Key Points – Russia’s Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic missile, developed after the collapse of the INF Treaty, poses a significant challenge to US-made Patriot air defense systems.
-In the summer of 2024, Iskander-M missiles reportedly destroyed several Patriot fire units in Ukraine.
-The system’s effectiveness stems from its hypersonic terminal speed (Mach 6-7), a “quasi-ballistic trajectory,” and the Russian domestic version’s ability to deploy decoys to confuse air defenses.
-This mobile, precision-strike weapon complicates NATO and Ukrainian defense planning, representing a key component of Russia’s tactical missile arsenal capable of targeting high-value assets.
Iskander-M: The Challenge to the US Patriot System
At the time it was agreed to and signed in 1987 by the then-Reagan Administration and the Soviet Government under Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a historic and positive moment in the relations between Washington and Moscow.
The treaty was the first time the two superpowers actually agreed to two—at the time—previously unheard-of steps in nuclear arms control.
One was that the two nations would reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals. The fatal shortcoming of previous agreements was that they were Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT), the key word being “limitations.”
The previous agreements meant as Reagan pointed out, the treaties did not reduce the number of nuclear weapons; they only limited the increase in the total number of existing types of weapons and delivery systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. These treaties restricted the development and deployment of new systems but did not prohibit them from being designed and fielded in the first place.
In the end, the INF agreement eliminated almost 2,700 intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, most of them from the Soviet arsenal, which far outnumbered the US inventory of weapons in this category at the time.
The INF Treaty was also the first time that the two nations had agreed to on-site inspections to verify compliance with the treaty’s various articles and provisions.
It was also the last time.
Since the end of the Boris Yeltsin era in Russia and the rise of President Vladimir Putin, the INF has been eroded to the point where it is now largely irrelevant. The US formally withdrew from the treaty in 2019, with one of the reasons being the emergence of the Russian Iskander Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).
Development and Operational Roles
The Iskander missile, NATO Codenamed SS-26 Stone, is a short-range tactical missile developed and produced in Russia in the post-Soviet era. It was designed to replace the Oka SS-23 Spider, which was one of the systems previously eliminated as part of the INF agreement.
The charge to develop the Iskander was given to the Kolomna Engineering Design Bureau (KBM) in the 1990s, where the design process initially operated under the project name “Tender.” The system, as designed, was intended as a theatre-range weapon that would be used to take out major enemy weapons emplacements, command posts, communications nodes, tactical aircraft parked on airfields, air and missile defense installations, and other high-value targets.
It was also intended to be capable of operating in-depth “around the clock” and in any season—even when faced with the threat of attack by precision-guided munitions, weapons of mass destruction, and anti-missile defense systems like the US Patriot battery and electronic warfare (EW) platforms.
Part of the system’s “proof of concept” took place in the summer of 2024 when Iskander-M missiles managed on two separate occasions to destroy several fire units from US Patriot batteries.
As US military officials explained at the time, “the Iskander is—in comparison with the Patriot’s $1 billion per battery price tag—a lower-cost system. If the Russians can use it to take out one of our PAC-3 units, then they have been able to make the Iskander pay for itself and then some.”
Advantages of the Russian Domestic Version
The Iskander has several advantages over other IRBMs—one being that its mobility reduces its vulnerability in a wartime situation like that in Ukraine.
Another is that in the terminal phase, the missile reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 6 to 7 and flies at an altitude of 6 to 50 kilometers. This poses a serious challenge for most air and missile defense systems, which is why it has become a key component in Russia’s tactical missile arsenal.
The employment of the missile and its operations in different theatres around the world has also created a volume of data that its designers and operators have used to improve the system over time.
However, it was only after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine that the Russian operators of the system revealed a previously unknown capability of the missile. The Iskander batteries can also deploy decoys to confuse enemy air defense systems, a feature not on board the export variants, such as the Iskander-E version.
Those export variants were also limited to a 280-kilometer range—far less than the Russian military version—in order to comply with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions.
In May 2022, the former Soviet Republic of Belarus announced its acquisition of the system. In October 2022, it was reported that the Iskander-M would be fitted with a new missile that “will enhance its combat potential.” (The versions of the missile that have been provided to Belarus are assumed to also be the full-up Russian military version and not an export variant).
The effectiveness of the Patriot against the Iskander remains a key question for Ukraine’s air defense units today. The latest versions have been modified to include not only more effective radar decoys, but the missile’s flight path now has what is called a ”quasi-ballistic trajectory,” which makes the missiles harder for the Patriot batteries to intercept.
These developments, if they are true to the degree that they are projected, increase the effectiveness of the Iskander in operation. This raises the issue this will degrade the ability of the Patriot to defend against these and other improvements to Russia’s ballistic and cruise missile arsenals.
About the Author:
Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw. He has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments, and the Australian government in the fields of defense technology and weapon systems design. Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.
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