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Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive: One Giant Blunder?

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Like in Ukraine
Aerial drone image of Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews from the 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conducting Table XII gunnery at Fort Stewart, Ga. December 7, 2016.

Was the Ukrainian Kursk Incursion One Big Mistake?: It was bound to happen. One side would eventually break the stalemate and rush through an opening in the front lines in Ukraine. The Ukrainian army was the first to do so in the Kursk Oblast on August 6. The Ukrainians sent an estimated 1,000 troops with tanks and armored vehicles through a weak point in the Russian lines on the first day of the incursion.

The invasion was an initial success as Russian troops gave up and scattered or became prisoners. By the end of the first week, Ukraine controlled 390 square miles of Russian territory and later ended up with 500 square miles in gains.

But what happens next and can Kyiv keep the momentum going? That seems to be the question the entire world is asking–and the news is not all positive.

Kursk Offensive: Russia Paid the Price at First

Kursk was seen as a considerable triumph done with surprise and confidence. Ukraine finally had their breakthrough, and they were going to make Russia pay in territory, men, and material.

Ukraine could use the land they gained in Kursk (100 settlements, towns, and villages) as a jumping-off point to grab more territory from the Russians.

Hopefully, this would force the Russian army to bring in reinforcements from other parts of the front, weakening their overall defensive position.

Or, at least, that was the idea, according to many experts.

Zelensky Called a Blitz

Even though Ukraine set up an administrative body to hold the territory, the incursion had bogged down by the end of the month due to Russian conscripts making a stand to blunt the Ukrainian offensive.

Vladimir Putin had stopped the bleeding and did a curious thing. He ignored the Ukrainian gains and took advantage of the situation. To conduct the offensive in Kursk, Ukraine had used troops and armor from the Donetsk city of Pokrovsk. Much like a blitz in football, it creates an opportunity to focus an offensive play on the part of the field where the attacking player left open, the Russians pounced in Pokrovsk.

Key City Pokrovsk In Danger

Pokrovsk has an important road network and rail hub that Ukraine uses to move troops, ammunition, and other supplies in that part of the front. By August 4, Russia’s counter-attack placed pressure on that city. Meanwhile, the Russian army was striking back in Kursk and had regained territory east of Korenevo by September 2. They also built on gains in Donetsk to make Ukraine pay for their gambit in Kursk. According to the Institute for the Study of War, “Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions and southwest of Donetsk City.”

Now, the shoe is on the other foot. Ukraine is playing defense, and Russia is counter-attacking and making gains in Donetsk, while Putin’s forces are also on the comeback trail in Kursk.

Did Ukraine Make a Strategic Mistake?

This has raised criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He called a blitz, and the Russians reacted well. Should Ukraine have conducted the incursion of Kursk in the first place?

Zelensky was desperate for a win, and he achieved that. The Ukrainians should be credited for mass, initiative, and surprise, but they overplayed their hand. Russia was quick to recognize the weakness and acted accordingly in Donetsk.

Now the situation is tenuous in Pokrovsk. The Russians have seized the initiative and are advancing in both Kursk and Donetsk. Ukraine may have gained tactically in Kursk, although it appears that the incursion will turn out to be a strategic mistake if Russia wins Pokrovsk completely. But Kyiv needed some type of good news from the front and hitting Russia and taking territory was one way that Zelensky could show the world that Ukraine could punch a hole and punish the Russians inside their homeland. Putin decided to “deal with Ukraine later,” as the Center for European Policy Analysis described the situation.

Zelensky Did the Necessary Attack in Ukraine

It is still too early to determine whether the Kursk Ukrainian gambit was a masterstroke or a mistake. I side with Zelensky on the Kursk operation. Ukraine had to do it. It was a means to show that the friendly forces could break the stalemate. Ukrainian generals put together a solid plan and executed it well. Yes, they used troops that were on the frontlines in Donetsk, allowing Russia to strike back there, but Ukraine needed a tactical victory. Russia should be given credit, too, for eventually reacting strongly to the incursion and sending green troops into the void to stop the bleeding while counter-attacking in Donetsk.

Historians will likely point toward the Kursk incursion as a critical point of the war if Russia continues to counterattack successfully. Ukraine could be seen as becoming over-extended in Kursk and making a strategic mistake, or the Kursk incursion would be considered a critical win by Zelensky that gave a psychological boost to Ukrainian forces that had made no real gains during previous offensives. Ukraine has achieved a valuable buffer zone in Russia that could help give them a stronger position in future negotiations. National Security Journal will continue to update you on the war’s progress, and we will determine if the Kursk incursion will be deemed an ultimate success or failure.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

Brent M. Eastwood
Written By

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

15 Comments

15 Comments

  1. One-World-Order

    September 3, 2024 at 2:40 pm

    Giant blunder !

    But who planned it.Who ?

    The CIA in eastern europe, maybe, or Lloyd Austin’s inner circle who’re the most likely guys to zelenskyy to do Kursk.

    Recall Austin”s words in Feb 2024. “….if ukraine is defeated, NATO’ll be forced to fight Russia.”

    Now, to get ahead of the prediction, super duper big shots cajoled combat-skilled ukro units with M2s, M1s, Leopard 2s and HIMARS to roll across the border in an exact replay of manstein’s bold foray into Kursk in July ’43.

    On 5 July ’43, Germany’s Wehrmacht attempted to cut off the soviet Kursk bulge via two pincer strikes, one through Orel in the north, and another strike from belgorod in south led by fourth panzee army.

    The northern pincer stalled just after 4 days after it ran straight into new soviet 152mm tank destroyers & other equally tough opposition.

    The southern pincer continued moving forward, but on 12 July ’43, masses of Soviet t-34s charged at the Wehrmacht at a village called provhorovka, 80 km south of kuesk and 60km north of Belgorod.

    The clash resulted in near crippling losses for the massive Soviet force but it stopped the german panzer and infantry units in their tracks.

    So the German leader called off the operation as at the same time he had learned of allied units landing in Sicily.

    So, the 2024 Kursk strike is a big big blunder ! Just like in ’43. Now, all putin needs to do is flatten Kyiv and the other cities to finish off the job.

    • George

      September 5, 2024 at 8:06 am

      The battlefield is shaped by terrain, not armies, on the Steppe. Oh, and don’t forget General Zima (winter).

  2. Kevin McCrory

    September 4, 2024 at 10:11 am

    Me thinks you are way off base here. The Kursk region incursion continues. More towns taken from Russian troops. The main north south supply route is under Ukrainian artillery interdiction. The Ukrainians have access to the Russian rail system through the rail station they took. If you look at the Russian response, they’re digging trenches 45km behind the lines. Russian aircraft have been moved back further due to Ukrainian drone strikes on Jets, hangars and ammo dumps. Russian fuel depots keep getting nailed by drones and burn for weeks. Russia has no more ferries to bring supplies across the sea of Azov by the Kerch Bridge. Russia once again, can’t fight a maneuver war. And of course, the current administration is still hamstringing Ukraine with lack of supplies from actually winning this war that Russia started. Provide more ADA systems and missiles. Remove the red lines put in place on the use of artillery and rockets. Let Ukraine fully engage in a deep strike war to hamper Russia’s ability to attack. There also needs to be a stern warning to Putin that any use of nuclear weapons or destruction of nuclear power plants will cause an immediate nuclear response from the nuclear armed countries.

    • George

      September 5, 2024 at 8:08 am

      I think it’s funny how people get all excited about taking farmland where troops are easily found and destroyed as evidenced by all the video coming out.

  3. TIMOTHY FARLEY

    September 4, 2024 at 10:53 am

    This analysis is Risk level gaming analysis. Truly sad stuff. And to think you got a degree in it.

  4. I. Martin

    September 4, 2024 at 12:26 pm

    The usual propaganda in the comments. This is not complicated. Ukraine clearly took a chance and the author’s assessment is incomplete, but what is presented, is not wrong. Ukraine was correct to make the move it did, but it needed more of a plan. They should have swung around and into Belgorod much sooner. That would have been both a tactical and strategic victory that would have changed the battlefield, even if it ultimately failed. However, what they did was ultimately, little more than a distraction.

  5. HAT451

    September 4, 2024 at 1:15 pm

    The Ukrainian Kursk operation was tactically sound. Operationally it was high risk, and initially well planned for the first 72 hours, within the first few weeks that plan is no longer valid. I agree with the author that strategically it is starting to look like a strategic blunder for Ukraine.

    After 2-3 weeks after the start of the Kursk operation, it is starting to look like the Ukrainians do not have staying power to continue effective offensive operations. Their biggest issue is manpower. 2-3 weeks is also a realistic amount of time the Russians need to either deploy or redeploy sufficient forces to deal with Kursk.

    Ukraine’s biggest problem is they do not have enough willing and unwilling able bodied men of military age to fill the ranks of the killed and wounded. Compare this with what happened in Russia regarding voluntarism for military service. Prior to Kursk operation the Russians had about 1100 volunteers per day for combat operations in Ukraine. After Kursk the average is up to about 1700 per day. And this is on top of the mandatory conscription that that Russia has. This manpower problem for Ukraine started in late 2022, early 2023, and since then has been getting worst for Ukraine.

    What the Russians have done since after Kursk incursion is increased forces and in offensive operations along the entire front. There were some Russian redeployments to Kursk from the Ease, but there was also an operational / strategic reserve redeployed not only to Kursk but also other regions, where I estimate the ratio of Russians involved in the Ukraine and Kursk is about 1.5 to 1, in the Russians favor.

    According to some Russian military commentators in Russia, there are three hasty lines of defense belts established in the north, and the Russians emphasis is on establishing a massive kill box in Kursk. For the Ukrainians the choice is try and stay, sustaining massive losses in personnel and equipment or withdraw. By continuing to stay in the Kursk region, the Ukrainians are now fighting a war on Russia’s terms in the way that Russia prefers to fight, with what they refer to as mobile defense to attrit the opposing forces.

    This is still too early to tall who was right and who was wrong. Once the war is over, and we start analyzing what happened with accurate data we will then truly know if this operation by Ukraine was prudent or effective.

  6. Tim aaron

    September 4, 2024 at 2:48 pm

    Ukraine needed a PR gain for continued ally support. I failed because there is no ‘part 2’…now what? No Western government will dare to praise any seizure of Russian territory as it’s a a terrible precedent. It’s also a failure domestically because Ukrainians want an end to the nightmare and not ‘More of the same’ with even greater Russian retaliation against Ukrainian infrastructure.

    Ukrainian cities will now be targets. As Winter approaches expect a couple million more refugees heading West. When refugees head West, they never return. When thr conflict ends men will join their families in the West and not the reverse. Ukrainian society will be even more devastated.

  7. mawendt

    September 4, 2024 at 3:18 pm

    A very poor, non-military analysis.

    Kevin McCrory addressed the basic benefits: effects against Russian supply and air.

    The very key thing to keep in mind when considering the Ukraine-Russian war is that Russia has lost almost a quarter of it’s ground forces in less than 900 days, over a billion USD a month in lost oil and gas revenues, and nearly 6 billion USD in infrastructure, much of it oil and gas – in a Special Military Operation the Russian army assured Putin wouldn’t take more than two weeks.

    Russia has lost over 5500 main battle tanks, and has only consistently been able to build about 20 new ones a month. It’ll take over 270 months – 22 years – for them to rebuild their armor reserves. And there are plenty of other critical war systems and equipment Russia has lost they have to replace.

    Ukraine *might* ‘lose’ in some way, but the Russian military has been crippled for decades, as well as lost face internationally by getting their ass handed to them, showing tremendous incompetence in tactics, strategy, cohesion, and the like. As well as having a reputation of having crappy military equipment compared to the West.

    I’d say if Ukraine continues for another year, Russia will have internal issues that will collapse Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine. Look and see the cracks now. They ain’t gonna get better.

    If the West continues to supply and support Ukraine, it’d be the cheap price to pay to get a less aggressive Russia.

    • Mannerheim

      September 6, 2024 at 6:13 am

      “Less aggressive Russia”? What are you smoking? Because I want some of it. This war on the contrary makes Russia much MORE aggressive and much more powerful and dangerous. Russian society is now militarized, war production has been enormously expanded, the size of the Russian military has been greatly expanded, has now been tested in battle and improved, and they now regard us as their mortal enemies. The world is a FAR more dangerous place than it was before the war. Putin is the principal villain here, of course, but we bear a huge amount of responsibility for stoking the flames of this conflict and then failing to stop it. And we will pay the price. War and conflict begets only more and more war and conflict.

  8. A

    September 4, 2024 at 3:50 pm

    Based on this author’s assertion, I am strongly confident Ukraine has made the right move.

  9. TrustbutVerify

    September 4, 2024 at 4:08 pm

    I think the mistake is that it was launched too far west and was disconnected from other operations. The tactical and strategic advantage of moving further east would have been the ability to quickly cut of GLOCs to Russian troops in the East of Ukraine and get behind the Russians static defenses for an attack in their rear areas – rolling up the northern flank and relieving pressure in the East. This seems like a half measure, like Monty’s small envelopment in the Battle of the Bulge counterattack vs Patton/Bradley wanting to attack the shoulder and trap all the Germans. The question is whether the Ukrainians could have mustered more forces for a focused counter offensive of this scale…maybe they did what they could. Still should have been further east to threaten the GLOCs.

    They do have a chance, now, however. The Russians are focused on Pokrovsk…they have concentrated forces and have an objective. They don’t adapt very well in the field and follow old orders in changing conditions. I would set up a kill sack and locate mobile forces north and south of Pokrovsk. Give them a “breakthrough” and channel it into the kill box. Hit them in the nose, freeze them in place, then cut them off with the maneuver forces. Once you have them cut off, pound them with indirect fires and turn your forces back down the Russian axis of advance (cleared of mines and such for their advance) and push hard – have the gas and ammo and follow on forces in place.

  10. Carl Elwell

    September 5, 2024 at 7:39 am

    My only ?, does dr Eastwood have any military experience or is he book read passing as experience?

  11. George

    September 5, 2024 at 8:03 am

    One of these days people will realize the Steppe is one big chessboard and Russians are masters of the game. You never heard that Pawns are expendable for strategic purposes, no?

  12. Pingback: Would North Korea Really Send 100,000 Troops to Fight in Ukraine? - NationalSecurityJournal

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