At some points during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a defeat for Kyiv has seemed inevitable. The war appeared to be a constant drain on Ukrainian and Western resources at times when Russian forces were making significant gains on the frontlines. Today, though, Kyiv is fighting back with domestically made long-range drones and missiles, putting Moscow on the back foot, and causing so much visible damage that it’s hard for any Russian to ignore the fact that not all is going to plan.
In recent weeks, Ukrainian forces have expanded their long-range strike campaign and successfully targeted oil refineries and military-industrial facilities – and even the Russian capital itself. Viral videos of fires and explosions in Russia’s capital city last week have arguably done more than any previous Ukrainian strike to wake up Russian citizens to the threat they face. And after the June 18 attack on the Moscow Oil Refinery, the strikes continued.
T-90 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
On June 22, Russian authorities reported dozens of Ukrainian drones approaching Moscow, forcing flight suspensions in nearby airports. The attacks have also forced Moscow to strengthen air defenses around the capital city, and move some air defense assets – including Pantsir systems – from the frontlines.
It’s clear that Russia is under pressure. President Vladimir Putin has admitted it, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has admitted it, and now, the Russian people can see it with their own eyes.
It means that, unless something changes dramatically in the coming weeks and months, Putin’s coup-proof shield could come under greater pressure than ever.
Is the Russian Elite Coming for Putin?
Writing for the Jamestown Foundation, Kassie Corelli noted how Putin is facing growing pressure – and questions – from Russia’s political and business elite. In “Elites Could Push Putin to Either End the War or to Escalate It,” Corelli says that while there is little evidence of any organized effort to challenge the Russian president directly, there are clear divisions between officials who believe the war has reached a dead end and the hardline figures who are continuing to push for escalation.
Citing Russian sociologist Igor Eydman, Corelli describes how some members of Russia’s elite are now more concerned about the costs of a conflict that has now entered its fifth year.
Between economic pressures and growing military losses, as well as Ukraine’s newfound ability to strike deep into Russia, all point to Russia being incapable of delivering the victory it once believed could be achieved within weeks.
T-90M Russian Army. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
But Putin still has support. Corelli points to far-right news websites in Russia piling on the pressure against the naysayers, claiming that Russian elites are “ready to sell out Russia and demand that Putin admit defeat.” Putin also maintains support within the security services, and of course within the Kremlin. Outside of a full Ukrainian victory, the Russian president is really the only man who will decide how this war ends.
The Economic Cost Is Growing
The military pressure is one thing, but Russia is facing economic pressure – and that’s something every Russian will understand, even if they didn’t see explosions first-hand.
By targeting oil refineries and fuel depots, as Ukraine has done since 2024, Kyiv has placed extreme pressure on the Russian economy. On June 22, Russian authorities in Crimea suspended civilian fuel sales after weeks of shortages caused by strikes on supply routes and depots.
The crisis in Crimea started with rationing and has ended with civilians fleeing the region as it comes under heavy fire. But the problem exists beyond Crimea.
Fuel shortages and rationing have been reported across dozens of Russian regions so far, while Ukrainian drones continue to target key energy facilities deep inside Russia. On June 20, Ukrainian forces struck the Tyumen refinery in Siberia, which is over 1,500 miles from the Ukrainian border. There is nowhere Ukraine can’t reach, it seems.
Combine these problems with labor shortages that won’t be solved any time soon, and it’s clear Russia’s economy is suffering. It’s unclear, though, just how long it will take the Russian people to change their opinions on the need to continue fighting. So far, polls indicate Russians remain broadly supportive of Putin’s goals, but are becoming more supportive of peace talks.
There Is No Obvious Solution for Putin
There is no obvious solution for Putin. Ukraine is intent on striking back, and can now do so without the direct support of the West. While Western support is still necessary, the most damaging strikes conducted in recent weeks have been conducted with Ukrainian-made drones and missiles. And, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains as committed as ever to pushing back hard – and even called on the Russian president in an open letter this month to meet with him privately to discuss a settlement.
If Putin does choose to escalate, as the Kremlin has indicated it plans to, it could certainly put more pressure on Ukraine. But unless Russia can take out Ukraine’s manufacturing operations and cut off supplies from the West, stopping the weekly barrage of drones and missiles against Russian infrastructure will be difficult. And as Putin escalates, he loses more weaponry and is forced to commit more national resources to manufacturing weapons and ammunition. In turn, he will divert capital, labor, and industrial capacity away from the civilian economy yet again, putting the Russian economy into a doom loop.
It’s hard to see where Putin goes from here, and if he is facing resistance from Russian elites, it’s not hard to see why.
About the Author: Jack Buckby
Jack Buckby is a British researcher and analyst specializing in defense and national security, based in New York. His work focuses on military capability, procurement, and strategic competition, producing and editing analysis for policy and defense audiences. He brings extensive editorial experience, with a career output spanning over 1,000 articles at 19FortyFive and National Security Journal, and has previously authored books and papers on extremism and deradicalization.
