Key Points and Summary – The U.S. Army has officially canceled the M10 Booker armored vehicle program as part of a major acquisition reform initiative.
-The decision was driven by a strategic shift away from counter-insurgency towards preparing for high-intensity peer conflict, a role for which the M10 was ill-suited.
-The vehicle failed on multiple fronts: it became too heavy for air deployment, was no longer cost-effective, and could not be adapted for future battlefields.
-Its termination reflects a pragmatic move to redirect scarce resources toward developing more lethal and survivable systems for the wars of tomorrow.
The M10 Booker Program Had to End
On May 1 of this year, the US Department of Defense issued a memorandum titled named Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform. This document described a comprehensive new policy initiative aimed at removing “outdated, redundant, and inefficient programs” from the Army’s arsenal.
Since then, the M10 Booker, an armored infantry support vehicle of fairly recent vintage, has been seen by many as precisely the kind of outdated, redundant, and inefficient system referred to in the May 2025 memo.
The expectation in these quarters was that the M10 Booker would be cancelled in relatively short order – and, sure enough, this is precisely what happened.
On June 11, 2025, the Army provided confirmation that the M10 Booker program — which had already delivered approximately 26 M10s — would not advance to full-rate production, effectively canceling it.
As the relevant press release put it, “In response to current global events and to support the strategic goals outlined in the Army Transformation Initiative, the U.S. Army has decided to terminate the current low-rate initial production of the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle and will not proceed with full-rate production as initially planned.”
The press release also stated that any remaining M10 development and production funds for fiscal 2025 would be redirected to “accelerate the deployment of war-winning capabilities.”
What Was the M10 Booker?
The M10 was initially envisioned as a game-changer for the U.S. Army, which was engaged in sustained counterinsurgency operations, often in urban environments – a tracked armored vehicle designed to provide light infantry formations with direct fire capability against fortified positions and light armored threats.
While it certainly had powerful advocates at the time the program was launched, it also had its detractors – indeed, almost from day one, the M10 was the object of derision and skepticism.
To understand why the skeptics ultimately prevailed—and why the program was subsequently canceled—we must recognize that the decision wasn’t merely a matter of cost.
Instead, the skeptics prevailed because they were able to make the case that the Army needed weapons systems suited to the battlespace of tomorrow, rather than the battlespace of yesteryear.
This being the case, the issue at hand wasn’t whether terminating the M10 Booker program was the wrong move from a financial perspective, but whether it was a necessary one given the evolving nature of war and the predicted needs of the Army as it sought to adapt to that changing character.
So, we must consider a few specific criteria when addressing the question of necessity of the the M10: first, operational utility – or how practical this is liable to be in actual use in the field; second, cost – value for money; and third, whether the M10 platform could be adapted to make it relevant in the battlespace of the future.
Did It Make Sense?
Let’s begin with operational utility.
The M10 Booker was developed in response to what was perceived as a lack of weapons systems suited to fighting the kinds of wars the US was actually fighting at the time – counterinsurgency operations with a substantial urban warfare element.
But the character of war – and the broader geopolitical context within which American armed forces must fight and win – has changed.
The Army is now prioritizing high-intensity conflict with peer adversaries, where heavy armored capabilities are essential. In this context, the lightweight design and hybrid features of the M10 do not align with the Army’s strategic needs.
Not Light
Parenthetically, the original intention behind the Booker was to create a lightweight, agile armored vehicle capable of airdrops to locations inaccessible to standard tanks.
However, similar to the M2 Bradley, the M10’s development led to an increase in weight. The Booker ultimately reached 38 tons, which eliminated its airdrop capability.
Additionally, it became too heavy for transport on a Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft, and the initial plan to transport two units on a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III was also unfeasible, as only one could fit on that aircraft. Another reason for a rational evaluation process to recommend terminating the M10 program.
M10 Booker Cost
Next, let’s look at the M10 through the lens of cost efficiency. From the start, the M10 was intended to be a cost-effective replacement for armored personnel carriers.
However, as time passed and the vehicle’s design further evolved, it became increasingly expensive, and the anticipated savings were never realized.
Money is always a limited resource in procurement circles and, on a finite budget, choices – sometimes hard choices – have to be made. As the M10 failed the strategic relevance criterion is was natural to ask why further resources should be allocated to it over weapons systems actually suited to the evolving battlespace.
The resources recovered by terminating the M10, or so the thinking went, could subsequently be used to address more relevant strategic priorities, whether those priorities be enhancing the “lethality” of armored vehicle formations in the evolving battlespace, or in promoting “the Army of 2028 and beyond”.
The M10 Booker Was Never Going to Make It
Finally, addressing the third criterion, the M10 cannot be easily adjusted to the new geopolitical challenges which we face today – multipolarity and the return to great power competition chief among them.
With the shift from counter-insurgency and related forms of urban conflict to preparing for large-scale armed conflict against peer competitors, the M10 has simply been rendered irrelevant – and cannot be updated to meet the new demands of the evolving battlespace.
According to this criterion, it makes more sense to terminate this program and invest instead in brand-new weapons systems ideally suited to the evolving character of war and the shift to multi-polarity and great power competition.
It Had To Go…
Ultimately, canceling the M10 was the right decision, as it will enable the Army to focus on more advanced and capable systems that better align with modern tactical, operational, and strategic requirements. This decision isn’t limited to the M10. It is emblematic of a broader shift in how the Army wants to modernize and/or develop its future weapon systems.
The termination of the M10 is about reallocating scarce resources to projects that qualitatively enhance survivability, lethality, and operational utility in tomorrow’s battlespace. Such an evolution is essential in a military where technology is evolving rapidly and geopolitics are shifting profoundly.
Critics of the M10 cancellation argue that it served as a platform for experimentation and innovation within the Army. They contend that shutting down the project is demoralizing and stifles creativity, suppressing bold ideas.
However, it is crucial to recognize that practical innovation must be grounded in informed operational and strategic requirements. The Army has finite resources and must prioritize investments that yield the best returns in capability and readiness.
The Right Call on the M10 Booker
To conclude, then, the cancellation of the M10 is not a “mistake”. Instead, it is a pragmatic adaptation to changing geopolitical realities and strategic needs, all against the backdrop of finite budgetary resources and rapidly evolving technologies.
The hope is that the case of the M10 will act as a North Star for the Army as it makes its way, cautiously, prudently, yet decisively through the treacherous minefield of military and military-industrial preparedness for future war, ensuring that the United States military has what it needs to prevail in the battlespace of the future.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.
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July 23, 2025 at 1:19 pm
The M10 booker toting a 105mm gun is just what the doctors ordered for the coming pacific war.
But of course the DoD has always preferred heavy stuff.
Like the M1 tank.
The booker has its engine at the front just like What the doctors recommended.
Once the mushroom cliuds have dissipated, soldiers in enclosed armor with NCB protection will have to sally out to look for stragglers to finish them off.
To put them out of their misery.
You don’t need an M1 to do that. You need the booker Instead.