that, eventually, European leaders would be forced to make the same decision as Trump.
But beyond the increasingly obvious fact that the West is spending huge sums of money on a conflict that might produce similar results to the fiasco in Afghanistan, this war also risks Americans becoming so skeptical of foreign interventions – particularly those framed as moral imperatives, as the piece in The Times points out – that any future proposed interventions will be met with immediate skepticism or opposition.
Is Public Skepticism A Bad Thing?
If Ukraine does become the “new Afghanistan,” as I am inclined to believe it will, then our leaders must grapple with the obvious consequence that future interventions will be harder to justify to the American people. It might not be an issue for President Trump, but it will certainly be a problem for future presidents, and potentially the security and wellbeing of the United States in general.
But, let’s ask ourselves some tough questions here:
Are we concerned that Ukraine is becoming the new Afghanistan for the right reasons?
Or are those who believe this is true merely anxious about the fact future wars will become harder to justify?
And, is it really such a bad thing if the American people become increasingly skeptical of foreign intervention?
Let’s imagine that some time after the war in Ukraine, the U.S. government determines that a new foreign intervention is truly imperative for the safety of the American people or for specific American interests overseas. Will we, then, face a “boy who cried wolf” scenario in which even the most serious threat is hard to counter because of domestic opposition among voters and in Congress?
I’d argue that’s a possibility. But here’s another one: the American people might simply have a better idea of what foreign interventions are really justifiable. After witnessing decades of failure, voters will know what works, what doesn’t, and what matters don’t actually concern us. Perhaps.
I’ll admit that I do not have the answers. I don’t think anybody really does. But I do find myself, in comparing U.S. failure in Afghanistan and its support of Ukraine, pondering these questions. And, indeed, another important one:
Will it be easier for the United States to coexist with major global powers like Russia and China, and even do business with them, if A) Ukraine wins the war, B) loses the war, or C) ends the fighting as a result of a negotiated settlement?
It’s a question, I think, that Western leaders must now consider. America’s future, both in terms of the faith its people place in its government’s ability to intervene overseas and its position on the global stage, should be the primary factors in making decisions about Ukraine.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
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