There May Be Only One Way to Truly Reopen the Strait of Hormuz — and It Involves American Boots on Iranian Soil

Despite months of military operations, economic pressure, and diplomacy, restoring commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has proven far more difficult than many expected. The waterway, one of the world’s most strategic, carries roughly 20 percent of global oil exports under normal conditions. But securing the strait has proven an extraordinarily difficult military challenge thanks to geography, Iran’s asymmetric capabilities, and the sheer scale of the operating environment.

The Importance of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow passage linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum exports normally transit the waterway, making it critical for Gulf producers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Qatar. Even partial disruptions affect shipping, insurance, energy markets, and global inflation. Accordingly, keeping the strait open is a vital economic objective—which is why Trump’s efforts have been varied, including airstrikes, economic pressure, naval operations, negotiations, and renewed blockade measures. Despite those varied efforts, commercial shipping remains below normal, with oil markets remaining sensitive to a renewed cycle of violence.

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM — F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-18 Hornets and a B-2 Spirit, line the Andersen flight line during Exercise Valiant Shield, 22 June, 2006. Valiant Shield 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command exercise, which runs June 19 to 23, will be conducted in the vicinity of Guam. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training and interoperability among U.S. military forces while responding to a range of mission scenarios.
(U.S. Air Force Photo/Staff Sgt Bennie J. Davis III)

Iran’s Resistance

Iran has proven difficult to beat. According to Jason Campbell of the Middle East Institute, Iran has prepared for this type of conflict for decades with a decentralized military structure, dispersed weapons storage, hidden missile sites, mobile drone launchers, and a distributed command structure. Rather than concentrating forces, Iran has emphasized survivability, which reduces the effectiveness of conventional air campaigns.

Iran has mastered the art of asymmetric warfare, which has been especially obvious in the Strait. Incapable of beating the US Navy head-on, Iran has instead relied on anti-ship missiles, drones, naval mines, fast attack craft, coastal missile batteries, and persistent harassment. The goal is to raise operational risk rather than seek a decisive naval battle. This forces commercial shipping companies to reconsider whether transit is worth the danger.

Campbell argues that bombing launch sites solves only part of the problem. The reasons are that Iran’s launchers are dispersed, the weapons are hidden, production is spread across multiple facilities, and units are capable of operating semi-independently. Destroying fixed infrastructure does not necessarily eliminate the overall threat.

Send in the Troops?

Campbell also argues that fully securing Hormuz would likely require large-scale ground operations, clearing missile launch sites, securing extensive coastline, and controlling inland terrain. Those objectives require troops on the ground. Such an operation would require months to assemble, impose high costs, and expose troops to insurgent attacks. This illustrates the enormous gap between conducting airstrikes and permanently eliminating the threat.

An alternative option, possibly, would be to have the Navy escort every tanker. There is a historical precedent: Operation Earnest Will during the 1980s, in which the US escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.

Today’s environment is far more complex, however. According to Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute, the US fleet is smaller today than in the 1980s. Plus, Iran possesses more advanced drones, anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned systems. Large-scale escort operations would consume substantial naval resources indefinitely.

A B-2 Spirit soars after a refueling mission over the Pacific Ocean on Tuesday, May 30, 2006. The B-2, from the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., is part of a continuous bomber presence in the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Bennie J. Davis III)

And according to Noam Raydan of the Washington Institute, Iran doesn’t even necessarily have to attack ships. Simple radio warnings, threats, or uncertainty alone may convince commercial operators to delay voyages.

Shipping companies respond to perceived risk, not only to confirmed attacks. The result is that insurance costs rise, crews become reluctant, and traffic falls.

The economic effects occur without large-scale combat. Shipping companies are already changing routes. Current adaptations include avoiding transit lanes, using southern routes near Oman, and accepting longer voyages where possible. These adjustments reduce efficiency while increasing shipping costs.

Strategic Implications

The strait highlights the enduring power of geography in modern warfare. Even against the US Navy, the world’s most capable blue-water force, a regional power relying on dispersed missiles, drones, mines, and asymmetric tactics can significantly disrupt one of the world’s most important waterways without a conventional battle.

For Washington, the challenge isn’t just defeating Iranian forces—it’s restoring confidence among commercial shipping companies.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.