I’m a Former U.S. Marine. Here’s How NATO Must Counter Russia and China in the Arctic

Reinvigorating a Containment Strategy for NATO in the Arctic: NATO has gained new key members in the military alliance, with Sweden and Finland, which provide a significant boost to peacekeeping operations in Northern Europe and the Arctic. This region is becoming a key regional hub for both Russia and China. The Arctic Flank, with a reemergence of Russian-Sino interests, could become a threat to regional allies and interests that Europe, the United States, and Canada will need to prepare for.

Strengthening patrols in the Arctic while maintaining a deterrence posture will be of utmost priority for NATO countries that are geographically close to the region. To prepare for any contingencies against Russia and China, the alliance will need to reinvigorate a new containment strategy.

Brewing Threats in the Arctic for NATO

Against the onset of Russia’s plans for conquest over Ukraine since 2014, Moscow has found itself increasingly isolated from the Western world in trade, economics, and cooperation, and is now increasingly dependent on China. Concurrently, Russia continues an aggressive posture in the Northern Sea with its Northern Fleet.

China has leveraged Russia’s dependence on Beijing to its advantage, as seen in the formation of a bilateral commission on cooperation in the Northern Sea between the two Eastern powers. Akin to their strategy of maintaining neutral ambiguity of Russia’s militaristic policies in Ukraine, China has neither condemned nor praised Russian naval maneuvers in the North Sea.

Both countries have held joint exercises in the Arctic, and Beijing and Moscow have been enshrined in hybrid warfare operations, such as cutting off cables of NATO members. Current cooperation between Russia and China has raised alarms among Western officials and NATO members, as both countries can gather key intelligence on the weak points of Western governments and conduct sabotage operations on critical communications networks.

Nevertheless, China maintains economic and scientific cooperation with Europe and shares interests in the Arctic with countries such as Finland, Sweden, Canada, Iceland, and Norway, which Beijing will not fully alienate or go against. In contrast, Moscow remains dependent on the Chinese government.

NATO’s Frontline Countries

Outside of Russia, several other NATO member countries are members of the Arctic Council. The member states are Iceland, Norway, Canada, Sweden, Finland, the United States, and Denmark through their territory of Greenland. The Arctic is estimated to be worth trillions of dollars in natural gas and minerals, which entices both Beijing and Moscow to cooperate.

Geographically, Russia has two fleets, the Baltic and Northern, which are located in the vicinity of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Consequently, the Kremlin seeks to overextend NATO patrols on the northern flank to achieve its own goals in the Arctic.

Patrols in the Arctic were heightened during the Cold War and subsequently reduced as the Soviet Union collapsed, as the West assumed a conflict with Moscow would never recur. Now, with a renewed imperial presence, NATO frontline countries in the Arctic need more cooperation than ever to counter Russian and Chinese provocations, rather than internal diplomatic conflicts.

The second Trump Administration held a diplomatic conflict with Denmark over Greenland, threatening to take over Danish territory, which led to a major diplomatic crisis. Russia and China have benefited from NATO’s diplomatic infighting and avoidance of internal turmoil, which will be tantamount to maintaining cohesion in the Arctic region.

Consolidating Deterrence

Although both Russia and China are making gains on NATO’s weak points in the Arctic, the Western alliance’s problems are fixable and require cooperation among member states. Reinvigorating a new strategy will require a policy recommendation of I.D.E.A.S.

In I.D.E.A.S., NATO should identify (I) the gaps that Russia and China can exploit and then create a doctrine (D) on how to counter both countries in the Arctic. Next, NATO should expand (E) military exercises such as Nordic Response to further enhance unit cohesion between different countries and key cooperation amongst member states.

NATO should also adjust (A) shared patrols in the Arctic and recognize that each Arctic Council country has its own independent economic goals, which should not be pressured into sharing. Instead, financial trade and scientific cooperation should also grow amongst NATO states, as the Arctic nations are amongst the world’s top countries for research and development.

Finally, strengthening the Northern Flank should be a priority for NATO going forward, and the alliance’s command should cede leadership over the region to the Nordic nations. With Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark being frontline countries that, in terms of GDP, allocate some of the most to Ukraine’s defense, these countries are well-positioned to take leadership roles in the Arctic shelf.

Already finalizing measures to create a Joint Nordic Air Command, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark could heighten naval and land patrols in the Arctic north, with other NATO member states backfilling gaps along the four’s southern and eastern flanks.

Lastly, China and Russia aren’t fully aligned regarding cooperation in the Arctic region, as Beijing and Moscow seek to expand their economic influence in the area, which is rich in natural gas and minerals. Beijing will continue to tread a line that is not fully aligned with either the West or Russia, but will simultaneously realize that Moscow is not as economically viable under heavy sanctions and a fledgling war. NATO should exploit this position going forward.

Reinvigorating a new NATO strategy in the Arctic and managing threats from Russia and China may be proceeding at a slow pace, as both adversaries have stepped up their presence on the Northern flanks. However, the situation is manageable, reversible, and requires full cooperation of member states, as the alliance has the capabilities to plug gaps and enhance joint patrols in the Northern flanks.

About the Author: Julian McBride

Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist born in New York. He is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.” Julian is also a new contributing editor to the National Security Journal.