On June 3, Germany lost its bid to become a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. In the race, three candidates competed for the two seats reserved for members from the European group.
Germany was edged out by Portugal and Austria. The outcome was not at all a close call. Portugal earned 134 votes and Austria 131, both comfortably surpassing the required threshold of 127 votes, while Germany trailed far behind with only 104.
German Leopard 2 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Both inside Germany and internationally, the loss has been viewed as a significant blow to Germany’s diplomatic prestige.
This single episode will not change the character of the Security Council or the U.N. in any significant way.
The organization has long suffered from extensive problems, including an inability to act effectively because of the veto powers of the permanent members, expensive administrative bloat, and the ideological distortions evident in the long-standing obsession with Israel or the absurdity of assigning the Islamic Republic of Iran leadership responsibilities in U.N. human rights bodies.
Nonetheless, the German loss provides an important perspective on Germany today, insights into the mood of the General Assembly, and an important lesson for the United States regarding the U.N. and contemporary international relations more broadly.
Germany had previously served on the Security Council for six terms, and as one of the major financial backers of the U.N., it believed it had a claim to a seat.
Its defeat has therefore been all the more bitter, leading to politicized recriminations. A particularly toxic narrative has begun to spread in Germany that the loss was due to Berlin’s support for Israel. Critics on the left argue that if Germany had only been more anti-Israel, it might have bought favor with the majority in the General Assembly.
Yet this facile argument overlooks the fact that Austria, which significantly outpolled Germany in the vote, has been more supportive of Israel than has Germany. For example, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer visited Israel early in the Gaza war, and Austria has often resisted EU criticism of Israel; in December 2023, Austria was one of only two EU states to vote against a General Assembly humanitarian ceasefire resolution (the Czech Republic was the other; Germany abstained).
If the General Assembly vote was a matter of punishing Israel’s supporters, Austria should have lost, and Portugal as we
The German defeat can therefore not easily be attributed to its Middle East policies alone. A more plausible explanation is that Berlin’s strong support for Ukraine may have encouraged active lobbying against its candidacy among states sympathetic to Russia.
In addition, the General Assembly’s reluctance to support Germany may have had to do with other matters. Austria and Portugal had long been campaigning for seats on the Security Council, while Germany, perhaps resting on its laurels, came late to the game.
Moreover, some countries could conclude that Germany is already well represented in important U.N. offices. On June 2, 2025, former German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock was elected President of the General Assembly.
Moreover, the unexpected replacement of the widely respected career diplomat Helga Schmid, the initial German candidate, with Baerbock–due to political deals in Berlin–was viewed critically in parts of the diplomatic community and may have complicated Germany’s effort to present its candidacy as a professional rather than partisan undertaking.
The fact that nearly half of the General Assembly refrained from supporting Germany, despite its outsized financial backing of the U.N., is, in any case, significant.
The outcome points to the declining ability of Europe’s traditional powers to convert historical status and economic weight into diplomatic influence.
There is surely also a specific policy dimension to the vote.
Germany’s emphasis on values-based diplomacy and, under Baerbock, its pursuit of a ‘feminist foreign policy’ has often placed Berlin at odds with more socially conservative governments across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Whether one regards these initiatives as admirable or misguided, they did not necessarily help Germany build the broad coalition needed for a vote in the General Assembly.
There are important lessons here for the U.S. In this era in which the transatlantic relationship is undergoing recalibration, most explicitly concerning NATO but also in terms of trade and cultural values, Washington should take note of how much the influence of some European countries has waned.
As the geopolitical order undergoes significant reshaping, traditional powers are losing their standing. For Germany, this process is amplified by its weak economy, which has contributed to the political instability associated with the rise of the right-populist AfD.
There is an additional lesson to be learned in Washington. Germany’s loss was due, at least in part, to the fact that it did not try aggressively enough; Austria and Portugal simply invested more time and diplomatic effort to secure votes to get onto the Security Council.
Of course, the U.S. holds a permanent seat, so at least it does not have to chase votes to retain that important status. However, the U.S. does have political interests in the final tally of Council votes, as well as in the many other U.N. bodies that deliberate on a wide range of topics.
If the U.S. wants to win those votes, it has to be present and engage vigorously.
For years, Washington has been deeply frustrated with the U.N., leading to calls to abandon it altogether. The Trump administration has taken steps to withdraw from several individual U.N. bodies pursuant to Executive Order 14199.
In some cases, this may well be a prudent choice, but it is worth proceeding carefully. A decision to reduce American presence across the board can also mean ceding ground to others, including America’s adversaries.
The better alternative is to choose where it makes the most sense to participate to defend U.S. national interests within the U.N.
Germany’s defeat was not inevitable. Austria and Portugal campaigned longer and more effectively, demonstrating that influence in multilateral institutions cannot be taken for granted.
The United States holds a permanent Security Council seat, but it still has vital interests in the outcome of countless votes throughout the U.N. system.
If Washington chooses to remain engaged, it must do so strategically, selectively, and energetically. Otherwise, it risks surrendering influence not to allies but to competitors and adversaries eager to fill the vacuum.
About the Author: Russell A. Berman
Russell A. Berman is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a former Senior Advisor on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department.
