The U.S. Navy Is Broken

Key Points and Summary – U.S. shipbuilding is struggling. Post-COVID workforce losses, aging yards, and unstable budgets have slowed or derailed key programs: LCS underperformed, Zumwalt shrank to three ships after ammo was canceled, and Virginia-class blocks slipped as Columbia took priority.

-The future SSN(X) risks competing for the same limited industrial base.

Littoral Combat Ship Deck. National Security Journal Image by Stephen Silver.

-Root causes include building before designs are mature, supply-chain fragility, labor shortages, and weak program oversight.

-Proposed fixes—SHIPS for America, tighter GAO-style discipline, and partnerships like Hyundai–HII—aim to add capacity and impose stable requirements.

-Progress will be slow, but rebuilding the yards is a national-security imperative if the Navy is to meet demand.

The U.S. Navy Has a Crisis It Can’t Seem to Fix 

It is no secret that the U.S. shipbuilding industry is a shadow of its former self.

After numerous budget cuts and the COVID pandemic, America’s premier shipbuilders have been forced to downsize, lay off workers, and slow down overall production.

This has had the unfortunate side effect of slowing or even halting the development of major platforms.

This problem is not unique to the U.S. Navy; many navies worldwide are experiencing similar issues.

Cancelled Project After Cancelled Project

The Littoral Combat Ship was envisioned in the early 2000s as a fast, agile vessel capable of operating in near-shore environments.

It was designed to be modular, allowing for quick swaps between mission packages focused on surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare.

However, both variants, the Freedom and Independence classes, suffered from unstable designs and frequent changes in mission modules.

Mechanical reliability issues, particularly with propulsion systems, plagued the fleet. The ships also failed to meet expectations in terms of survivability and combat capability.

As a result, the Navy curtailed the program, retiring some ships early and shifting focus to more robust platforms.

A rare occurrence of a 5-country multinational fleet of the NATO countries, the Netherlands, France, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom, during Operation Enduring Freedom in the Oman Sea. Image Credit: U.S. Navy

The Zumwalt-class destroyer was another ambitious project, intended to revolutionize surface warfare with stealth features, electric propulsion, and advanced weaponry.

Originally planned as a fleet of 32 ships, the program was reduced to just three due to escalating costs and shifting strategic priorities.

The advanced gun system, a centerpiece of the ship’s firepower, was rendered ineffective when the Navy canceled the development of its specialized ammunition.

The Zumwalt’s mission profile was also changed midstream, further complicating its integration and deployment.

The program became a cautionary tale of overreaching technological ambition without a clear operational path.

Submarine Delays

The Virginia-class submarine program has been one of the more successful shipbuilding efforts, but recent blocks, particularly Block V, have encountered delays of up to three years.

These delays stem from supply chain disruptions, workforce shortages, and the prioritization of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program.

The Columbia-class is the Navy’s top acquisition priority due to its role in strategic deterrence, and any delays in Virginia-class production risk cascading effects on both programs.

The industrial base simply lacks the capacity to build two major submarine classes simultaneously without significant investment and expansion.

The SSN(X), the Navy’s future attack submarine, is still in the conceptual phase.

It is intended to be faster, stealthier, and more capable than the Virginia-class, with enhanced payload capacity and sensor suites. However, the program faces uncertainty in terms of requirements, budget, and industrial capacity.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Oct. 1, 2024) The Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Mobile (LCS 26) comes alongside the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) for a fueling-at-sea, Oct. 1, 2024. Theodore Roosevelt, flagship of Carrier Strike Group 9, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. An integral part of U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. 3rd Fleet operates naval forces in the Indo-Pacific and provides he realistic, relevant training necessary to execute the U.S. Navy’s role across the full spectrum of military operations – from combat operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. U.S. 3rd Fleet works together with our allies and partners to advance freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and other principles that underpin security for the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Richard Tinker)

There is concern that SSN(X) development will compete with Columbia-class production for limited shipyard resources, potentially delaying both programs.

The Navy must carefully balance its strategic needs with the realities of its industrial base and funding constraints.

What’s Wrong with U.S. Shipbuilding?

Many, many other projects have been canceled or delayed, but the point has been made. The U.S. has been and continues to replace its aging fleet—why is that?

One major issue is design instability. Many shipbuilding efforts begin construction before the design is finalized, leading to rework, inefficiencies, and delays.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly criticized the Navy for weak business cases and failure to follow commercial best practices.

Overambitious designs that attempt to integrate multiple unproven technologies often result in cost overruns and performance shortfalls.

The industrial base itself is another critical factor.

The U.S. shipbuilding industry has contracted significantly since the Cold War, leaving only a handful of major shipyards with limited surge capacity.

Aging infrastructure and underinvestment in modernization have left these facilities ill-equipped to handle multiple complex programs simultaneously.

Skilled labor shortages, particularly in trades like welding and pipefitting, further constrain production. These issues are exacerbated by supply chain disruptions, which became especially pronounced during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Delays in critical components, long lead times, and reliance on foreign suppliers have all contributed to schedule slippages.

Who Is at Fault?

Budgetary instability also plays a significant role.

Shipbuilding requires long-term, predictable funding to support multi-year construction timelines. However, delays in congressional budget approvals, shifting priorities, and reallocation of funds have undermined planning and execution.

For example, the recent diversion of $2.8 billion from shipbuilding to cover troop pay created additional uncertainty for ongoing programs. Without consistent funding, shipyards and contractors struggle to maintain momentum and invest in capacity.

Program management within the Navy has also come under scrutiny.

Ineffective oversight, lack of accountability, and poor coordination between leadership and contractors have led to misaligned expectations and execution failures.

The Navy has been slow to implement GAO recommendations, with many still outstanding. Internal reviews have identified systemic issues, but translating those findings into actionable reforms remains a challenge.

What Can Be Done to Fix America’s Shipbuilding?

Fortunately, the current administration is at least aware of the problem and is trying to fix it.

Congress has introduced legislation such as the SHIPS for America Act, aimed at strengthening the commercial shipbuilding base and improving coordination across government agencies. International partnerships, such as the collaboration between Hyundai Heavy Industries and Huntington Ingalls Industries, offer opportunities to share best practices and expand capacity.

The Navy has also conducted internal reviews to identify root causes and develop action plans for better program management.

However, these problems will not simply disappear overnight. Many proposed solutions require deep institutional reforms that could take decades to implement fully.

Additionally, modernizing U.S. shipbuilding facilities requires significant resources and time. Moreover, it requires dedicated long-term commitment across multiple administrations, which the U.S. has historically struggled with.

Rebuilding America’s shipbuilding will be a long process, but it will ultimately be worth it.

Arguably, it is a matter of national security as well, since the world relies heavily on the U.S. Navy to protect its commercial shipping lanes.

About the Author: Isaac Seitz

Isaac Seitz, a Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.

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