The Real Loser of the Trump–Putin Summit? Europe

PUBLISHED on August 12, 2025, 3:22 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary – The upcoming Alaska summit between Presidents Trump and Putin could shape the endgame for the Ukraine war. While international law supports Ukraine’s full territorial restoration, battlefield realities and Western half-measures make compromise likely.

-Such concessions would challenge moral principles and risk rewarding Russian aggression, yet Kyiv may have little leverage—especially with NATO and EU doors still shut.

-If terms are too unfavorable, President Zelensky could reject them, but that risks losing U.S. support and exposing Europe’s inability to act strategically.

-Regardless of the outcome, the summit may leave Europe weakened, constrained by internal divisions and lacking credible military deterrence.

Who Wins and Loses in Trump-Putin Summit on Ukraine?

It would be foolish to predict the outcome of the upcoming summit between Presidents Trump and Putin and the implications for the war in Ukraine. We will know the results soon enough.

Nonetheless, several conditions will significantly impact the summit discussions.

Leading to the Ukraine Summit

First, it is important to recall that what is at stake is ending a Russian war of aggression. That war is a key piece of Putin’s efforts to reverse the loss of power and regional influence that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In terms of international law, Ukraine absolutely deserves to regain control of its full national territory. In addition, it is at least as important to remember how Russia has waged a campaign that regularly includes targeting civilian populations, while it kidnaps Ukrainian children and deporting them deep into Russia. This all means that the rule of law and sense of morality are on Ukraine’s side. Russia is in the docket for breaking international law and committing war crimes.

Yet, second, it is likely that if the summit comes up with a template to end the war, it will involve some compromise proposals. These compromises will be perceived–correctly–as breaches of international law and a common sense of morality.

It will therefore be difficult, in parts, for world opinion to accept compromise. From a normative point of view or concerning the model of a “rules-based order,” the moralists will be correct. Some Europeans, in particular, will complain that Putin should not be rewarded for his war crimes—but these are of course the same  Europeans, like President Macron or Prime Minister Starmer, who have proposed plans to reward Hamas for October 7. Moralism and hypocrisy are often seen together.

Third: the moralist stance is limited by the facts on the ground. Russia holds considerable Ukrainian territory. Ukraine has fought valiantly, but it has not been able to expel the aggressor. Europe and the US have provided significant aid to Ukraine, but often too little and too late, and with conditions attached that have prevented Kyiv from pushing back harder against Moscow. Perhaps that half-heartedness was a legitimate expression of a fear of escalation.

However one evaluates it, Ukraine and the West have not mustered the power to defeat Russia on the battlefield. One might say that the West should have done more, but it did not, and there seems to be little appetite for upping the stakes. A war that might have been won a year ago is grinding on.

Fourth: since Russia holds territory, some territorial compromise is a plausible outcome, but the real issue will be additional conditions beyond the territory. Will a Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory be granted full international recognition, or will it be treated as something less, such as an occupation short of annexation? Of equal importance is the question of prospects for Ukraine and any guarantees.

Yet on this point, there are some key limits. As much as the West has supported Ukraine, its access to the key Western institutions—the EU and NATO—is effectively blocked. Ukraine has been knocking on the door, but the Europeans keep it shut. This exclusion from the economic and security structures is as much part of a realistic assessment of the state of affairs as is the presence of the Russian troops. Something less may be offered: funds for reconstruction, trade agreements, security promises. Ukraine will remember that it received such security promises in the  Budapest Accords, when it gave up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons. In retrospect, that looks like a big mistake.

Terms Given to Ukraine? 

If the terms for Ukraine are egregiously unfavorable, President Zelensky can fall back on the argument that his Constitution prohibits territorial concessions. He could therefore reject a proposal coming from the summit.

In that case, US support is sure to end, and Europe’s bluff will be called. Europe could try to increase support for Ukraine rapidly, including finally giving it the Taurus missiles from Germany. This is, however, unlikely. The whole matter will serve as another example of Europe’s inability to act geostrategically.

Trump and Putin will be meeting in Alaska. The location is symbolic—not simply because of Alaska’s history in the Russian Empire, but because it is about as far away from Europe as possible. Ukraine will probably face a compromise proposal, which it can choose to accept or reject. However, whatever the outcome of the summit, Europe is going to end up as the loser.

Despite its significant economic clout, Europe remains incapable of acting effectively on the international stage. This is due in part to institutional structures, for example, the requirement for unanimity, which means that a single country, such as Viktor Orban’s Hungary, can veto initiatives. Yet it is wrong to blame Europe’s failings on Orban. The European publics and the governments they elect are simply not committed to mounting a credible military force that could deter or repel aggressors.

This structural weakness in Europe appears all the more glaring because of the shrill moralism of its public discourse: it knows what is right and wrong in its vision of a rules-based order, but it refuses to have the power to enforce the rules.

About the Author: Dr. Russell A. Berman 

Dr. Russell A. Berman, the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a co-chair of The Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic World. At Stanford, he is a member of both the Department of German Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature, with a specialization in European and Middle Eastern politics and culture. He has served in numerous administrative positions at Stanford, including as chair of the Senate of the Academic Council. He is a member of the National Humanities Council and, during the Trump administration, served as a Senior Advisor on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department.

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