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Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea

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A M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank in 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division fires at a prop target during a live fire exercise on Feb. 17, 2023 in Petrochori Training Area, Greece. American armored units along with Greek armored units spent the past couple days training force-on-force and other combat simulation exercises.

The complex nature of the North Korean regime and its potential collapse presents a unique challenge that cannot be addressed through conventional military strategies alone. The ROK/U.S. alliance must plan for the eventuality of North Korea’s destabilization by developing an irregular warfare (IW) campaign. Such planning may also be valuable in informing planning for a post-war situation as well.  This approach is crucial for ensuring regional stability, mitigating the potential for continued conflict, and facilitating the acceptable durable political arrangement (or end state) that will protect, sustain, and advance the interests of the ROK/U.S. Alliance.

Understanding Irregular Warfare in the North Korean Context

Most policymakers and strategists ignore irregular warfare in the context of North Korea, and some may argue the new definition of irregular warfare (as of 2023) does not apply to North Korea:

IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.

However, by delving deeper into Joint Publication 1, Warfighting an important paragraph provides the description for why IW applies in North Korea:

Asymmetric activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner when a gross disparity in relative comprehensive power causes the weaker party to resort to irregular methodologies (e.g., disinformation, terrorism, insurgency, resistance to occupation) to erode or exhaust their opponent’s power, influence, and will. However, a stronger party may target opponents asymmetrically when the risks and cost associated with a direct, symmetric approach are unacceptable.

Elements remaining in North Korea in post-collapse or post-conflict conditions are likely to resort to irregular warfare to resist occupation by South Korean and international forces. This is because IW emphasizes indirect and asymmetric approaches, utilizing a full range of military and other capabilities to erode an adversary’s power and influence. In the North Korean context, the collapse of the Kim Family Regime is likely to trigger a violent struggle involving remnants of the North Korean military, Communist Party elements, and a population indoctrinated with the regime’s ideology. They will likely fight each other, and they may fight any intervening forces.

The Potential for an Insurgency

The North Korean regime has inculcated a “guerrilla mindset” among its people, rooted in anti-foreign sentiment (deriving from anti-Japanese partisan warfare and of Kim Il Sung as a great guerrilla leader) and the glorification of self-reliance (Juche ideology). This indoctrination makes the North Korean population and military potentially hostile to external forces, including those from South Korea. A defeated North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and regime loyalists may choose to resist rather than surrender, potentially leading to an insurgency.

North Korea’s extensive asymmetric capabilities, including its large special operations forces, weapons of mass destruction, and illicit global networks, further complicate the situation. These capabilities could support an insurgency that is more complex and dangerous than those encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Therefore, the ROK/U.S. alliance must prepare for the possibility of irregular warfare emerging in the aftermath of regime collapse​ or war.

The Rationale for an Irregular Warfare Campaign

1. Countering Complex Threats: The nature of the threats posed by a post-collapse North Korea necessitates an irregular warfare approach. The possibility of an insurgency, the presence of WMDs, and the potential for rogue elements within the North Korean military to continue hostilities all underscore the need for a strategy that goes beyond conventional warfare.

2. Mitigating Regional Instability: North Korea’s collapse could lead to significant instability not only on the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia. The ROK/U.S. alliance must be prepared to manage the situation to prevent conflict spillover, control the flow of refugees, and secure WMDs to avoid regional destabilization.

3. Facilitating Peaceful Reunification: An effective irregular warfare campaign can pave the way for a more stable and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. By addressing the potential for an insurgency and ensuring the security and stability of the region, the ROK/U.S. alliance can create conditions more conducive to a unification that is peaceful and legitimate.

Components of an Irregular Warfare Campaign

1. Establishing a Clear End State: The ROK/U.S. alliance must define a clear end state to guide their irregular warfare strategy. A viable end state would be “a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.”

2. Influence Campaigns: An influence campaign targeting second-tier North Korean military leaders and the population is essential. This campaign should focus on persuading military commanders to maintain control of their units and refrain from engaging in insurgent activities. Simultaneously, efforts must be made to inform the North Korean population about the benefits of unification and reduce the decades-long indoctrination against external forces.

3. Maintaining the North Korean Military: To avoid the mistakes made in Iraq with the disbanding of the Iraqi military, the ROK/U.S. alliance should aim to keep the remnants of the North Korean military intact. As the only functioning institution in North Korea, it could play a role in maintaining internal stability and contributing to support and stabilization operations. Maintaining a functional military chain of command can also mitigate the risk of an insurgency by preventing soldiers from striking out on their own to support a resistance.

4. Developing Expertise and Coordination: The ROK/U.S. alliance must develop a dedicated cadre of North Korea experts who can plan and execute an irregular warfare campaign effectively. These experts should possess a deep understanding of North Korean culture, military structure, and potential irregular warfare and insurgent tactics. Their expertise will be crucial in formulating policies and strategies that are culturally informed and operationally effective.

5. International Coalition Building: Engaging with regional powers, especially China, is crucial for the success of an irregular warfare campaign. The ROK/U.S. alliance must find common ground with China to manage the regional implications of North Korea’s collapse and prevent potential conflicts. Building an international coalition can provide the necessary support and resources for a comprehensive irregular warfare campaign.  The existing United Nations Command could play a key role.

Challenges and Considerations

Implementing an irregular warfare campaign in North Korea to counter the likely resistance presents significant challenges. The alliance must navigate the complexities of a deeply indoctrinated population, the potential for Chinese intervention, and the risks associated with North Korea’s WMDs. However, the absence of such preparation could lead to greater instability and conflict, underscoring the necessity of this approach.

Conclusion

As Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote in their seminal work, Military Misfortune, all military failures result from a failure to learn, a failure to adapt, and a failure to anticipate.  The ROK/US Alliance continues to learn from conflicts around the world and is adapting appropriately.  However, it is imperative that it anticipate what might come next on the Korean peninsula. While deterrence must remain paramount and the ability to fight and win remains the supreme concern, the alliance must anticipate what may come next.  And it must plan and prepare now.

The collapse of the North Korean regime poses one of the most complex and dangerous challenges for the ROK/U.S. alliance, as do the likely post-conflict conditions. The potential for irregular warfare threats, including an insurgency and the use of asymmetric capabilities, requires a comprehensive irregular warfare strategy in addition to nuclear and conventional war plans. By preparing for the full range of these challenges now, particularly in the information domain, the ROK/U.S. alliance can mitigate the risks of regional destabilization and create a pathway toward a peaceful and stable unification of the Korean Peninsula. The development and implementation of an irregular warfare campaign are not just strategic imperatives but necessary steps in ensuring long-term peace and security in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, the alliance must keep its eye on the prize: a free and unified Korea or a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

David Maxwell
Written By

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

3 Comments

3 Comments

  1. Avatar

    RequestBeingVerified

    September 24, 2024 at 3:01 pm

    North Korea is like a doll (US likes dolls or likes playing with them) except it’s made of solid iron.

    Many in the west think (still do today in 2024) beijing has a grip on Pyongyang’s doll. Just point your middle digit and ask it to make a call.

    Nothing of that sort today.

    North Korea today is a bona fide nuke power just like that one in the middle east.

    Its nukes pose a real and present danger to everybody in its immediate vicinity, including the city of Beijing.

    Though not at all dangerous to USA, north Korea’s nukes still fully capable of reminding the immediate neighbors to always THINK TWICE before trying anything stupid.

  2. Avatar

    ronald hill

    September 26, 2024 at 12:22 pm

    The nuke capability of North Korea really makes the concept of irregular warfare quite ludicrous. Much of Maxwell’s hypothesis is unacceptable to the rational mind. Use of UN forces and engaging help from China, I find to be an excellent pipe dream. Also, the National Security Journal should really refrain from publishing articles simply because the author claims to be an authority.

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