Can Arms Control Be Saved?

Arms Control: Will Trump Save or Destroy It? 

One of the great tragedies flowing from the onset of a second Cold War between the West and Russia has been the destruction of the global arms control system.

Much of that damage occurred during Donald Trump’s first administration as a result of Washington’s callous or myopic policies toward Moscow.

In his second term, Trump has both the opportunity and the moral obligation to repair at least some of the damage.

However, even with the best of intentions, it would be a slow process, and some initiatives would need to address additional problems that emerged during Joe Biden’s administration.

U.S. leaders must focus on what is attainable in the short term, not necessarily what is most desirable in the long term.

The State of Arms Control Then and Now 

When Trump entered the White House for the first time in January 2017, there were several central pillars of a strategic arms control system, with measures to reduce the danger of a military confrontation between Moscow and Washington at the forefront.

One key agreement was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) which went into effect in 1987, when the Soviet Union still existed. That measure limited the number of provocative, potentially destabilizing weapons.

The same was true of the Open Skies agreement, which established much greater transparency regarding the deployment or movement of bombers or ballistic missiles by either superpower.

Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from both of those tension-reducing measures was extremely unhelpful.

Although Washington’s actions under both Trump and Biden did the most damage to features of the global arms control system involving Russia, that effect was not the only negative consequence.

For example, Washington’s withdrawal in May 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral agreement designed to limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful uses, greatly exacerbated tensions with Tehran.

Iran’s missile capabilities. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The escalating dispute eventually resulted in Washington’s military strikes in June 2025 using B-2 stealth bombers against Iranian nuclear installations.

The North Korea Example 

The Trump and Biden administrations also stubbornly refused to acknowledge officially that North Korea is a nuclear weapons power, despite abundant evidence that the Pyongyang regime has that status.

Indeed, experts at the U.S. Arms Control Association estimate that North Korea has assembled approximately 50 nuclear warheads.  The DPRK also is building an increasingly capable ballistic missile system to deliver such weapons.

Worse, there is growing evidence that Pyongyang already has tested missiles that have sufficient range to reach the continental United States.

The longstanding U.S. demand that Pyongyang return to nuclear virginity has become increasingly detached from reality.

Hwasong-20 ICBM. Image Credit: North Korea State Media.

It is long past time for Washington to abandon its utopian agenda and accept the reality, however unpleasant, that North Korea is a nuclear weapons power.

North Korean officials no longer even bother pretending that they are willing to negotiate about rescinding or limiting their country’s nuclear program.

In April, Kim Yo-jong, North Korea dictator Kim Jong-un’s sister and powerful adviser, made that point very explicit.

Washington’s willful blindness about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, along with a continuing refusal to establish economic or even diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, is creating yet another front in the growing global crisis for the decaying strategic nuclear arms control system.

What Should Happen 

The impact of all these corrosive developments is why adopting some difficult, potentially frustrating priorities is necessary.

Ideally, restoration of both the INF treaty and the Open Skies agreement should take place immediately.

So should a lengthy extension (not just a one-year extension as proposed by Vladimir Putin) of the New START agreement be adopted.  That crucial treaty caps the number of ICBMs at 1,550 for each side, and the numerical limitation needs to be retained along with restraints on the modernization of nuclear weapons systems.

But given the wretched state of relations between the United States and Russia, such major achievements are unlikely to take place in the short term.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. Image is of a Russian missile being tested.

Likewise, the chances of a significant breakthrough to reduce tensions between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear issue are not good.

Prospects are just minimally better for recognizing nuclear realities with respect to North Korea and moving to normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

How to Move Forward

Focusing on the attainable, for example, means proposing to Moscow that New START be extended by at least 3 years and that negotiations commence on a new INF treaty.

A prudent, limited agenda means that Washington would finally agree to ratify the 1996 Global Nuclear Test Ban Treaty CTBT) (which U.S. leaders should have done many years ago) if Moscow reverses its 2023 decision to rescind Russia’s ratification.

In pushing through the de-ratification measure, Putin said that he merely sought to “mirror” the U.S. position.

Although the United States signed the treaty in 1996, it never ratified the document.  Russia’s repudiation of its previous position, though, underscored the growing estrangement of Moscow and Washington on arms control as well as on a host of other issues.

There is also potential for limited progress in security relations with Pyongyang.

Moreover, the urgency to do so is nearly as great as easing the toxic confrontation with Russia.

Establishing a high-quality hotline for emergencies and initiating a bilateral strategic dialogue are initiatives with at least some potential for success, and the Trump administration should seriously explore both.

Why It Matters

Repairing a badly damaged global arms control system will be both difficult and time-consuming, even with the best intentions.

Retaining the previous, albeit imperfect, arrangements would have been far easier and more rewarding.

But stubborn, short-sighted U.S. policymakers chose otherwise, and we must now begin the cleanup process or watch the world careen toward an existential crisis.

Taking even small steps would at least get us moving away from the abyss.

About the Author: Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a contributing editor at The National Security Journal and The American Conservative.  He is the author of 13 books and more than 1,500 articles on national security, international affairs, and civil liberties.  His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

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