Ukraine’s mid-range drone strike campaign is being used to heavily disrupt Russian supply lines, fuel depots, and air defenses 20 to 150 miles behind the front lines.
This strategy has forced Russia to severely restrict heavy equipment movements and ration fuel along vital corridors, such as the M-14 highway to Crimea. And they have been crippling Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure.

Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
But many of the drones are not arriving at the front ready to go for the operators. In an attempt to get as many to the front as quickly as possible, many of the drones arrive riddled with issues, causing operators to spend valuable time on testing that should have been completed before they were issued.
Also, many drones often require significant modifications before they can be deployed in combat.
The Quality Of The Drones Tends To Vary
A drone operator for the Ukrainian National Guard’s Typhoon Unit told Business Insider that she’s tested over 10 different types of drones, most of which are produced inside Ukraine.

Shahed Drone from Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
“In every sortie, everything that could go wrong went wrong,” she said. At times, there would be issues with a fixed-wing drone’s camera feed, drones stalling, or controls becoming unresponsive.
Ukraine’s Mid-Range Drones
The country’s “mid-range drones” generally refer to fixed-wing systems with a range between 18 and 180 miles. The operator, going by the code name Spring to protect her identity, said she usually tests and operates drones with a range of 40-60 km.
A significant factor in selecting the drones for use by the Typhoon Unit is their reliability in resisting Russian jamming. “Some mid-range drones are equipped with AI targeting that keeps them flying and continues seeking out their quarry after losing connection to the pilot’s control station.”
Some of the different mid-range drones include:
The Hornet: Manufactured by California-based Perennial Autonomy, this winged-surfboard-sized drone flies at low altitudes and uses machine vision to lock on to and destroy Russian vehicles with an 11-pound warhead. These drones are now being trained on by the US Army for its own use.
Darts-2: The Darts-2 is an upgraded, twin-engine version of the Ukrainian-made Darts fixed-wing kamikaze strike drone. Built for mid-range operations, it serves as a heavier, high-precision successor to the original single-engine Darts model.
Produced by the Ukrainian company Norda Dynamics, this kamikaze drone is highly cost-effective (ranging from $1,000 to $3,000) and carries a powerful 18- to 22-pound payload at ranges of 30 to 62 miles.
MORRIGAN: A Ukrainian-made strike wing drone developed in collaboration with frontline operators, primarily tasked with hunting Russian logistics and crippling high-priority air defenses along the 370-mile land bridge to Crimea.
Developed by operators from the 412th Nemesis Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces, this “mid-strike” aircraft fills the operational gap between short-range FPV quadcopters and long-range strategic bombers.
Shark & Lelka-100: Primarily acting as the tactical eyes of the operation, these mid-range observation drones provide continuous surveillance, mapping, and targeting data for strike units to execute
It can fly up to 80 kilometers behind enemy lines and patrol for 4 to 5 hours. It is highly resistant to enemy electronic warfare (EW) and GPS jamming.
By deploying advanced, mainly domestically produced drones, Ukraine has systematically targeted Russia’s oil infrastructure, supply chains, and military-industrial sites.
Mid-Range Drones Are Targeting And Hitting Russia’s Supply Routes
Ukraine’s elite Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) began an ambitious strike campaign in early May targeting the Kremlin’s deliveries of military materials to frontline troops by attacking Russian military trucks, trains, and logistics nodes with drone swarms.
These large drone swarms have taken Russian logistics units by surprise and have been very successful.
The ISW recently posted that “Ukrainian forces notably began in May 2026 to interdict key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, particularly along the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-20 highway) and the M-14 highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway), which together with the M-18 highway, connects Russia with occupied Crimea.”
Ukraine Is Gaining The Initiative In The War
The Ukrainian drone attacks are savaging Russia’s infrastructure. This includes weapons and ammunition depots, warehouses, command posts, and oil facilities.
In mid-May, Ukraine sent more than 600 drones on an attack on Moscow itself. The attacks hit microelectronics plants, fuel infrastructure, and missile-related targets in the Moscow area.
Coupled with the enormous casualties the Russian military is suffering (nearly 1,000 a day), the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has stated that the Ukrainians have taken the initiative in the war.
Ukrainian forces have pushed back Russian troops along parts of the frontline, making their most significant battlefield gains since 2024. Ukraine’s “intensified midrange strike campaign” since early 2026 has also degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations across the theatre and has likely supported recent Ukrainian advances.
Several reports state that despite some of its drones not arriving ready for combat, the Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes along several highways have been so successful that Russian troops could no longer safely use them. All of these points suggest that Ukraine is creating vulnerabilities in the Russians’ lines. And the gradual weakening of Russia’s positions in occupied Ukraine.
About the Author: Steve Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
