How Trump Used ‘Coercive Diplomacy’ to Force Iran’s Hand

The United States, Israel, and Iran: The Time for Coercive Diplomacy – Notwithstanding the normal volatility of the Middle East, the rapid and fluid nature of events surrounding the rivalry between Iran and Israel over recent weeks has been head-spinning.

From calls for restraint to devastating military attacks and possible regime change to discussions about reconciliation and long-term peace and stability, one can be forgiven for being flummoxed about the current situation and what will happen next.

That said, prudence requires a deeper examination of recent events to provide context and inform the way ahead for the conflict and the region, in addition to assessing the implications for US national security interests and policies.

On June 17, 2025, United States President Donald Trump demanded the unconditional surrender of Iran after a wave of Israeli attacks and retaliatory Iranian missile strikes. The hardline comments, followed by US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21, were the first salvos in what could be renewed nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran and peace negotiations between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

Negotiations could be aided by a commitment to coercive diplomacy.

Deadline to a Deal with Iran

Mr. Trump has long held two distinct yet seemingly contradictory priorities regarding Iran. The first is a pledge not to get the United States involved in another war in the Middle East. The other is that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. His administration attempted to resolve this strategic conundrum by engaging in diplomacy and warning Iran to strike a nuclear deal within 60 days. Despite several direct negotiations, a nuclear accord was not reached ahead of the deadline. Moreover, he appeared skeptical that Iran was negotiating in good faith and reportedly sought to arrange a meeting between US and Iranian senior officials in Turkey.

Frustrated with the lack of progress and piggybacking off the ongoing Israeli strikes, Mr. Trump announced he would decide within two weeks whether the US would militarily intervene in the conflict. Two days later, he made the decision to strike Iran’s nuclear sites, and the United States now finds itself enmeshed in the conflict and its attendant risks and consequences while also creating an opportunity for diplomacy.

It was surprising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to initially strike the Iranian homeland during ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran over its nuclear capabilities—the US and Iran were scheduled for a sixth round of talks on June 16. But Netanyahu remained skeptical about Iran’s motives, while his calculus to press ahead with or without the United States was driven by “a sense of both opportunity and necessity” to stop an existential threat to Israel.

From a strategic perspective, the timing for any military strike was optimal, given Iran’s weakened geopolitical position. Israel’s offensive against Iran began with its war against Hamas in response to the October 7th attacks. The destruction of Hamas quickly led to the degradation of Lebanese Hezbollah, the decapitation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leadership, and the decimation of Iran’s air defense systems utilizing intelligence and covert action capability that had been in place for some time. These operational successes were aided strategically by the overthrow of the Asad Government and Russia’s focus on the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, leaving Iran isolated and vulnerable.

With the strikes targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear scientists, and facilities, and with the threat of additional attacks, Israel has begun the possible “end game” of an overall strategy to degrade Iran’s ability to obtain a nuclear weapon and target the Israeli homeland. That said, the Trump administration was initially cautious to fully weigh in on the matter. For example, the President’s trip to the Middle East in May was largely focused on striking economic deals with Gulf nations. Although he did meet with Syria’s President Ahmad al-Sharaa, diplomacy was not the primary focus, and he notably avoided visiting Israel.

In response to Israel’s initial attack against Iran’s nuclear and military sites, Secretary of State Marco Rubio distanced the United States by making it clear this was “unilateral action” and that Iran “should not target US interests or personnel.” Despite internal fissures—most notably a public break with Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard about the status of Iran’s nuclear program—Mr. Trump became increasingly enamored by the success of Israel’s weeklong attacks that dealt Tehran a series of consecutive blows to its nuclear program and military leadership.

Seizing upon Iran’s vulnerability created by Israel’s relentless airstrikes, President Trump made the bold decision to enter the fray. Whatever the strategic outcome, Operation Midnight Hammer was an impressive tactical and operational success, employing joint and multi-domain capabilities including some 125 aircraft, including B2 bombers with 14 GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs and submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles against nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan while achieving complete operational surprise and no losses. The latter was enabled by the Israeli Air Force’s systematic degradation of Iran’s air defenses.

Concerned about reprisals, the administration immediately sought to explain the scope and intentions of the US military operation. In a Meet the Press interview the next day, Vice President JD Vance emphasized that “We’re not at war with Iran. We’re at war with Iran’s nuclear program,” calling the strikes a “testament to the power of the American military.” Tehran may not appreciate the nuanced difference after seeing the damage in its homeland. In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that “Iran reserves all options to defend its sovereignty, interest, and people.”This statement underscores the validity of the maxim that the “enemy always gets a vote.”

The battle damage assessment will take some time to determine the extent of impairment to the Iranian nuclear program. For example, the status of Iran’s 400-kilogram enriched uranium stockpile is unknown at the time of this writing. During a Pentagon press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine said that “initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.” Despite this cautious assessment, President Trump subsequently claimed that Iran’s nuclear sites were “completely and fully obliterated.” While the program might be set back years, it is impossible to eliminate the knowledge and determination of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon.

The idea that Operation Midnight Hammer is a ‘one and done’ military operation (i.e., an attempt to ‘escalate in order to de-escalate) seems unlikely given the Iranian regime’s historic intransigence. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu reportedly sees regime change as an unstated goal of its military operations in Iran, and President Trump has also hinted at regime change that would significantly expand the scope of US involvement in the conflict and could produce an outcome worse than the status quo. Moreover, this line of hubristic thinking is reminiscent of the 2003 invasion of Iraq that mired the United States in a brutal counterinsurgency at great human and material cost. However, the coercive threat remains, and anticipating the possibility of regime change, Ayatollah Khamenei has reportedly made succession plans to ensure the continuity and survival of the regime.

Despite the ongoing strikes, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has continued to speak with the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in an attempt to end the conflict, with the desire to end uranium enrichment in Iran remaining the sticking point. But with the loss of numerous senior military commanders and the crippling of its proxy forces, Iran is becoming increasingly isolated and facing strategic defeat. And the longer the war continues, the greater the chance that the Islamic Republic could face a popular uprising.

All this presents an excellent opportunity for the Trump administration to utilize coercive diplomacy. Thomas Schelling introduced the idea of coercive diplomacy in 1966, arguing that a state uses coercion to influence an adversary’s will or incentive structure directly. By “hurting” the enemy, this creates inherent bargaining power. Subsequently, Alexander George concluded that the primary factors favoring the success of coercive diplomacy are “an asymmetry of motivation favoring the coercing state, a sense of time urgency on the part of the target, and the target’s fear of unacceptable escalation.” Israel, and it seems the United States, is motivated to end the Iranian nuclear program, while Iran is facing an unacceptable escalation and an uncertain future.

While significantly degraded, Iran does have an array of potential response options, including attacks against US bases in the region, closing the Strait of Hormuz with mines or other weaponry that would disrupt the global economy (approximately 20% of the world’s oil pass through this vital maritime chokepoint), attacking Gulf State energy infrastructure and commercial shipping in the region, conducting terror attacks against US citizens and interests around the world, and targeted cyberattacks.

On the other hand, Iran already has its hands full with Israel’s overt and covert actions and is not likely seeking a direct confrontation with the United States. Moreover, Tehran is not popular outside the so-called “Axis of Upheaval” (i.e., China, Russia, and North Korea), and even their immediate support has been tepid at best. Given the circumstances, the opportunity for a diplomatic solution may be now.

Iran’s initial response to Operation Midnight Hammer was a (telegraphed) missile strike against Qatar that was successfully repulsed with no casualties and limited damage. This largely symbolic act suggests Iran wants to control escalation while simultaneously signaling strength to its already battered and disgruntled domestic population. Iran’s actions also provide a face-saving off-ramp that President Trump embraced by declaring that since Iran has “gotten it all out of their system,” progress towards “peace and harmony” is possible in the region. To that end, he subsequently announced a “complete and total ceasefire” to end what he termed the “12-day war.”

Despite his confident declaration, much uncertainty lies ahead, and the risk of the United States being engaged in another Middle East conflict is certainly feasible. This is ironic, given Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s recent remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue that the Indo-Pacific is the department’s “priority theater.” On the other hand, seeing US tactical and operational military prowess and political resolve from the White House might deter China from invading Taiwan or advancing its regional ambitions. Moreover, continued escalation risks a wider regional conflict that threatens Beijing’s energy security interests. China can (and should) use its economic and political influence with Tehran to seek a negotiated settlement.

In a recent phone call after the US airstrikes, Mr. Trump said that Iran “should make peace immediately. They should stop immediately. Otherwise, they’ll get hit again.” Such coercive diplomacy, in addition to friendly persuasion by its few remaining partners, could prompt Tehran to reconsider its nuclear ambitions and resolve a longstanding security challenge without engaging in a regional conflict that would have global implications.

Parting Thoughts

In sum, President Trump’s gambit might succeed, especially in the short term. The longer-term horizon appears murky, as events in the Middle East seldom follow a linear, predictable pattern. That said, it is this uncertainty that underscores the need for diplomacy now. The Iranian regime of Ali Khamenei is on the ropes, and Washington has leverage to secure a deal that goes well beyond the JCPOA. Assuming the administration doesn’t want to continue its direct involvement in the conflict, now is the time for coercive diplomacy to secure a lasting peace and Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear program. If the Trump administration is successful in its attempts to broker a deal through coercion, this could be a playbook President Trump returns to in future negotiations or conflicts.

About the Authors:

Jim Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He specializes in Strategy, Military Force Planning and the Middle East. A retired Army Air Defense Artillery officer, Professor Cook is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and the Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff). He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments within the United States, Europe and the Middle East, most recently in Afghanistan. Professor Cook is an active participant in the Naval War College’s International Engagement program, where he lectures on strategy and international security matters.

Joe Swiecki is a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and the George H. W. Bush Chair of National Intelligence. He teaches policy analysis in the National Security Affairs Department and electives on intelligence. In more than 29 years of US military and government service he has held senior positions in Washington D.C. and the foreign field. In his career, he has worked closely with the National Security Council, Congress, and other governmental agencies on the creation and implementation of critical US government initiatives.

Note: The views expressed here are solely those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the US Department of Defense or its components, including the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.