After more than four years of war, Ukraine is no longer just defending itself. Kyiv has inflicted major damage on Russia in recent weeks with a sustained pressure campaign designed to cripple the Russian economy and Moscow’s ability to sustain the war.
Ukrainian drones and domestically manufactured missiles have repeatedly struck oil refineries and military facilities, logistics hubs, and fuel depots, some 1,500 kilometers away from the front lines – and that pressure is about to be ramped up even further.
Tu-160. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
One of the most widely seen examples – one that could not be ignored by any Russian – was the Moscow Oil Refinery strike at Kapotnya, where video footage showed the lid of a massive fuel storage tank blasted hundreds of feet into the air after an explosion.
The refinery, which processes roughly 11.6 million metric tons of crude oil annually and supplies much of the Russian capital with gasoline and diesel, is only one of dozens of strategic energy targets that Ukraine has struck this year. And it won’t be the last.
Combined with fuel shortages and blackouts, the campaign is beginning to create exactly the kind of economic pressure Kyiv needs – because not only is Putin now faced with the prospect of being unable to sustain the war, but the Russian people themselves are beginning to feel the impact of war.
That leaves the Russian president facing a very difficult question: how does he respond to Ukraine’s promised 40-day escalation without making Russia’s strategic position even worse than it is today?
Putin Is In A Bind
Tu-160 Infographic: Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Moscow knows more is coming because Kyiv just said so.
On Thursday, June 25, Zelenskyy issued a statement confirming that he had approved a 40-day-long campaign of drone and missile strikes designed to pressure the Russians to return to the negotiating table.
Unlike earlier in the war, when Kyiv was largely defending itself on the front lines, Kyiv now believes it possesses both the industrial capacity and the stockpiles necessary to pick up the tempo and maintain it for weeks.
Putin, therefore, has a considerable problem, because Russia must continue launching missile and drone attacks against Ukraine while simultaneously defending an enormous homeland that stretches across eleven time zones.
Ukrainian missiles are reaching more than 1,500 kilometers inside Russia, reaching as far as Siberia and other regions that were once considered safely beyond Ukraine’s reach.
Every refinery, fuel depot, ammunition warehouse, bridge, or military airfield is now at risk of becoming the next target – and Russia doesn’t know which one it will be.
Meanwhile, its commanders are spreading their finite number of air defense systems across thousands of kilometers.
Zelenskyy recently said that Moscow had already begun redeploying “hundreds” of air defense systems toward Moscow, the Kerch Bridge, and Valdai, as Ukraine’s strikes continue.
Meanwhile, Russia’s economy is struggling. By every measure except perhaps drone manufacturing capability, Russia is worse off today than it was at the beginning of the war.
It faces labor shortages after years of mobilization.
Its defense factories are operating around the clock while civilian industries struggle.
Inflation is elevated, and sanctions – including the recently restored U.S. sanctions on Russian oil – have also created additional pressure.
And it’s amid this chaos, which is slowly beginning to make Russians rethink their position on the war, that Russia finds itself reacting to unpredictable threats across an enormous geographic area.
What Are Putin’s Options?
Putin’s first and most obvious option is escalation. Russia could increase missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure in an effort to break Kyiv’s momentum.
Moscow has done this before, repeatedly relying on large-scale missile barrages, and may conclude that overwhelming force remains its best chance of hurting Ukraine.
But that strategy isn’t infallible and carries costs. Every missile or precision-guided weapon launched at Ukraine is one that cannot be stockpiled and prepared for another contingency.
Russian defense production may have significantly expanded since 2022, but sanctions and supply chain constraints – not to mention manufacturing bottlenecks – continue to limit its ability to replenish some of its most sophisticated weapons.
At the same time, Russia cannot ignore the possibility of future crises elsewhere. Committing more military resources to Ukraine would leave Moscow less prepared for those other potential contingencies, including a confrontation with NATO.
And while Russian officials still claim that NATO is effectively a party to the conflict, opening up a second military campaign against NATO would be an extraordinary gamble that neither side can afford to risk.
And then there’s nuclear.
Nuclear weapons are still a part of Russia’s official doctrine. Former President Dmitry Medvedev and other senior officials have repeatedly warned that Moscow could resort to nuclear weapons if the Kremlin believes Russia’s territorial integrity was threatened.
With Crimea at risk of being isolated from the mainland, that case could now be made easily. But such a move would also be highly risky, and is still considered unlikely by most governments and analysts because of the enormous consequences it would carry, including further international isolation and the possibility of a much wider conflict.
Putin’s Best Option For Now?
Considering all the constraints, Putin’s most practical strategy for now may not be a dramatic escalation or a dangerous expansion of the war.
Instead, Russia may need to focus on proving that Ukraine’s campaign can be contained.
That would mean investing even more heavily in air defenses around its most important infrastructure and dispersing critical military assets – even if it means making sacrifices on the front line. It would require increased protection for refineries and logistics hubs, which means intercepting as many Ukrainian drones and missiles before they reach their targets.
Moscow will almost certainly continue launching precision strikes where opportunities arise – potentially against the infrastructure that supports the production and distribution of its latest missiles and weapons.
Targets will likely include Ukrainian defense companies, command centers, drone production facilities, and other sites that make Ukraine’s counter-offensive possible.
The next 40 days could nevertheless become one of the most consequential periods of the war – and Putin’s response might decide how it ends.
About the Author: Jack Buckby
Jack Buckby is a British researcher and analyst specializing in defense and national security, based in New York. His work focuses on military capability, procurement, and strategic competition, producing and editing analysis for policy and defense audiences. He brings extensive editorial experience, with a career output spanning over 1,000 articles at 19FortyFive and National Security Journal, and has previously authored books and papers on extremism and deradicalization.
