What’s Next For Georgia?

These are decisive days in Tbilisi. On October 26^th, voters in the country of Georgia went to the polls to cast their ballots in a pivotal parliamentary vote. The results of that contest have sent shockwaves through the country and beyond, and raised profound concerns about Georgia’s democratic future.

From the outset, the election was seen as a pivotal one for Georgia, a nation striving to break free of Russia’s grip and chart a course toward Europe. The pro-European opposition, fueled by discontent with the increasingly autocratic rule of the Georgian Dream (GD) party, entered the race with high hopes but a lack of coordination or “ground game” in the country’s assorted regions.

Election day did not bring clarity, however. While the ruling GD party declared a resounding victory, a chorus of voices – including the opposition, international observers, and Georgia’s own president – have denounced the elections as fraudulent and illegitimate. The president of the European Council has asked the country’s Electoral Commission to respond “swiftly, transparently and independently” to the reported irregularities.

The problems stem from a stark discrepancy between the official results, which handed GD 54% of the vote, and independent pre-election polls and exit polls that projected an opposition win. This gap has fueled allegations of widespread manipulation, and cast a pall over Georgia’s larger democratic trajectory.

Indeed, early data and statistical analysis of the elections show a disturbing picture of a sophisticated and multifaceted strategy employed by GD to manipulate the electoral process, while maintaining a carefully constructed facade of legitimacy. This strategy encompassed both pre-election maneuvering and potential election-day fraud, all designed to tilt the playing field decisively in GD’s favor.

GD’s pre-election tactics allegedly involved exploiting the levers of state power to influence voters and stifle dissent. This included deploying a vast network of political patronage to reward loyalists and punish opponents. The international observation mission reported widespread pressure and intimidation of voters, particularly on public sector employees, during the campaign.

GD’s manipulation extended beyond pre-election maneuvering to encompass potential election-day fraud. Despite the use of electronic voting machines, which were touted as safeguards against manipulation, there are credible allegations that GD engaged in a range of illicit activities to inflate its vote count. Inside polling stations, many GD representatives placed cameras which served to intimidate voters and create the sense that “big brother is watching.”

Other alleged activities included deploying groups of repeat voters, vote buying, ID buying to prevent people from voting, and allied groups to engage in virtual ballot stuffing, particularly in remote areas that are typically GD strongholds and have less oversight. GD is also accused of exploiting the lack of electronic voting systems in certain rural areas to facilitate manipulation. Data analysis revealed a troubling pattern: while urban areas, typically opposition strongholds, showed voting trends consistent with fair practices, certain rural districts, considered GD bastions, exhibited significant anomalies. Vote clusters in these areas indicated inflated support for GD and a substantial discrepancy between voter turnout and vote share, strongly suggesting manipulation.

But the Georgian elections cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader geopolitical context, because Moscow has maintained a long-standing interest in undermining Georgia’s pro-Western orientation and keeping the country in its sphere of influence.

Thus, according to Bloomberg, between 2017 and 2020, coinciding with Georgia’s pro-Western turn, Russia’s intelligence agencies carried out an extensive hacking campaign targeting the country’s government, financial institutions, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Russian operatives also infiltrated Georgia’s Foreign Ministry, central bank, and key infrastructure, gaining access to email systems, electricity companies, oil terminals, and media organizations. This espionage effort, led by the GRU (Russian military intelligence) and FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service), gave Moscow the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure if needed. And the hacking intensified ahead of Georgia’s previous 2020 elections, with Russian hackers, particularly from the GRU, infiltrating Georgia’s Central Election Commission, compromising emails and sensitive election-related communications. Major media outlets, such as Imedi and Maestro, were also targeted.

The most recent elections were, by all accounts, no different. Even Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili has refused to recognize the October 26^th results, depicting it as a political contest rigged by the Kremlin. “We’ve seen that Russian propaganda was directly used,” she said, accusing Georgian Dream of “working hand-in-hand with Russia” and “probably” receiving assistance from Russian security services.

The aftermath of these deeply flawed elections puts Georgia at a critical crossroads. Just days after the elections, we have already seen one mass protest, as both the opposition parties and President Zourabichvili have called for citizens to take to the streets to demand accountability and defend their democratic rights. Speaking at the rally, several members of the opposition vowed to not take up their mandate in Parliament. However, GD has demonstrated a willingness to use force to suppress dissent in the past, raising worries about potential violence and further repression.

Tellingly, no single EU member leader has congratulated the Georgian government except for Hungary’s pro-Moscow President, Viktor Orbán. But what comes next remains to be seen. The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, faces a crucial test of its commitment to democratic values. Ministers of European Affairs from thirteen EU Member countries have issued a joint statement on their deep concern for the Georgian elections. Sweden cut ties with the Georgian government on Tuesday morning, and Charles Michel, the President of the European Council announced that Georgia will be on the agenda during the next EUCO in Budapest on November 8th.

But diplomatic demarches are simply not sufficient. The United States and Europe cannot allow GD to consolidate this undemocratic takeover. Concrete actions, including the suspension of aid and targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for undermining the electoral process are needed as well. So, too, is a redoubling of Western support for Georgian civil society, lest the country’s political turmoil – and the machinations of both internal players and outside powers – inflict lasting damage to the prospects of democracy in Georgia.

About the Authors:

Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council. Pauline Le Grand is a research intern at the Rondeli Foundation in Tbilisi, Georgia.