Key Points and Summary – Canada faces a critical decision in its submarine renewal program, a choice that will define its Arctic sovereignty for a generation.
-The contest has come down to two finalists: the battle-tested German-Norwegian Type 212 and the technologically dazzling but unproven South Korean KSS-III.
KSS-III submarine from South Korea. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
-The German design offers a proven, ultra-quiet AIP system perfect for under-ice operations and seamless NATO interoperability.
-The South Korean submarine, while advanced, is a riskier, more complex platform optimized for a different mission set, making the German boat the only logical choice to meet Canada’s unique and demanding needs.
Canada Has a Big Submarine Call To Make
Canada’s submarine renewal program is the biggest naval procurement of this generation.
What hangs in the balance is not simply a fleet replacement, but the very credibility of Ottawa’s claim to be a serious Arctic power.
What Will Canada Pick?
For decades, we have limped along with the Victoria-class—aging, unreliable, and increasingly irrelevant in an era of intensifying great power competition.
Now, with Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government narrowing the field to two finalists, the choice is clear.
On one side is the German-Norwegian bid, based on the Type 212 platform, which is proven and battle-tested.
On the other hand, the South Korean KSS-III, a tempting but ultimately unproven option, is technologically dazzling but untested in the very environment Canada must master.
If we measure merit by more than glossy brochures and speculative capability, and consider proven fitness for Canada’s unique mission, then the German submarine is the only logical choice.
How to Make the Right Call
Let’s start with the basics.
Canada needs submarines that can operate year-round under the Arctic ice. That means platforms that can remain submerged for weeks without surfacing, generating almost no noise, and withstanding punishing cold.
The German-Norwegian Type 212CD design delivers on all of these criteria.
Its hydrogen fuel-cell air-independent propulsion system is not experimental but battle-tested, with German and Italian boats having already demonstrated the ability to remain silently submerged for up to three weeks without the need for snorkeling.
Type 212A. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology gives stealthy endurance denied to conventional diesel-electric boats, which must surface and snorkel every few days to recharge batteries.
This capability, already proven, is a prerequisite in the contested, murky northern waters we call home. Add to that the 212’s exceptionally low acoustic signature, a consequence of its nearly vibration-free propulsion and minimal thermal exhaust, and you have a submarine whose most significant strength is what adversaries will not be able to hear.
The South Korean KSS-III, by contrast, is a more complex prospect. In many ways it is formidable: a displacement of over 3,000 tons, fuel-cell AIP married to advanced lithium-ion batteries, and, most eye-catchingly, vertical launch tubes for submarine-launched ballistic or cruise missiles. It is the product of Seoul’s ambition to assert itself among the advanced naval powers of the world.
But its scale and design are optimized for a very different set of missions—deterring regional foes like North Korea and China in the more confined waters of Northeast Asia. Its vaunted vertical launch capability, for example, while impressive, is of little practical use to Canada. Ottawa has neither the doctrine nor the need for a submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet.
What Canada does need is not a Swiss army knife bristling with redundant options but a hyper-specialized under-ice sentry optimized for endurance, silence, and alliance interoperability.
In this sense, the KSS-III is a mismatch. The additional complexity of its systems, a layering together of lithium-ion power, AIP, and missile tubes, may make sense to South Korea, but for Canada it means greater integration risk, untested Arctic suitability, and, almost certainly, an escalation of maintenance burdens.
There is also the question of scale. At around 2,500 tons submerged, the German-Norwegian submarine is smaller and more agile in Arctic conditions. The KSS-III is significantly larger at over 3,300 tons, with a hull form less optimized for surfacing through ice and more likely to experience logistical headaches in the shallow approaches of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Support infrastructure must also be considered.
TKMS submarines are already in service with NATO navies, including those of Germany, Norway, and Italy. Canada would be plugging into an existing ecosystem of training, maintenance, and operating doctrine.
The KSS-III, by contrast, would leave Canada as an outlier, operating a bespoke system with little alliance interoperability. South Korea has never exported the KSS-III before. If Canada selects the KSS-III, it will effectively become the first foreign test case, absorbing the growing pains of integration into a fleet with no NATO pedigree.
None of this is to deny the technical merits of South Korea’s proposal. Its lithium-ion battery technology is cutting-edge, enabling faster charging and longer underwater endurance compared to older lead-acid batteries.
Its indigenous component base, over three-quarters sourced domestically, is a testament to remarkable industrial independence. And Hanwha Ocean has promised to sweeten its offer, not just with maintenance facilities but with co-production opportunities in Canada.
Why South Korea’s Submarines are A Bad Fit for Canada
However, all of these strengths cannot obscure the fundamental reality: the KSS-III is optimized for someone else’s war. Canada’s requirements are unique. Royal Canadian Navy submarines must be able to endure the ice, not fire ballistic missiles.
They must be able to patrol silently for weeks on end, not be bristling with multi-role payloads designed for entirely different theaters of operations. The German-Norwegian boat meets those requirements right now, without caveats, without leaps of faith.
One counter-argument that will inevitably be floated is that Canada should prioritize industrial benefits over technical merits. Hanwha’s offer, after all, promises billions in economic offsets, shiny new infrastructure, and no shortage of media-friendly spin.
But history should make us cautious. Ottawa has stumbled time and time again in the past when procurement became hostage to industrial nationalism rather than mission effectiveness.
The German offer, it should be noted, also offers significant domestic partnership, particularly with Seaspan and other Canadian shipyards, but it does so in the context of a proven design with a deep NATO pedigree. This Conservative government must ask itself: do we want a program that fuels headlines today but inevitably ends in another procurement debacle tomorrow, or do we want submarines that will actually be able to defend our sovereignty when it counts?
What Submarine to Choose?
Ultimately, this decision comes down not to some spreadsheet or industrial offsets. It comes down to Canada’s ability to patrol the last frontier of our sovereignty, the Arctic. The German-Norwegian submarines are not glamorous, but they are, at every level, reliable, silent, and proven. They fit the Royal Canadian Navy’s mission exactly.
The South Korean KSS-III may dazzle, but dazzlement is no substitute for strategic certainty. Canada cannot afford another procurement gamble. Our adversaries will not wait for us, nor will the ice yield to PowerPoint slides.
If sovereignty is more than an empty word, if it is the organizing principle for this government’s Arctic posture, then the choice is clear. Canada must select the German-Norwegian design. It is the only option that combines proven endurance, alliance interoperability, and Arctic readiness.
To select anything else is to roll the dice on complexity and novelty, to place blind faith that systems designed for another ocean can be bent to the requirements of our own.
That is not a strategy; it is wishful thinking. The test of Canadian seriousness is whether we see that difference. When the history of this era is written, it will not be judged by how many offsets Ottawa extracted or how many options dazzled on paper.
It will be judged by whether Canada’s submarines were there, standing silent vigil beneath the ice when sovereignty and security were on the line.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.
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Gabr
August 27, 2025 at 9:33 am
Just a small note for Andrew: The current Canadian government is not Conservative. We have a Liberal government at the moment. I’m interested in the economics of this. Do we have an idea about the operational cost for each boat?
Fred Scribner
August 27, 2025 at 12:03 pm
This sounds more like an advert for tkms. You say it’s proven when they have yet to build a single 212 CD like we’re looking at, and that the Korean boat is unproven while it’s already in service with the South Korean navy. Also our doctrine is apparently changing as our intent to purchase tomahawk land attack cruise missiles for the upcoming Fraser class destroyers proves.
Keven
August 27, 2025 at 1:19 pm
A bit incomplete and missleading in some regard. We are liberal for now as one reader said. Our doctrine regarding the north is evolving and we are buying land missile and the RCN is actively looking toward tgis launch capacity for the artic because of the added treat that is Russia. Unless it changed lately the Korean model is serving already and as been proven to be cheaper to run compare to the german submarine year on year maintenance. And the purchase prices were similar and tge delivery would also be faster with the Korean model. All in all yes they are both great option the reality is more of a neck a neck than a landslide win for the german. (My appologies english is not my first language or second lol)
Best regards.
Andrew Zador
August 27, 2025 at 1:33 pm
Dr.Latham’s credentials speak for themselves, and very relevant points have been raised regarding NATO compatibility, sub-arctic operation, maintenance questions, designed task, etc.
However, it cannot be ignored that multiple nuclear powers covet the Canadian sectors of the arctic, nor that this advice comes from Canada’s Southern neighbour – currently under the management of a regime repeatedly threatening its allies both economically, and militarily, nor that vast natural resources have prompted repeated thinly veiled threats of national absorption.
In light of the present situation, and with dwindling critical resources world-wide, advising that Canada should equip itself with submarines lacking the capacity to defend themselves and Canada with SLCMs, is analogous to handing our soldiers rifles incapable of firing ammunition. What useful purpose would such a toothless fleet serve? Who would benefit?
Joel W
August 27, 2025 at 2:41 pm
I recall we built a certain Avro air interceptor, but by the time it actually came close to production time, it became irrelevant.
We NEED a Swiss Army knife in terms of subs. All the military honchos and “advisors” are famously incompetent at predicting Canada’s needs in a decade or two.
Notknowing
August 27, 2025 at 3:50 pm
Being a G7 why can’t we build our own stuff with our own natural citizens?
It’s stupid going through other countries when we can handle this ourselves.
Ron Fischer
August 27, 2025 at 4:12 pm
While I agree that the German sub would be a great choice for the arctic, if indeed it has been produced and tested in the arctic, I can’t just stop there. The idea that SLBMs would be of no use to Canada or is unproven seems unfounded this is already in service in Korea. This article focuses entirely on the artic aspect of the requirement, and completely ignores the Atlantic and Pacific requirements. The KSS 3 might not be ideal for the Artic but it also needs to operate in the wide open Pacific, and the rough Atlantic, seems to me we need that Swiss Army knife not just an arctic scalpel. Lastly this article doesn’t touch on the 23 submarine backlog that TKMS has and that is before India just selected them. It may be a great submarine but if we don’t get the them all before 2060 that could be a big problem. Korea has indicated they can get our first sub by 2031 and one per year after that. Lastly the KSS 3 already has a fair bit of NATO gear, I imagine some more could be swapped out at need and coms great would be a must, lastly I expect like the K9 Canada would not be an outlier, already Poland is looking at the KSS3
Gene
August 27, 2025 at 5:12 pm
As pointed out in the article, much of the technology of the German boat is well proven as is its cold-water operability. However as the author also points out, the German boats,being smaller are optimized for more littoral and less trans-oceanic work, whereas Canada needs a 3-ocean transoceanic capable boat…and the Korean boats being larger offer that capability more so than the German boats. Everything else about the boats is pretty-much a wash. However, the Koreans are far more able to meet the required timelines and start getting us our boats at a much earlier and faster rate than the Germans for a better price and more technology transfer to Canada.
Kyle
August 27, 2025 at 5:31 pm
Your article is flawed and misleading.
1. The type 212cd is not proven…at all, it is being built. With a backlog of German and Norwegian navies already waiting. Your info pertaining to said sub is completely fabricated.
2. The KSS 3 is truly proven, with the longest submerged time of any new AIP combat sub (actually in service). Which exceeds the pre reqs for RCN.
3. Not our war? We currently have 5 Chinese icebreakers off the Alaskan coast. This world is far to small for this nonsensical rhetoric.
4. Poland doesn’t seem to have an issue with NATO interoperability. With them being the largest buyer of RSK weaponry. The KSS 3 is designed to integrate preferred systems flawlessly.
5. So in an ever changing and evolving combat landscape. All we need is is 2 torpedoes tubes and a prayer? got it. Anti air and land strike capabilities are not “redundant”. They are deterrents giving us sovereignty. Modernize or be left behind…..or conquered
6. South Korea is the only option that can effectively beat our timeline. Or we can take a number behind Germany and Norway and further extend our already bureaucratically heavy procurement process.
Next time you write an opinion piece try collecting proper data and info as opposed to a pay cheque from TKMS.
Ray
August 27, 2025 at 5:57 pm
So far only the South Koreans have said they will build the maintenance facilities here in Canada. As for missile capabilities it should be considered with Russia reopening and expanding Arctic bases.
eric
August 29, 2025 at 12:41 am
Your report is offset of the points and pro German. Not fair comparison and declined to German product. Report is not reliable from fair comparison at all.
Claude
August 29, 2025 at 6:55 pm
Nothing against the German solution per se, but it is a lot more strategically limited compared to the KSS-3. The KSS-3 offers so many more options for Canada to use a new fleet of submarines; the vertical launcher would provide us with a long range and versatile strike capability. And Korea has a very aggressive delivery schedule that fits our need with industrial offsets that would directly address our industrial shortcomnigs.
I’m sure the 212CD will be very good at the limited scope it is meant to address – Baltic Sea patrol. But the delivery schedule is not optimized for our needs and why would start a new fleet with operational and strategic limits?
Poland, Greece and other NATO nations have been offered the KSS-3
If we want to defend our nation sovereignty, we ought to have a credible deterrence; patrolling our shore is not enough.
Our partnership with Korea could open a new road towards economic diversity… If we do end up with the KSS-3, we will want to find something else from the EU, but the continent is struggling with production capacity.
Joel
August 30, 2025 at 1:11 pm
The German sub is a next generation sub design, specifically if you consider it’s hull design. It likely provides superior stealth when compared to the KSSIII. However, to fulfill Canada’s blue water requirement we would require the 212CDE a larger variant of the 212CD. We need a comprehensive tale of the tape between these two subs as there is much to consider.